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Resumo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A presente tese tem como objetivo identificar as causas que estão na origem de uma 
crescente segmentação no mercado de trabalho, nomeadamente a que é caracterizada 
por uma precarização da situação laboral dos jovens. Começa-se por argumentar que 
as explicações baseadas numa suposta rigidez do mercado de trabalho devido a uma 
elevada proteção no emprego para os insiders ou as explicações baseadas na 
existência de uma dicotomia crescente entre o setor industrial e o dos serviços não 
conseguem explicar porque é que em alguns países europeus são sobretudo os jovens 
que são os outsiders. Em resposta a esta questão, argumenta-se que uma elevada 
conflitualidade social (devido à existência de um sistema de relações laborais 
descoordenado ou ao processo de liberalização) e uma baixa proporção de empregos 
no setor primário do mercado de trabalho constituem a força motriz deste processo. 
Adicionalmente, também se defende que, embora a elevada proteção no emprego 
agrave a segmentação porque reforça o poder dos grupos com mais poder político, a 
elevada proteção no emprego não constitui isoladamente uma condição suficiente 
para que o processo ocorra. 
 A parte empírica deste trabalho utiliza duas metodologias distintas: o fsQCA e 
uma análise comparada de dois estudos de caso. A análise com o fsQCA corrobora o 
argumento teórico e as hipóteses formuladas, e mostra que é nos países da Europa do 
Sul e Anglo-Saxónicos que este processo está mais presente. A análise comparada dos 
dois setores de atividade mostra que enquanto nas telecomunicações os jovens foram 
especialmente afetados pela precarização das condições de trabalho, uma situação 
semelhante não ocorreu no setor da fabricação de veículos automóveis.      
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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis aims to identify the causes that have led to growing labour market 
segmentation, particularly the one characterized by a precarious labour situation of 
young people. We begin by claiming that arguments based on a supposed rigidity of 
the labour market due to high employment protection for insiders or arguments based 
on a growing dichotomy between the industrial core and the service sector cannot 
explain why, in some European countries, outsiders are mainly young labour market 
participants. To address this puzzle, it is argued that high social conflict (due to the 
existence of an uncoordinated system of industrial relations or liberalization) and a 
small proportion of primary sector jobs are the driving forces of this process. In 
addition, we also argue that, even though high employment protection aggravates 
segmentation because it reinforces the power of those with more political power, high 
employment protection alone is not sufficient for the process to occur.  
The empirical part of this study uses two different methodologies: fsQCA and 
a comparative analysis of two case studies. The fsQCA analysis supports the 
theoretical argument and hypotheses, and shows that it is in Southern and Anglo-
Saxon countries that this process is more present. A comparative analysis of the two 
sectors shows that while in telecommunications young people have been particularly 
affected by more precarious working conditions, a similar process did not occur in the 
vehicle manufacturing industries.  
 
 
 
Keywords: automotive sector, case studies, labour market institutions, liberalization, 
QCA, segmentation, social conflict, telecommunications sector, youth.  
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1 Introduction  
 
 
 
 
 
As a direct consequence of the global economic crisis, millions of jobs have been lost 
and unemployment has soared in many European countries. In the EU-15, from 2008 
to 2012, the unemployment rate increased by 3.5 percentage points (Table 1.1). 
However, national labour markets reacted in different ways (Lallement 2011): 
whereas the unemployment rate increased by 13.8 percentage points in Spain; in 
Germany it has decreased 2.0 percentage points and in Belgium it has increased only 
0.6 percentage points. On the other hand, the rise of unemployment has particularly 
affected younger generations (OECD 2010; ILO 2012). Before the crisis the 
unemployment rate for young people was already higher than that for adults (25-55 
years). In 2008 the youth/adult unemployment ratio was 2.6 in the EU-27, i.e. the 
unemployment rate among young people was 2.6 times higher than the 
unemployment rate between adults. However, the crisis has put even greater pressure 
on this problem, ‘the 2008-2009 recession and the resulting jobs crisis had a dramatic 
impact on youth unemployment. In OECD area, the youth unemployment rate reached 
a post-war high of 19% in 2010’ (OECD 2010, p. 23). Moreover, unemployment 
among young people grew faster than among adults (OECD 2010, p. 14; Liddle and 
Diamond 2010, pp. 76-77; Scarpetta et al. 2010, p. 11; Chung et al. 2012).  
With the economic crisis and an increase in unemployment rates in several 
countries, youth unemployment has reached historically high levels in Southern 
Europe. In 2012 the youth unemployment rate reached 53.2 per cent in Spain, 55.3 in 
Greece, 37.7 in Portugal, and 35.3 in Italy (Table 1.1). Furthermore, using a broader 
definition of young people (Chung et al. 2012), we see that among those aged 25 to 
29 years the unemployment rate is also higher, i.e. the problem is not seen only in the 
transition from school-to-work.   
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Given this fact, unemployment among young people has been brought to 
public attention at the European level (European Commission 2010). 1 However, as it 
will be argued throughout this thesis, youth unemployment is only one part of the 
story. The spread of flexible contract arrangements and the spread of low paid jobs 
have affected the younger generations across the past two decades and therefore, in 
the scope of the global economic downturn, have contributed to an unsustainable 
situation in the labour market position of young people (youth unemployment is just 
the tip of the iceberg). Youth unemployment is a serious problem, but in our view it is 
crucial to go further to explain why youth have seen such deterioration in their labour 
market position over the past two decades, especially in Southern Europe.  
 
 
Table 1.1 – Unemployment rate by age group 
 15-24 25-29 30-34 15-64 
 2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012  2008 2012  
EU-15 15.4 22.2 8.9 14.1 6.9 11.4 7.2 10.7 
Austria 8.0 8.7 4.8 5.8 3.6 3.9 3.9 4.4 
Belgium 18.0 19.8 9.0 11.1 7.1 8.0 7.0 7.6 
Denmark 8.0 14.1 3.4 11.0 3.7 8.2 3.5 7.7 
Finland 16.5 19.0 6.7 8.9 5.0 6.2 6.4 7.8 
France 18.6 23.8 9.2 12.9 6.7 9.6 7.4 9.9 
Germany 10.6 8.1 8.4 6.5 7.7 5.5 7.6 5.6 
Greece 22.1 55.3 13.1 37.5 8.7 27.5 7.8 24.5 
Ireland 12.7 30.4 6.8 17.3 5.4 14.1 6.1 15.0 
Italy 21.3 35.3 11.0 17.9 7.3 12.5 6.8 10.8 
Netherlands 5.3 9.5 2.2 5.5 1.8 4.4 2.7 5.3 
Portugal 16.4 37.7 10.8 20.1 7.0 16.5 8.1 16.4 
Spain 24.6 53.2 13.6 32.2 10.6 25.3 11.4 25.2 
Sweden 20.2 23.6 6.7 9.5 4.7 6.4 6.3 8.1 
United Kingdom 15.0 21.0 5.7 8.7 4.6 6.4 5.7 8.0 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey. Extracted on 26 March 2014. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For example, the British newspaper ‘The Observer’ on Sunday 29th January 2012 had the following 
headline: ‘Despair of “lost generation” sparks EU leaders to action’ (The Observer, 29 January 2012). 
More recently, ‘The Economist’ dedicated its first page to this issue: ‘Generation jobless: The global 
rise of youth unemployment’ (The Economist, 27 April 2013). Interestingly, both articles pay particular 
attention to the Southern European case. 
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1.1 The research puzzle  
Recent research in the field of comparative political economy has pointed to a 
growing inequality across the Western European world. While some authors have 
underlined the process of liberalization (Streeck 2009), others have pinpointed the 
process of dualization as the main driver of change (Emmenneger et. al. 2012). While 
the former constitutes a powerful critique to the varieties of capitalism (VoC) 
approach (Hall and Soskice 2001), the latter attempts to show how change is 
constrained by an attempt to maintain a set of institutional comparative advantages 
(very much in line with the VoC framework).  
The liberalization literature is an institutional theory of capitalism rather than 
of its varieties, and tries to capture the logic that structures the process of change in all 
capitalist economies (Streeck 2009, Chapter 17). In Streeck’s (2009, p. 130) point of 
view ‘the concept of capitalism draws our attention to a core process of market 
expansion and accumulation. Moreover, it also and at the same time moves into the 
center of analysis the fundamental issue of the compatibility of expanding markets 
with the basic requirements of social integration, thereby providing a coherent 
analytical framework in which to consider the manifold social conflicts associated 
with the “capitalist constant” (…) of progressive commodification’. The concept of 
capitalism is based on three building blocks. Firstly, it expands the historical 
institutionalist theory of institutional change (Streeck and Thelen 2005) by arguing 
that change in all capitalist economies is towards liberalization. This is so because 
‘differential resource endowment under capitalism works in favour of interests in the 
liberalization of social obligations, imparting on gradual institutional change a bias 
towards disorganization unless counteracted by political intervention’ (Streeck 2009, 
p. 241). Secondly, drawing on Polanyi’s (1944) ‘double movement’ of market 
expansion and market containment thesis, Streeck emphasizes the intrinsic conflictual 
and evolutionary logic of the capitalist system and criticizes the functionalist bias 
towards cooperation and equilibrium. Thirdly, Streeck explains coordination in the 
‘coordinated market economies’ as an unintended consequence of the conflict 
between market expansion and market containment, since, in his view, ‘capitalist 
inventiveness is capable of using institutions for economizing, for example in 
transaction costs, that had originally been intended to serve very different objectives, 
including not least market breaking ones’ (2009, p. 257). In short, by emphasizing the 
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need to bring capitalism back in, Streeck stresses the similarities between capitalist 
economies and its conflictual and evolutionary logic. Notwithstanding, as is discussed 
in the next chapter, liberalization is not necessarily identical with de-
institutionalization, and important differences between countries may remain. 
The second approach (Palier and Thelen 2010; Emmenegger et al. 2012a, pp. 
10-16) recognizes that the structural pressures (globalization, deindustrialization and 
the feminization of employment) triggered by the twilight of the industrial era in the 
early 1980s have jeopardized the former mechanisms of redistribution; however, in 
contrast to liberalization scholars, they argue that the current era is characterized by 
dualization, a political process that is becoming a structural feature of our times. In 
fact, Emmenegger et al. (2012a, pp. 10-16) advocate that dualization is a process ‘in 
which politically and economically stronger groups are using their power resources to 
insulate themselves from the negative effects of [the] structural pressures, and in 
which governments make deliberative choices in favour or against outsiders. Thereby, 
changes in the labour market are translated into the social policy realm, where new 
distinctions arise or old institutional distinctions are re-activated … dualization 
implies that policies increasingly differentiate rights, entitlements, and services 
provided to different categories of recipients. Thereby, the position of insiders may 
remain more or less constant, while only the position of outsiders deteriorates.’ By 
emphasizing the role of policies, this theory stresses that the dualization process does 
not imply that all countries will necessarily experience high levels of insider-outsider 
divides. They argue that the existing differences between regimes (Esping-Andersen 
1990) illustrate how dualization is reinforced by some policies whereas others may 
tackle it (e.g. when outsider policies are relatively generous).  
To explain the causes of the changes in the labour market (the structural 
drivers), the dualization literature draws on the work of Palier and Thelen (2010, 
2012). Palier and Thelen argue that the attempt to save the ‘core manufacturing 
economy’ has been the main driver of dualization in Continental Europe. The authors 
claim that reforms during the 1980s and 1990s shrank the industrial sector and 
therefore allowed the expansion of new types of jobs in the outside, giving rise to the 
emergence of a secondary labour market. To maintain a set of comparative 
institutional advantages, coordination between capital and labour was kept within the 
‘core manufacturing industry’ (thus preserving a number of stable and well 
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remunerated jobs), but the expansion of the secondary sector contributed to the spread 
of poor jobs.  
 As regards the insider-outsider divides, several authors have pointed out that 
post-industrial labour markets have downplayed the position of young people, women 
and the low skilled (Esping-Andersen 1999a, p. 306; Bonoli 2006, p. 3; Oliveira, 
Carvalho and Veloso 2011, p. 163; Emmenegger et al. 2012a, pp. 6-7; Häusermann 
and Schwander 2012, p. 29). This can be explained by the fact that younger 
generations hold a much weaker position in the labour market and are therefore 
endowed with few power resources. Indeed, as Price at al. noted ‘young people have 
less experience in employment relationships and less capacity to bargain with 
employers, relative to their adult counterparts, based on endemic disparities of power’ 
(2011, p. 4).  
 Taking into account the fact that post-industrial labour markets are 
characterized by a growing number of jobs in services and by the fact that these jobs 
are more insecure and less regulated by collective arrangements than jobs in the 
manufacturing sector, it is not surprising that young people are more vulnerable to 
this process and therefore more penalized. On the other hand, by comparing two 
different historical époques (deruralization and deindustrialization), Esping-Andersen 
(1999, pp. 298-299) highlights an interesting fact: even though factory and 
construction job growth were very high during the process of deruralization 
(absorbing a large number of workers formerly employed in the agricultural sector), 
this does not fully explain why youth and women faced few problems during that 
period. Compared with deindustrialization, labour supply growth was lower during 
deruralization. Indeed, pressure from the new entrants (as a result of the small 1930s 
cohorts) and from women (at that time predominantly still outside the labour market) 
was lower. In summary, deindustrialization with its consequences in terms of job 
quality, together with a high number of new entrants and women in the labour market, 
contributed to insider-outsider divides that disproportionately affected women and the 
young people.   
 The weaker position of youth in the labour market would be less problematic 
if individuals only experienced this situation for a short period of time, i.e. if it was 
only a transitory stage. Esping-Andersen (1999, p. 294) defends this view and argues 
that ‘we should be cautious in believing that such trends [towards growing insider-
outsider divides] create class structure’. Recent studies have challenged Esping-
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Andersen’s optimistic perspective by considering that while in some countries the 
labour market position of the young people is a transitory stage, in others it tends to 
become more persistent over time (Lodovici 2000; Blanchard 2006, p. 12; 
Ebbinghaus 2006a, p. 125; Chauvel 2010; Häusermann and Schwander 2012). 2 
Häusermann and Schwander (2012, p. 34) identify different patterns of dualization, 
claiming that ‘in the Nordic and Continental countries, gender is the most important 
criterion, while in the Southern European regime, outsiderness concerns mostly young 
labour market participants, and in the Liberal countries, outsiders are predominantly 
found among the low-skilled’. In their analysis, Häusermann and Schwander show 
that in Southern Europe 59.7% of young people (those under 40 years old) are 
outsiders while in other regimes younger people are much less affected (31%; 21.8% 
and 33.8% in Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and Continental Europe respectively). Chauvel 
(2010) supports these conclusions by arguing that differences between age groups are 
higher in Southern Europe and France. The author provides data on the earnings of 
the different age groups in France and concludes that ‘in 1977, the earnings gap 
between age groups 30-35 and 50-55 was 15%, the gap is now about 40%’. 
Furthermore, by comparing France, the United States and Italy, Chauvel (2010, pp. 
32-33) argues that ‘France and Italy show profound redistributions of living standards 
to the profit of seniors and at the expense of younger and mid-aged adults whereas 
Denmark and the US face no massive transformations’.        
Thus, in Southern Europe age plays a crucial role in describing the existing 
divides in the labour market. It is not the dichotomy between jobs in the 
manufacturing sector versus jobs in services, nor divides within the service sector 
between high-skilled versus low-skilled jobs that mainly characterizes the situation in 
Southern European countries. 
 Our puzzle relies precisely on this paradox. Given its emphasis on efficiency 
(inspired by the VoC approach), the dualization literature (Emmenegger et al. 2012a) 
does not consider explanations based on age. Indeed, by arguing that the process of 
dualization began with the attempt to save the ‘core manufacturing economy’, Palier 
and Thelen (2010) point to efficiency as the main driver of labour market reforms, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Although emphasising the optimistic perspective, Esping-Andersen has also pointed out that in the 
1990s the rates of long-term youth unemployment were two to three times higher in Germany, France 
and Italy than in the Nordic countries or the United States (1999, p. 304).  
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given that comparative advantages would otherwise be undermined. 3 In Southern 
Europe however, it seems that the opposite has occurred, especially if we take into 
consideration the consequences of the existing divides. Indeed, age dualities have 
contributed (especially during the crisis) to a dramatic increase in youth 
unemployment in Southern European countries. This situation has short and medium 
term consequences for the sustainability of the welfare state (Chauvel 2010, p. 26), to 
the extent that it has an impact on contributions to social security, given that an 
increase in unemployment raises social protection expenditure and diminishes 
contributions. Delaying the entrance of young people into the labour market, and the 
type of contract under which they are employed (precarious work) both have a 
negative influence on fertility rates, which worsens the problem of an ageing 
population (Chung et al. 2012, p. 315). If we take into account the fact that the 
younger generations are comparatively more educated, the situation becomes even 
more dramatic, due to the waste of productive potential. The constraints discussed 
above, together with the fact that a huge proportion of young people have inadequate 
jobs for their level of education, are jeopardizing the future of these countries.   
 
 
1.2 The argument in brief 
The core argument of this thesis is that the tendency to see institutions as ‘guardians’ 
of efficiency (as rationalist scholars often do) has concealed crucial features of some 
countries and neglected the conflictual logic of the capitalist system. In our view, this 
has contributed to a lack of understanding of the growing age-based labour market 
inequalities. To overcome these problems, it is crucial to highlight the distinctive 
characteristics of the industrial relations system in some countries and to place greater 
emphasis on liberalization. Finally, it is also because some countries lack what Palier 
and Thelen (2010) have called the ‘core manufacturing economy’ that a growing 
number of outsiders among young people exist. It is the combination of these three 
factors (the existence of different patterns of interest intermediation, liberalization, 
and the absence of a ‘core manufacturing economy’) that leads to the process of 
dualization as generational layering. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Hall (2007) and Iversen and Soskice (2009) point to efficiency to explain change as well. 
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The functioning of the industrial relations system in European countries 
diverges: while more cooperative relations between social partners characterize 
Continental and Scandinavian countries, more conflictual relations historically typify 
Southern Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries. Colin Crouch (1993, pp. 61–62) 
analyzed how the industrial relations system evolved between 1870 and 1990 in a 
large set of European countries and stressed the existence of three ideal types of 
interest intermediation: (i) contestative relations, (ii) pluralist collective bargaining, 
and (iii) neo-corporatism. It is well documented that contestative relations 
characterize Southern Europe, pluralist relations the Anglo-Saxon countries, and neo-
corporatism Continental and Scandinavian countries (Ebbinghaus 2006b, p. 69; 
Molina and Rhodes 2007; Lima and Naumann 2011). 
The conflictual logic of some industrial relations systems is problematic to the 
dualization framework given the emphasis that this literature places on cooperation. It 
is at the very least debatable to suggest that trade unions, which historically followed 
a class struggle approach, guide their behaviour on the basis of strategic coordination 
with the employers of the core manufacturing economy. In our opinion, a different 
point must be highlighted: in countries with poor coordination between labour and 
capital, the limited union density led unions to represent their members first and 
foremost and to neglect the remaining workers (i.e., to protect workers with more 
political power rather than those in a weaker position), through a process of 
confrontation rather than cooperation with employers. Since younger generations are 
less unionized and therefore have less political power, this process has affected them 
in particular (Lima and Artiles 2013, pp. 351-352).  
Furthermore, social conflict can also result from market expansion, as 
liberalization scholars have emphasized. The liberalization literature, as an 
institutional theory of capitalism, emphasizes the communalities between countries 
rather than their distinctions and criticizes the functionalist’s assumptions on which 
the VoC relies (Streeck 2009). Drawing on Polanyi’s (1944) ‘double movement’ of 
market expansion and market containment thesis, Streeck argues that change in all 
capitalist economies is driven by a process of market expansion and by the social 
conflicts associated with it. This emphasis on the conflictual logic of the capitalist 
system (Streeck 2009, pp. 5–6), is very much in line with the point we stressed above: 
politics plays a crucial role in countries with more conflictual relations since insiders 
are the ones who are more organized (and hold more political power), rather than 
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those with more specific skills. The social countermovements have protected these 
workers more, but this is neither an efficient nor a stable solution. The two factors – 
poor coordination in the industrial relations system and the liberalization process – 
can be synthesized under what we call fertile breeding grounds for social conflict 
because both market expansion and a conflictual industrial relations system are 
conducive to social conflict. Social conflict has a negative effect on young people 
because, as mentioned above, they hold less political power.  
Besides its emphasis on social conflict, the literature on liberalization is 
crucial for an additional reason. Above, we argued that conflictual relations between 
social partners and market expansion are conducive to social conflict, but we did not 
explain why older people were able to obtain more stable jobs in the past. To shed 
light on this, it is necessary to first clarify how Streeck defines liberalization.  
Against some misconceptions, liberalization does not claim the end of 
strategic coordination between capital and labour in ‘coordinated market economies’ 
and does not argue that all capitalist economies are converging towards the ‘liberal 
market economy’ model. As for the role of institutions, Streeck (2009, p. 158) clearly 
notes that ‘while liberalization sometimes does create atomistic markets, or aims to 
create them, it is not in principle hostile to institutions, provided their purpose is 
confined to making markets, or making them more efficient’. What Streeck does 
defend is that the German political economy underwent a process of liberalization that 
led to a shift from organized to disorganized capitalism (rather than from a 
coordinated to an uncoordinated system – from Streeck’s point of view, coordination 
may go hand-in-hand with disorganization), the first being characterized by what he 
calls Durkheimian institutions and the latter by Williamsonian ones (Streeck 2009, 
Chapter 11). According to Streeck (2009, pp. 154–155): ‘Durkheimian institutions 
authoritatively constitute an obligatory public order that in principle exists apart from 
and beyond the choosing of those subject to it. To them they are “social facts”: a 
constraining external reality that they are not in principle free to adopt, reject, or 
change [while] (…) Williamson institutions, by contrast, are devices for nonmarket 
though market-responsive and indeed market-driven coordination of economic 
behaviour. They are purposely and voluntarily constructed by market participants to 
increase the efficiency of their exchanges.’ Therefore, the shift from organized to 
disorganized capitalism is characterized by the shift from Durkheimian institutions to 
Williamsonian institutions.   
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By distinguishing organization and coordination, and arguing that 
liberalization is a process characterized by a shift from organized to disorganized 
capitalism (rather than a shift from a coordinated to an uncoordinated system), 
Streeck shows that coordination is compatible with market expansion, provided such 
coordination comes about voluntarily and from below. There are, however, countries 
(e.g., in Southern Europe) where coordination is almost absent. As a consequence, the 
impact of the shift from an organized to a disorganized capitalism is stronger. In 
Southern Europe, a large part of stable jobs were created in the public sector (rather 
than in the ‘core manufacturing economy’), both due to the great expansion of the 
welfare state during the 1980s and the existence of a large number of state-owned 
enterprises (Ferner 1994, p. 57; Chauvel 2010, p. 25). The privatizations of these 
enterprises and the cuts in public services have reduced the share of these jobs. This 
explains why older people were able to find more stable jobs in the past.  
Finally, by arguing that the dualization framework is particularly well suited 
to explaining the situation in Continental European countries, we do not mean that the 
emphasis on differences between the primary and the secondary sector is useless for 
understanding the situation in Southern Europe. In our view, that emphasis is 
important, but for a different reason. We argue that it is also because some countries 
lack what Palier and Thelen (2010) have called the ‘core manufacturing economy’ 
that a growing number of outsiders among young people exist. Indeed, while in 
Continental Europe the manufacturing sector still provides access to a large number 
of stable jobs, the same does not apply to the Mediterranean regime. The number of 
jobs in the core sectors of the public economy was already falling before the 
sovereign debt crisis, but the levels afterwards plummeted. Indeed, together with 
austerity policies in the public sector, the massive process of privatization of public 
enterprises that has taken place since the 1980s (coinciding with the accession to the 
European Economic Community) has also contributed to reducing the power of 
unions, as well as the share of workers covered by stable work arrangements. The 
new generations entering the labour market after/during this process have been 
severely affected. The deterioration of the position of young people on the labour 
market is therefore directly related to the spread of poor jobs. 
Taking these two factors together – fertile breeding grounds for social conflict, 
and the absence of a ‘core manufacturing economy’ –, we argue that the process of 
change in Southern Europe is therefore best described as change through layering: 
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while the core labour force has remained protected, the fringes have been affected the 
most. Given the characteristics of the industrial relations system, a radical and abrupt 
change towards liberalization is difficult to implement in Southern Europe, as 
contestative relations constrain labour market reforms. However, transformation can 
occur without disruption (Thelen 1999). Streeck and Thelen (2005) built a powerful 
theory to explain institutional change and stressed the importance of incremental 
change with transformative results. They highlighted the existence of at least five 
broad modes of gradual but nevertheless transformative change (displacement, 
layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion). We believe that change through layering 
is the most accurate way to classify the process of labour market adjustment in 
Southern Europe. For Streeck and Thelen (2005, pp. 23–24), ‘change through layering 
can set in motion path-altering dynamics through a mechanism of what we might 
think of as differential growth. (…) Layering involves active sponsorship of 
amendments, additions, or revisions to an existing set of institutions.’ This was 
precisely what happened in Southern Europe. Although no structural changes took 
place regarding employees with permanent contracts and covered by collective 
agreements, massive changes were implemented outside this core. By resisting 
policies aiming to make the labour market more flexible, unions have been able to 
protect their core constituencies (in contrast to Continental Europe, protected workers 
are found not in the ‘core manufacturing economy’, but where the strength of trade 
unions is higher, i.e. in the core sectors of the public economy). As a consequence, 
gradually, from the 1990s onwards, a new labour market was created, characterized 
by the expansion of a secondary labour market, where fixed-term contracts, low paid-
jobs, and low union density are its main features. 
 
 
1.3 An overview of the study 
This study has been organized in the following way. The second chapter sets out the 
theoretical framework, the third chapter explains why Fuzzy Set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is used in the scope of this thesis, the fourth chapter 
contains the main results of the fsQCA analysis, and the fifth chapter contrasts two 
case studies, the telecommunications and vehicle manufacturing sectors, to explain 
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why dualization as generational layering captures well the transformations that are 
taking place in Southern European labour markets.  
  The analytical framework is presented in the second chapter. This chapter is 
composed of four sections. The first deals with the debate over the different variants 
of institutionalism and argues that seeing institutions only as drivers of efficiency 
(and therefore of stability) contains several pitfalls that may undermine a thorough 
analysis of institutional change. To overcome the rationalist bias of much of the 
existing institutionalist literature, the second section reviews the historical 
institutionalist theory concerning the problem of change. The third section reviews the 
literature on labour market segmentation by contrasting classical and contemporary 
perspectives on this topic. This section also highlights the controversies between 
institutionalist and mainstream approaches. Finally, based on the discussion carried 
out so far, the last section presents our theoretical argument. It is argued that the 
literature on dualization has to overcome its efficiency bias. Towards this aim, it is 
argued that dualization and liberalization literatures should be combined because by 
doing so the growing labour market inequalities based on age will become less 
puzzling.   
 The third chapter examines the epistemological foundations of Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA). The main objective of this chapter is to explain why 
QCA is used in the scope of this study and to describe its main features. This chapter 
begins by laying out the differences between the qualitative and quantitative 
traditions. To clarify the origins of each tradition, a discussion on John Stuart Mill’s 
canons of experimental inquiry is presented. The third section addresses the main 
features of QCA. The remaining part of the chapter explains why the method is used 
in the scope of our study.  
The fourth chapter applies fsQCA to examine the determinants of outsiderness 
among young people in Europe, a method that has been gaining in popularity and 
application. The results of the fsQCA analysis presented in this chapter show that a 
small proportion primary sector jobs and the combination of a poor coordination in 
the industrial relations system and liberalization are necessary conditions for the 
outcome high levels of outsiderness among young people. Furthermore, we find no 
evidence that high employment protection is a necessary condition for the outcome. 
As concerns the analysis of sufficient conditions, two possible paths for the outcome 
are identified: the first combines a small proportion primary sector jobs, high 
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employment protection, and poor coordination in the industrial relations system; the 
second combines a small proportion of primary sector jobs, the absence of high 
employment protection, and liberalization. The chapter is divided into four parts. The 
first presents the raw data and the calibration of the outcome and conditions. The 
second part discusses the results of the empirical analysis, namely through the 
analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions. With regard to the analysis of 
sufficient conditions, besides discussing the solution term and the parameters of fit, a 
qualitative discussion of the different solution terms is also made. Namely, three cases 
are discussed: Portugal, United Kingdom and Denmark. The third part presents the 
robustness tests. The final section summarizes and concludes the chapter.  
The fifth chapter contrasts two case studies – the telecommunications sector 
and the vehicle manufacturing sector – to illustrate why dualization as generational 
layering captures the process of change in Southern European labour markets. The 
starting point of this analysis is the results of the fsQCA analysis, namely the fact that 
a small proportion of primary sector jobs is a necessary condition for high levels of 
outsiderness among young people. Based on this finding, the main objective of the 
fifth chapter is to deepen the analysis carried out before, namely to discuss how the 
reduction of the primary sector and the concomitant expansion of the secondary sector 
brought about a generational divide in Southern European labour markets, one in 
which young people face a much higher risk of unemployment and atypical 
employment than the older generations. The central thesis of Chapter 5 is that the 
gradual erosion of the traditional internal labour market model (ILM) in the telecoms 
sector led to the expansion of non-standard employment and consequently to increase 
the risk of unemployment. It is argued that older generations were able to maintain a 
better position in the labour market because, when liberalization and privatization 
started, both union membership and bargaining coverage were very high and trade 
unions resisted against this process. This prevented therefore a large number of 
redundancies in the former public company. On the other hand, it is argued that, in the 
vehicle manufacturing industry, the traditional ILM model was maintained. Although 
some changes were implemented, the ‘traditional’ pillars of the ILM model were 
safeguarded. Therefore, no substantial generational differences exist. It is however 
stressed that the vehicle manufacturing sector represents a low share of jobs in the 
Portuguese labour market and that it has not increased throughout the past decades. 
Taken as a whole, it is argued that liberalization led to a radical transformation in 
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telecoms but not in vehicle manufacturing. The fifth chapter is organized in the 
following way. The first section makes a brief presentation of the data and reasons 
underlying the comparison between these two cases. Thereafter, each one is analysed 
separately, scrutinizing in detail two different periods: before (2004-08) and after the 
global economic downturn (2008-13). The third section outlines the main differences 
between sectors and discusses the main findings. 
The final chapter summarizes the empirical findings of the thesis and relates 
our findings with the broader theoretical debate on dualization. The chapter is divided 
in three parts: the empirical findings, the theoretical implications, and the policy 
implications.  
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2 Dualization as generational layering – an analytical 
framework 
 
 
 
 
 
On the following pages an analytical framework will be provided to address the 
puzzle presented in the introduction. Drawing on the debate over the different variants 
of institutionalism (rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism, and evolutionary and institutional economics), we begin by 
discussing the role of institutions. We argue that seeing institutions simply as drivers 
of efficiency (and therefore stability) contains several pitfalls that may undermine a 
thorough analysis of the changes taking place in European labour markets. Thereafter, 
we analyze the existing theories that give a pivotal role to institutional change, 
namely the historical institutionalist theory concerning the problem of change. The 
third section reviews the literature on labour market segmentation. Dual labour 
market (DLM) theory, economic insider-outsider theory, and the dualization literature 
are reviewed. It then goes on to discuss the existing links between these three strands 
of literature as well as the strengths and weakness of each. Finally, it is argued that 
the literature on dualization has to overcome its efficiency bias. Towards that end, it is 
argued that dualization and liberalization literatures must be combined. By doing so 
the growing labour market inequalities based on age will become less puzzling.        
 
 
2.1 Efficiency versus conflict and asymmetric power  
Following the insights of classical political economists such as Polanyi (1944, 1957), 
and Veblen (1904), the re-emergence of institutionalism in the 1980s demonstrated a 
common view about the role of institutions in shaping human behaviour, economic 
rules and the functioning of organizations. 1 This re-emergence, coincident with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For the intellectual foundations of institutionalism see: Djelic (2010, pp. 17-24) and Hodgson (2001, 
2004). We prefer the term ‘re-emergence’ to the term ‘new’ (the literature in comparative political 
economy coined the term ‘new institutionalism’ to characterise the re-emergence of institutionalism in 
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March and Olsen’s (1984) seminal article, was a reaction against the ‘behaviourist 
revolution’ of the 1950s and 1960s (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p. 2), namely 
because of its rejections of the ‘old’ institutionalism (Djelic 2010, pp. 19-22) and, 
consequently, the role of institutions in structuring different socioeconomic models 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992, p. 1). However, controversies exist between the different 
variants of institutionalism. Some result from disciplinary divides, but others have 
more substantive grounds. Among the key debates, the concept of institutions is a 
topical one and it has played a major role in mapping the frontiers between types of 
institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 7). One can distinguish at least four 
different variants of institutionalism: rational choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and evolutionary and institutional 
economics (Koelble 1995; Hall and Taylor 1996). 2 
 Even though its roots are in neoclassical microeconomics, rational choice 
institutionalism rejects orthodox neoclassical assumptions and highlights the role of 
institutions (Cook and Levi 1990). 3 Indeed, this approach played an important role in 
strengthening the field of comparative political economy (Levi 2000). Furthermore, 
one of its more recognized members, Douglass C. North, won the Nobel prize for 
economics in 1993, which helped bring institutions back into economics. The four 
notable features of rational choice institutionalism pointed out by Hall and Taylor 
(1996, pp. 944-945) illustrate these two assumptions, i.e. the role given to institutions 
and its microeconomic roots. Hall and Taylor argue that (i) rational choice 
institutionalism employs a characteristic set of behavioural assumptions; (ii) tends to 
see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas; (iii) emphasizes the role of 
strategic interaction in determining political outcomes (Scharpf 1997); and (iv) sees 
the process of institutional creation as a consequence of voluntary agreement. The 
concept of strategic interaction indeed plays a crucial role and illustrates quite well 
how rational choice institutionalism combined its microeconomic foundations with 
the role of institutions, especially if we take into account the further influence of this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the 1980s). Indeed, the dichotomy between ‘new’ and ‘old’ institutionalism contributed (perhaps 
unintentionally) to support for orthodox assumptions in economics. The rejection of the ‘old’ 
institutionalism in economics (allegedly for being ‘atheoretical’) supported the assumption that rational 
choice constitutes the cornerstone of economics (Hodgson 2004). 
2 For discussion around the different variants of institutionalism also see: Campbell (2004, pp. i-xxx), 
DiMaggio (1998), and Kato (1996). 
3 Although this variant has proclaimed itself as ‘new institutional economics’ (Williamson 1975), we 
follow here the definition proposed by Hall and Taylor (1996) – rational choice institutionalism.  
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concept on the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice 2001). The 
concept, which draws on game-theoretical assumptions, points to the fact that ‘actors 
are aware of their interdependence and (…) in arriving at their own choices each will 
try to anticipate the choices of the others, knowing that they in turn will do the same’ 
(Scharpf 1997, p. 10). Institutions ‘allow’ this interaction because they ‘structure the 
courses of actions that a set of actors may choose’ (Scharpf 1997, p. 38) and, by doing 
this, create the conditions for the strategic interactions between actors to take place. 
Finally, as regards the definition of institutions, as North (1990, p. 4) pointed out: 
‘institutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human 
interaction. (…) They can be either (…) formal constraints – such as rules that human 
beings devise – and informal constraints – such as conventions and codes of 
behaviour’.    
 Sociological institutionalism borrows from both organizational 
institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) and new economic sociology 
(Swedberg and Granovetter 1992). Having its roots in sociological theory – drawing 
especially on phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and cognitive psychology 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991, pp. 15-27) – this approach defines institutions in a more 
encompassing way, ‘sociological institutionalists tend to define institutions much 
more broadly than political scientists do to include, not just formal rules, procedures 
or norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide 
the “frames of meaning” guiding human action’ (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 947). 
Furthermore, in contrast with the rational choice variant, rather than being a source of 
efficiency, institutions provide information on what is appropriate or legitimate in a 
given context (Campbell 2004, p. xviii). Consequently, institutions result not from an 
attempt to enhance efficiency (i.e. they do not emerge to solve problems of collective 
action, to reduce transaction costs or to structure strategic interaction) but to enhance 
the social legitimacy of an organization or its participants (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 
949).      
 Group theories and structural-functionalism left their imprint on the third 
variant of institutionalism. From group theories (Hall 1986, pp. 13-15) historical 
institutionalism took the fact that group conflict lies at the centre of politics. From 
structural functionalism they emphasized structuralism, but rejected the functionalist 
argument that political outcomes are a consequence of the needs of the system (Hall 
and Taylor 1996). Furthermore, historical institutionalists criticized both variants of 
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group theories – pluralist and neo-Marxist theories – the first for its emphasis on 
stability (the main argument of pluralist analyses was that the constitutional 
arrangements of democracies contributed to the existence of many competing groups 
and these groups offered access to everyone to political power and consequently to 
stability) and the second for ignoring the role of institutions in defining class interest 
and class power on the one hand, and neglecting the relationships between society and 
the state on the other. Indeed, for neo-Marxist scholars, the state was seen as a 
reproducer of the capitalist economic system and they were particularly interested in 
the commonalities (of ‘the capitalist state’) between countries rather than in its 
differences (Hall 1986, p. 18).  
Historical institutionalists define institutions in a similar vein to rational 
choice institutionalists, i.e. they include both formal organizations and informal rules 
and procedures (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Four main contributions of historical 
institutionalism should be underlined: the conceptualization of state-society 
relationships; the relational character of institutions and the asymmetries of power 
associated with this process; the role of path-dependency; and the contribution of 
ideas to explain political outcomes. Going beyond group theories (pluralist and neo-
Marxist theories) and society centred approaches (Skocpol 1985, pp. 4-7), as well as 
state-centric theories (Hall 1986, pp. 15-17), historical institutionalists ‘brought the 
state back in’, arguing that ‘a complete analysis (…) requires examination of the 
organization and interests of the state, specification of the organization and interests 
of socioeconomic groups, and inquiries into the complementary as well as conflicting 
relationships of state and societal actors’ (Skocpol 1985, p. 20). Second, historical 
institutionalism argues that institutions are not neutral and the distributional effects of 
institutions need to be taken into account, ‘historical institutionalism represents an 
attempt to illuminate how political struggles “are mediated by the institutional setting 
in which they take place”’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, p. 2). Furthermore, institutions 
distribute power unevenly between different groups and, by doing this, benefit some 
groups while others become marginalized (Thelen 1999, p. 394). Third, this variant of 
institutionalism underlined the role of path-dependence (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 941; 
Thelen 1999, pp. 387-399; Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000), rejecting the view that 
similar challenges will drive all countries to the same path. Fourth, historical 
institutionalism made a great contribution by incorporating the diffusion of ideas as 
an important variable in explaining political outcomes, i.e. institutions play an 
  Dualization as generational layering !
! 20 
important role but should not be seen as the only causal force (Hall 1989; 
Fleckenstein 2011).   
 Evolutionary and institutional economics has been very much inspired by 
Richard Nelson and Sydney Winter’s seminal book – An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change (1982). Against rational choice institutionalists, evolutionary and 
institutional economists argue that ‘the idea of tracing how institutions emerge from 
an imaginary world with individuals but without institutions is misconceived. What is 
required is a theory of process, development and learning’ (Hodgson 2009, p. 10). 4 
Thus, both neo-Schumpeterian (Nelson and Winter 1982, pp. 39-40; Magnusson 
1994, pp. 1-9; Nelson 1995, pp. 68-72; Nelson and Winter 2002; Freeman 2007) and 
Veblenian (Hodgson 2001, pp. 137-151; 2004, pp. 123-248) branches of evolutionary 
and institutional economics converge in the idea that ‘in contrast to the traditional 
equilibrium and steady-state orientation of much economic theory, institutional and 
evolutionary economists place much greater emphasis on processes, changes and 
structural transformations. The recognition of the historical specificity of socio-
economic systems itself points to the processes of evolution and system change 
through time’ (Hodgson 2002, p. xix).  Finally, as regards the definition of 
institutions, they share with sociological institutionalism (and the ‘old’ 
institutionalism!) a broader definition, i.e. they ‘define institutions as systems of 
established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. Language, 
money, law, systems of weight and measures, table manners, and firms (and other 
organizations) are thus all institutions’ (Hodgson 2006, p. 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Although evolutionary scholars have criticised the rational choice variant of institutionalism, the other 
two variants (historical and sociological) did not give much echo to evolutionary arguments. Two 
reasons contributed to this fact. First, evolutionary theorists tend to disagree with the ‘old’ versus ‘new’ 
institutionalism dichotomy. Indeed, they contest the assumption that the ‘old’ institutionalism was 
‘atheoretical’ and see the attack against ‘old’ institutionalism as a tentative attempt to impose 
orthodoxy on economics (Hodgson 2004, pp. 3-5). Second, the use of Darwinism (already present in 
Veblen’s work) led to misunderstandings. Contrary to some misconceptions, evolutionist approaches 
do not fall into the trap of biologistic reductionism. See Pierson (2000), footnote 5, for an interesting 
example of this problem.  
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Table 2.1 – Variants of institutionalism  
 Intellectual roots Definition of 
institutions 
Role of institutions 
Rational choice 
institutionalism 
Neoclassical 
microeconomics 
Strict To allow strategic interaction 
 
Sociological 
institutionalism 
 
Organizational 
institutionalism and new 
economic sociology 
 
Broad 
 
To provide information on 
what is appropriate in a given 
context 
 
Historical 
institutionalism 
 
Group theories and 
structural-functionalism 
 
Strict 
 
To distribute power  
 
Evolutionary and 
institutional 
economics 
 
‘Old’ institutionalism 
 
Broad 
 
To mould individual 
preferences and drive change 
 
 At first sight, rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism 
share more similarities than dissimilarities: both strands of literature use a strict 
definition of institutions – formal organizations and informal rules and procedures. 
Sociological institutionalism and evolutionary and institutional economics point to a 
broader definition of institutions, including symbol systems, cognitive scripts, moral 
templates, language and table manners. Looking, however, at how each variant 
manage the problem of change we arrive at a quite different landscape. Sociological 
institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism emphasize stability. On the other 
hand, historical institutionalism and evolutionary and institutional economics are 
more prone to accommodating change in their frameworks. The next section discusses 
why each approach deals differently with the problem of change. 
 
 
2.2 ‘From conflict to change’ versus ‘from efficiency to stability and equilibrium’  
This section argues that while evolutionary and institutional economics and historical 
institutionalism are more prone to accommodate change in their frameworks, 
sociological and rational choice institutionalisms tend to be better placed to explain 
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stability and path-dependence. Below it is explained how each variant deals with the 
issue of institutional change. 5 
 Rational choice institutionalism emphasizes stability because of its efficiency 
bias; as Streeck (2010, pp. 22-23) points out ‘in the rationalist-functionalist model 
(…) economic institutions have only one function, to increase efficiency’. The way 
the VoC theory deals with the problem of change is a good illustration of this. The 
VoC school is an actor-centred approach and advocates that individuals pursue their 
interests in a rational way in strategic interaction with others (Hall and Soskice 2001, 
p. 7). Concerning the problem of change, VoC scholars argue that change is shaped 
by the historical trajectory of each model: when a country faces challenges, the way it 
reacts is constrained by an attempt to maintain a set of comparative institutional 
advantages (Hall and Soskice 2001, pp. 36-44; Hall 2007). Therefore, to 
conceptualize change, the VoC approach relies on a type of path dependence that 
suffers from an efficiency/deterministic bias (and consequently emphasizes 
equilibrium rather than change). Consequently, as Chris Howell (2003, p. 110) points 
out, ‘the theoretical framework of Varieties of Capitalism offers an extremely thin 
notion of politics and state action. (…) This approach betrays a latent functionalism in 
which capitalist political economies and the social relations that undergird them are 
fundamentally nonconflictual’. As well as having some problems in explaining 
change in its two exemplary case studies – Germany and United States (US) (Crouch 
2005; Streeck 2009) – the VoC’s efficiency bias is particularly problematic in 
countries where the political foundations and conflict play a pivotal role. Indeed, the 
VoC approach has faced, since its outset (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 21), problems in 
integrating the Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) into its 
framework, as well as taking account of the differences between Nordic and 
Continental Europe. 6 In the next section it will be argued that the influence of the 
VoC approach over the dualization literature lead to an efficiency bias, especially 
with regard to the causes of the process of dualization.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Except for evolutionary and institutional economics because we have already explained in the 
previous section that this variant emerged in opposition to traditional equilibrium and steady-state 
orientation of much economic theory. Indeed, these scholars’ main contribution is precisely the 
emphasis on the evolutionary logic of the capitalist system.  
6 Recently, Iversen and Stephens (2008), Thelen (2012), and Emmenegger et al., (2012a, p. 14) have 
tried to overcome this problem by combining the VoC and power-resource theory.  !
  Dualization as generational layering !
! 23 
Sociological institutionalism criticizes the rational choice institutionalism 
view of institutions as efficiency ‘guardians’. Although avoiding the pitfall of 
efficiency it suffers from a ‘consensus’ bias. As seen previously, sociological 
institutionalists argue that institutions provide information about what is appropriate 
or legitimate in a given context. This way of seeing institutions ignores their 
mediating role in the distribution of power in society, and therefore provides little 
room for conflict and change. DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 14) recognize this and 
point out that ‘not only does neoinstitutionalism emphasize the homogeneity of 
organizations; it also tends to stress the stability of institutional components’. 
Sociological institutionalism has tried to overcome this limitation (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991, pp. 27-33) by emphasizing the role of ‘institutional contradiction’ as a 
source of institutional change. However, they recognize that ‘power and interests have 
been slighted topics in institutional analysis’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p. 30), and 
therefore a crucial source of institutional change is left behind. While trying to 
overcome this problem, they argue that ‘the acquisition and maintenance of power 
within organizational fields requires that dominant organizations continually enact 
strategies of control, most notably through either socialization of newcomers into a 
shared world view or via the support of the state and its judicial arm’ (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991, p. 31). This solution is symptomatic of this variant bias, i.e. even when 
recognizing that power plays a crucial role, they neglect conflict by either assuming 
that individuals voluntarily accept the process of socialization enacted by the 
dominant organizations or that the state and the judicial arm are immutable and 
immune to society’s pressure.   
 Historical institutionalists have over the last decade built a powerful theory of 
institutional change. However, this was not a haphazard development. Compared with 
rational choice and sociological institutionalists, historical institutionalists were much 
better equipped to tackle the problem of change because they had never seen 
institutions as efficiency or information providers, but as mediators of political 
struggles; ‘the emphasis on the power-political underpinnings of institutions has 
always distinguished this version of institutionalism from alternative accounts, both 
sociological perspectives on institutions as shared understandings or cognitive scripts 
and rationalist (…) approaches to institutions as voluntary resting points held together 
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by shared interests and mutual benefit’ (Thelen 2010b, p. 54). 7 Kathleen Thelen has 
played a prominent role in developing the historical institutionalist approach to the 
problem of institutional evolution. The theory has been developed in three steps: first, 
by criticizing the existing theories (technological models of path dependency from 
economics and path dependency from institutional sociology) (Thelen 1999, pp. 384-
387); second, by proposing an alternative theory of institutional change and 
pinpointing five different modes of institutional evolution (Thelen 2004; Streeck and 
Thelen 2005); and finally, by setting out the context in which each mode of change 
tends to emerge (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) .8        
 First, drawing on historical institutional analyses of critical junctures and the 
work on policy feedbacks, Thelen (1999, p. 369) proposed ‘a way of thinking about 
institutional evolution and path dependency that provides an alternative to equilibrium 
and other approaches that separate the analysis of institutional stability from that of 
institutional change’. Thelen argued that stability and change are inseparable and 
change is not only triggered by exogenous factors. To understand change, she argues, 
one has to look at the foundations of political stability, i.e. ‘the key to understanding 
institutional evolution and change lies in specifying more precisely the reproduction 
and feedback mechanisms on which particular institutions rest’. In a second step, 
Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 9) argued that rather than looking at big changes (in 
response to big shocks), the focus should be put on looking for incremental change 
with transformative results (therefore linking stability and change). Streeck and 
Thelen (2005, pp. 18-30) therefore identified five broad modes of gradual but 
nevertheless transformative change: displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and 
exhaustion (see Table 2.2). In a third step, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) elaborated a 
model to explain which institutional contexts (with strong veto possibilities versus 
with weak veto possibilities) and which proprieties of institutions (with low level of 
discretion in interpretation/enforcement versus with high level of discretion in 
interpretation/enforcement) are associated with each kind of change (see Figure 2.1).  
In section four it will be argued that change through layering describes well 
the process of change in Southern European labour markets.9 It is argued that 
separating stability and change does not capture the reasons behind the high levels of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 On the other hand, there are signs that an approximation of evolutionary institutional economics and 
historical institutionalism is underway (Lewis and Steinmo 2009; Steinmo 2010; Blyth et al. 2011).  
8 See Thelen (2010a) for a survey of this literature.  
9 In the same section it is explained in detail the meaning of layering.    
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unemployment among the youth in Southern Europe, i.e. seeing youth unemployment 
only as a consequence of external shocks (e.g. due to the global economic crisis) does 
not tackle the root cause of the problem: the deterioration of its labour market position 
over the past decades. However, before going more deeply into that issue, the 
literature about labour market segmentation will be reviewed in order to explain why 
youth has been more affected in post-industrial labour markets and why this process is 
more problematic in Southern Europe. 
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Figure 2.1 – Contextual and institutional sources of institutional change  
 
Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 19) 
 
 
Table 2.3 – Variants of institutionalism and institutional change 
 Driving force of institutional change  
Rational choice institutionalism To increase efficiency 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
 
To reinforce shared understandings or the power of 
dominant organizations 
 
Historical institutionalism 
 
Distributional conflicts  
 
Evolutionary and institutional 
economics 
 
Change is seen as an intrinsic feature of capitalism  
 
   
2.3 Varieties of labour market segmentation in post-industrial societies  
Considerable attention has been given in the literature to the existing divides in the 
labour market. DLM theories (Doeringer and Piore 1971) and economic insider-
outsider theories (Lindbeck and Snower 1988a) are often cited as the most relevant 
literature in this area. 10 More recently, a new approach – the dualization literature – !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 As well as these two approaches, we could also add the sociological literature on the rise of 
precariousness and atypical employment (Kalleberg 2000, 2009; Barbier 2011; Price et al. 2011), and 
radical theory (Reich, Gordon and Edwards 1973). Although providing interesting insights regarding 
the existence of different types of non-standard work (Kalleberg 2000) and consequently stressing the 
inconsistences of the available indicators to measure precariousness (Barbier 2011), sociological 
studies are mainly focused on defining precariousness rather than identifying its causes. Radical 
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table 1.2. Contextual and Institutional Sources of Institutional Change
Characteristics of the Targeted Institution
Low Level of High Level of
Discretion in Discretion in
Interpretation/ Interpretation/
Enforcement Enforcement
Strong
Layering DriftVeto
Possibilities
Characteristics of
the Political Context
Weak
Displacement ConversionVeto
Possibilities
Tsebelis 2002). Either way, veto possibilities are high where there exist
actors who have access to institutional or extrainstitutional means of
blocking change. These actors may have access to veto capabilities
regarding both changes in the (formal or informal) rules themselves
and changes in the rules’ enactment in practice. Actors with strong
veto capabilities vis-a`-vis a given institution, however, may not enjoy
this strength vis-a`-vis other institutions. F r example, an independent
central bank may be a powerful veto player with respect to changes in
financial institutions but not welfare institutions.
Where would-be agents of change face political contexts with myr-
iad veto possibilities, it will be difficult for them to mobilize the
resources and assemble a coalition that can displace the existing insti-
tutional rules. Hence, displacement is unlikely in the context of strong
veto possibilities. Likewise, efforts at active conversion will be difficult
in such a context, since veto powers also apply to the realm of rule
enactment. Instead of displacement or conversion, drift and layering
are more promising as strategies of change in political environments
with strong veto players. This is true because drift and layering do not
require making any direct changes to the old institutions and do not
rely on altering the rules themselves or actively shifting their enactment.
With drift, institutional change grows out of the neglect of an insti-
tution, or more precisely, the failure to adapt and update an institution
so as tomaintain its traditional impact in a changed environment. Pow-
erful veto players may be able to defend existing institutions against
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has gained importance within the field of comparative political economy (Rueda 
2007; Palier and Thelen 2010; Emmenegger et al. 2012a; Rueda 2014). As can be 
seen below, each of these three strands of literature has different analytical roots and 
addresses different socio-political challenges. We will begin by identifying the key 
features of each approach before describing the main differences between them. 
Finally, we identify the weaknesses of the literature on dualization.  
 DLM theories have their roots in the American Institutionalist School 
(Doeringer and Piore 1975, p. 70; Cain 1976, pp. 1226-1228; Bosworth et al. 1996, p. 
335; Leontaridi 1998, pp. 68-69; Barbier 2011, pp. 7-9), particularly in the 
contribution of Kerr (1954) and Dunlop (1957). 11 There are at least two reasons for 
this relationship. First, together with institutional economics, DLM scholars 
challenged classical and neo-classical explanations about the workings of the labour 
market. Indeed, in contrast to human capital theories, they argued that the labour 
market is not a single competitive market. The DLM scholars believe there are several 
non-competing segments, as well as institutional barriers between them. These 
scholars indicate the existence of two sectors: a primary and secondary. The primary 
sector is characterized by having well developed internal labour markets (ILMs) (a 
concept first developed by Kerr (1954, p. 102)) in which (formal and informal) 
institutional rules substitute market mechanisms. It is argued that firms in the primary 
sector depend more on their employees’ specific skills (acquired through on-the-job 
training and experience) and therefore develop strategies to protect their labour force 
from the risk of poaching (Rubery 1978, p. 19).12 Furthermore, it should be noted that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
scholars share with DLM theories the emphasis on institutions, but stress a different point. They point 
to a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy (Reich, Gordon and Edwards 1973, p. 361; Rubery 1978, p. 18; 
Bosworth et al. 1996, p. 337) pursued by the capitalist class. Regardless of the analytical focus, several 
authors have surveyed this literature. See for instance: Cain (1976); Rubery (1978); Piore (1980, pp. 
379-384); Ball (1990); Bosworth et al. (1996); Leontaridi (1998); Kalleberg (2000, 2009); Lindbeck 
and Snower (2001); Blanchard (2006); Suleman (2007, pp. 121-127); Davidsson and Naczyk (2009); 
Suleman and Sgobbi (2010, pp. 97-99); Barbier (2011); Emmenegger et al. (2012a). 
11 John Dunlop was teacher of Doeringer and Piore at Harvard (Cain 1976, p. 1222). It is no 
coincidence that Doeringer and Piore’s seminal book (1971) was dedicated to him. 
12 Notwithstanding, DLM scholars later distinguished between an upper and a lower tier within the 
primary sector. Piore (1972, p. 3) argued that upper tier jobs are different ‘from those in the lower tier 
by the higher pay and status, and the greater promotion opportunities which they afford. They are also 
distinguished by the mobility and turnover patterns, which tend to more closely resemble those of the 
secondary sector except, in contrast to the patterns of that sector, mobility and turnover tend to be 
associated with advancement’. While workers in the upper tier make use of general skills, the lower tier 
is mainly characterized by the use of specific skills. In their view, ‘it is for this reason that lower tier 
jobs place a premium upon stability and routine’ (Piore 1972, p. 14). By clarifying the differences 
within the primary sector, DLM scholars recognized that not all jobs in the primary sector are 
characterized by employment stability. This clarification is crucial because the objective of the present 
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only firms faced with stable product demand are able to make this type of long-term 
investment in their labour force and therefore create ILMs. This is why DLM theories 
argue that the focus should be made on the industrial structure of the economy and on 
the demand side, rather than the supply side focus of neo-classical economics on 
worker characteristics (Leontaridi 1998, pp. 71-72). The secondary sector covers 
workers outside ILMs, their tasks depending less on specific skills. Supply and 
demand play a pivotal role in this sector, there are more entry ports and workers are 
therefore more vulnerable to pressure from outside. While the primary sector is 
characterized by ‘relatively high wages, good working conditions, chances of 
advancement, (…) and above all employment stability’ (Piore 1975, p. 126), the 
secondary sector is characterized by relying mainly on poor jobs (low wages, few 
promotion possibilities, poor working conditions and high labour turnover). Due to 
these differences, the mobility of employees between sectors is restricted.  
Second, the analytic focus on institutions also implied the use of different 
methodologies. Both institutional economics and DLM theories have challenged the 
practice of econometric estimation of deductive neoclassical models, and have 
emphasized the potential of unorthodox research practices, such as open-ended, 
unstructured interviews with economic actors (Cain 1976, pp. 1226-1227; Piore 1983, 
p. 250). In summary, there exists a clear link between DLM and institutional 
economics. Both approaches challenge the classical and neo-classical perspective and 
stress the role of institutions to explain the workings of the labour market. 
Furthermore, DLM scholars have borrowed important insights from institutional 
economics to build their theory. Given their analytical focus, both approaches tend to 
reject orthodox methodologies.   
 Finally, the socio-political context has also exerted great influence over DLM 
scholars. As Piore (1983, p. 250) recognized ‘the notion of labor market stratification 
emerged through “participant observation”. The ideas were originally put forward by 
a group of us who encountered the labor market through participation in the civil 
rights movement and as advocates for the community based groups which grew up 
around that movement and President Johnson’s War on Poverty. The ideas were an 
attempt to make sense out of the labor market problems as the people in these 
communities experienced them (or at least described their experiences) and to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
study is to explain the rise of atypical employment and/or unemployment. Therefore, it is expected that 
only lower tier jobs are characterized by stable contractual arrangements. 
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describe the labor market as these people saw it’. Indeed, this approach has tried to 
provide an answer for the political concerns of the 1960s: structural unemployment, 
technological change and racial discrimination. Contrary to human capital theories 
(which argued that education and training programs could fight poverty), DLM 
stressed that poverty could only be tackled by providing access to primary 
employment to those excluded from it (Piore 1970, p. 55).  
Economic insider-outsider theories, the second strand, emerged at the end of 
the 1980s. Rather than considering the rise of poverty and inequality, their interest 
relied on the intriguing high levels of structural unemployment in Europe, especially 
when compared with a much lower level in the US (Blanchard 2006, p. 19). In 
contrast to the prevalent natural rate explanations, they considered that short-term 
economic shocks were not the main reason behind unemployment. Moreover, 
economic insider-outsider theorists argued that market mechanisms were not able to 
explain the rise of structural unemployment. They noted the fact that a decline in 
productivity growth (due to rapid deindustrialization throughout the 1980s) did not 
lead to an adjustment in wages (Emmenegger 2009, p. 133). To explain this, they 
preferred to blame labour market institutions by arguing that some workers are 
trapped in involuntary unemployment because labour market institutions hinder 
competition between the unemployed – the outsiders – and those already in the labour 
market – the insiders (Lindbeck and Snower 1988a, p. 1). They claim that this results 
in conflicting interests between insiders and outsiders because the latter prefer to 
dismantle existing labour market institutions, while the former prefer the opposite. 
When speaking of labour market institutions, economic insider-outsider 
theorists mean institutions that protect insiders from the competition of outsiders. The 
basic idea is that ‘it may not be in the insiders’ interests to permit outsider 
underbidding. Insiders may be able to impose their interests on their employers, since 
the insiders’ positions are protected by labour turnover costs’ (Lindbeck and Snower 
2001, p. 166). Labour turnover costs mean both production-related turnover costs and 
rent-related labour turnover costs. Production-related ‘include search, hiring, 
relocation and training costs, (…) [while rent-related] are (…) the outcome of insiders 
rent-seeking activities. These come in many forms, such as severance-pay, seniority 
rules, requirements that firms give insiders advance notice of dismissal, and other 
forms of legal protection against firing’ (Lindbeck and Snower 2001, p. 167). As well 
as these two types, they have also pinpointed the existence of another kind of labour 
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turnover cost: the refusal to cooperate with outsiders who offer to work for less, i.e. 
especially on those jobs where work is performed in teams, refusing to cooperate with 
new entrants who have accepted work for lower wages may undermine an employer’s 
intention to recruit new (outsider) workers (Lindbeck and Snower 1988b; Lindbeck 
and Snower 2001, p. 167). Notwithstanding this, job security regulations are indeed 
the main focus of economic insider-outsider theory (Emmenegger 2009, p. 133), and 
policies inspired by this theory (for instance those pursued by the IMF and OECD) 
have focused on the reduction of job security regulations (‘labour market rigidities’) 
to tackle structural unemployment, as well as reducing labour power in terms of 
collective bargaining. 13 Finally, although economic insider-outsider theory challenges 
classical explanations, this approach is built on the assumptions of mainstream 
economics (Barbier 2011, p. 4), taking into account that, for them, institutions impede 
the optimal functioning of the market.  
Two main differences between DLM theory and economic insider-outsider 
theory should be underlined: their theoretical roots and their socio-political 
motivations. First, the separation between these two strands of literature is rooted in a 
broader debate between institutional economics and mainstream economics. While 
institutional economics understand that social groups and institutions are crucial to the 
functioning of the labour market and are indeed inseparable from it, mainstream 
economics emphasizes the role of market mechanisms, arguing that institutions only 
disturb the functioning of the market. Piore (1983, p. 252) has summarized the 
institutionalist point of view by arguing that ‘at the core of labour market 
segmentation are social groups and institutions. The process governing allocation and 
pricing within ILMs are social, opposed either to competitive processes or to 
instrumental calculations’. Second, each approach attempts to deal with different 
challenges: DLM scholars focus on the rising levels of poverty and inequality in the 
US, while the high level of structural unemployment in Europe is the conundrum 
behind the economic insider-outsider framework.  
Therefore, although both theories attempt to deal with labour market 
segmentation, they support different solutions, either because they have different 
theoretical roots or because they attempt to tackle different socio-political issues (see 
Table 2.4). While economic insider-outsider theory emphasizes the role of ‘power-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See, for instance, The 1994 OECD Jobs Study (OECD 1994).  
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reducing policies’, such as ‘restrictions on strikes and picking and relaxing job 
security and seniority legislation’ (Lindbeck and Snower 2001, p. 184), DLM points 
to an expansion of the primary sector, a sector mainly regulated by institutional rules. 
DLM theory supports the adoption of anti-discrimination policies for the expansion of 
the primary sector and, above all, the encouragement of full employment (Piore 1975, 
p. 79).  As far as youth is regarded in the labour market, both economic insider-
outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower 2001, p. 182) and DLM theory (Piore 1975) 
agree that the younger generations are more vulnerable in the labour market than 
other age groups. Despite this, and taking into account what we have just mentioned, 
different causes as well as different solutions to the youth unemployment problem are 
identified. While insider-outsider theorists stress the need to reduce older generations 
protections (e.g., by relaxing seniority legislation), DLM scholars point to the need of 
providing access to the primary sector to young people (e.g., by implementing 
policies facilitating the school-to-work transition). In short, these two traditions rely 
in different assumptions and consequently provide different solutions to the youth 
unemployment problem.     
The fact that each approach addresses different socio-political challenges is 
much more important than it seems. By arguing that the best solution to tackling 
labour market segmentation is to dismantle the existing institutional rules (which have 
historically protected workers’ interests), economic insider-outsider theorists are only 
fighting structural unemployment. Indeed, the US (the ‘good’ example for economic 
insider-outsider scholars) are historically characterized as having high levels of 
income inequality and high poverty rates. The main pitfall of this approach is that by 
arguing that insiders and outsiders have conflicting interests, economic insider-
outsider scholars ‘forget’ that both insiders and outsiders are interested in improving 
their living conditions, and not only in obtaining a job. Indeed, making labour 
relations radically more flexible can provide access to the labour market for outsiders 
but does not guarantee access to good jobs. Therefore, more flexible labour relations 
may, against economic insider-outsider assumptions, face opposition from both 
insiders and outsiders (Emmenegger 2009), especially when more flexible labour 
relations means the spread of poverty and inequality.  
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Table 2.4 – Contrasting theories on labour market segmentation 
 Dual Labour Market  Economic insider-outsider 
Intellectual roots Institutional economics Mainstream economics 
 
Divide 
 
Primary and secondary 
sectors 
 
Insiders and outsiders 
 
Driver 
 
Specific-skills; on-the-job 
training 
 
Job security regulations 
 
Socio-political motivations 
 
Poverty and inequality 
 
Structural unemployment 
 
Until now the reviewed literature has been embedded in the industrial era’s 
debates, i.e. when jobs in the industrial sector still represented a high proportion of the 
labour force, and so it does not reflect the changes undergone by the labour market 
throughout the past decades. 14  The third strand, dualization literature, provides 
interesting insights into post-industrial labour markets. It has been inspired by the 
seminal work of Rueda (2005, 2006, 2007). However, recent contributions have 
challenged Rueda’s initial framework: while Rueda has drawn on the economic 
insider-outsider theory, Palier and Thelen (2010, 2012) and Emmenegger et al. 
(2012a) have built their ideas mainly on DLM theory.   
Following the insider-outsider framework, Rueda has argued that ‘labor is 
divided into two segments: those with secure employment (insiders) and those 
without (outsiders) … [and that] the interests of insiders and outsiders are 
fundamentally different and, in some circumstances, contradictory’ (Rueda 2007, pp. 
2-3). Rueda goes beyond the insider-outsider framework in at least two ways. First, he 
includes both the unemployed and those with temporary jobs in the group of 
outsiders. Second, he argues that in the presence of conflict between different groups 
within the labour force, social democratic governments often fail to promote the 
interests of the weakest members of society, and therefore exacerbate the gap between 
insiders and outsiders. In his view, this happens because insiders vote 
disproportionately for social democratic parties and are over-represented within trade 
unions. Rueda stresses that these parties (together with trade unions) contributed to an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Especially the DLM theory, given that economic insider-outsider emerged during the transition from 
industrial to post-industrial labour markets.  
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increase in the gap between insiders and outsiders for electoral reasons because they 
promoted job security for insiders instead of active labour market policies (ALMP) to 
support outsiders. By stressing this second point, and using Thelen’s (2012, p. 149) 
words, Rueda ‘flips the power-resource theory on its head’ given that the power 
resource theory (Korpi 1983) argued that a link exists between high levels of equality 
and social solidarity and the strength of organized labour and labour’s political allies, 
i.e. the social democratic parties (Rueda 2007, p. 4). The innovativeness of Rueda’s 
argument is therefore the introduction of a political flavour into the economic insider-
outsider theory (Emmenegger 2009, p. 133).  
The negative role of social democratic parties has however been challenged by 
others (Emmenegger 2009, pp. 133-137; Palier and Thelen 2010, p. 121; Thelen 
2012). They argue that where social democratic parties are stronger (e.g. in the Nordic 
countries), dualistic trends are less pronounced. Palier and Thelen put forward a 
different explanation for the growing levels of dualities, namely the attempt to save 
the core manufacturing economy in Continental Europe. They defend the view that 
reforms during the 1980s and 1990s shrank the industrial sector and therefore allowed 
the expansion of new types of jobs in the outside, giving rise to the emergence of a 
secondary labour market. 15 To maintain a set of comparative institutional advantages, 
coordination between capital and labour was kept within the core manufacturing 
industry (thus preserving a number of stable and well remunerated jobs), but the 
expansion of the secondary sector contributed to the spread of poor jobs. 
Additionally, the welfare state has reinforced the problem in countries where the 
eligibility for benefits is historically based on past contributions (Palier and Martin 
2007; Palier 2010; Emmenegger et al. 2012a; Arcanjo 2012). By emphasizing the role 
of social policies, Emmenegger et al. stress that dualization does not imply that all 
countries will necessarily experience high levels of insider-outsider divides. The 
existing differences illustrate how some policies may foster dualization while others 
(e.g. if outsider policies are relatively generous) may reduce it.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Palier and Thelen’s argument points to the same type of institutions Doeringer and Piore (1971) 
identified in the 1970s to explain the existing dualities in US labour markets. Indeed, what Palier and 
Thelen call the ‘core manufacturing economy’ is similar to what Doeringer and Piore called, in the 
1970s, the primary sector (characterised by well-developed ILMs). The main difference however is that 
an expansion of the primary sector is not expected in the near future. Furthermore, both the dualization 
literature (Emmenegger et al. 2012a, pp. 3-7) and DLM were concerned with the growing levels of 
inequality and poverty, rather than only focused on the problem of unemployment. 
  Dualization as generational layering !
! 35 
The innovativeness of the argument by Emmenegger et al. (2012a, pp. 16-17) 
relies on its emphasis on policies, namely the translation of the changes in the labour 
market into the social policy realm. Emmenegger et al. (2012a, pp. 10-16) argue that 
the process of dualization is a process ‘in which politically and economically stronger 
groups are using their power resources to insulate themselves from the negative 
effects of [the] structural pressures, and in which governments make deliberate 
choices in favour or against outsiders. Thereby, changes in the labour market are 
translated into the social policy realm, where new distinctions arise or old institutional 
distinctions are re-activated … [D]ualization implies that policies increasingly 
differentiate rights, entitlements, and services provided to different categories of 
recipients. In this way, the position of insiders may remain more or less constant, 
while only the position of outsiders deteriorates.’ 
But even though social policies play a crucial role, they only become 
important because of previous changes occurred in the labour market; this explains 
the clear link between the arguments of Palier and Thelen and of Emmenegger et al. 
The same is not true of Rueda’s argument due to his emphasis on the negative role of 
social democratic parties and trade unions. Contrary to Rueda’s point of view, 
Emmenegger et al. argue that social policies carried out by the social democratic 
parties are indeed the cause of lower levels of dualization in some countries. Finally, 
while Rueda is focused on the high levels of unemployment, Emmenegger et al. 
(2012a, pp. 3-4) are concerned mainly with the increasing levels of poverty and 
inequality. 
Although rooted in DLM theory, the perspective of Palier and Thelen (2010) 
goes beyond it in several ways. It adapts DLM theory to post-industrial labour 
markets, a period in which jobs in the manufacturing sector dropped dramatically. It 
successfully links DLM theory with the welfare state literature, and does this in a way 
that combines welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990) with the VoC literature (Hall 
and Soskice 2001). Figure 2.2 illustrates the different foundations of each perspective. 
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Figure 2.2 – Foundations of each perspective  
 
   
Comparing these two approaches (see Table 2.5), we consider Rueda’s 
perspective excessively focused on job security. Indeed, due to its mainstream 
assumptions it does not pay enough attention to job quality. As Chapter 4 will show, 
less employment protection does not guarantee, per se, less age-based labour market 
segmentation. Although the approach put forward by Palier and Thelen is better 
placed to address the issue of job quality, it also has its limitations. Regardless of its 
merits, it is difficult to explain growing age-based labour market inequalities with this 
framework. In our view, this is related with the pitfalls of rational choice 
institutionalism (see section 2.1 above), namely its tendency to see institutions as 
‘guardians’ of efficiency (Howell 2003, p. 110; Streeck 2009, Chapter 13). While this 
conceptual framework is well suited to explain Continental countries pattern of 
dualization, the same does not apply to Southern Europe. One could argue that the 
dualization literature departs from this when Emmenegger et al. (2012a) and Palier 
and Thelen (2010) emphasize the role of the welfare state and argue that in some 
regimes the strongest groups are using the welfare state to protect themselves and by 
doing so are excluding outsiders. Although the second part of the argument – about 
the role of the welfare state – is useful for the study of other socio-economic models, 
the first constitutes mainly a description of the Continental European case. Moreover, 
the dualization framework does not pay enough attention to change. Perhaps because 
of its emphasis on institutions as providers of efficiency this theory advocates that 
dualistic trends may last; theorists argue that the fringe is not eating the core because 
workers are not competing directly (Emmenegger et al. 2012b, pp. 315-318). 
Furthermore, they claim that employers are interested in maintaining this dualistic 
Institutional economics Mainstream economics 
Dual labour market theory Economic insider-outsider 
Dualization  
(Palier and Thelen) 
Dualization  
(Rueda) 
Welfare regimes VoC theory 
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trend because the ‘core manufacturing economy’ is the source of these countries’ 
comparative advantage. Below, we argue that the Southern European case exemplifies 
how problematic it is to see institutions only as a source of efficiency.  
 
Table 2.5 – Summarizing controversies among dualization scholars 
 Intellectual roots Driver of dualization 
Rueda’s perspective Economic insider-
outsider 
Social democratic parties’ 
promotion of job security for 
insiders instead of ALMP for 
the outsiders.   
 
Palier and Thelen’s perspective 
 
Dual labour market 
 
The attempt to save the ‘core 
manufacturing economy’ 
together with the existence of 
a conservative welfare 
regime.  
 
Häusermann and Schwander (2012) have recently provided empirical 
evidence about the process of dualization across regimes and by doing so have, 
unintentionally, shown some of the strengths and weaknesses of this literature. 16 In 
confirmation of previous studies, they point to the fact that young labour participants 
and women in the labour market are over-represented among outsiders in all regimes. 
Furthermore, regimes show different patterns of dualization: ‘in the Nordic and 
Continental countries, gender is the most important criteria, while in Southern 
European regimes, it is mostly young labour market participants who are potential 
outsiders, and in the Anglo-Saxon countries, outsiders are predominantly found 
among the low-skilled’ (2012, p. 34). As regards the role of social policies, the 
authors point to an interesting finding: while the effect of taxes and transfers tends to 
reduce inequality in the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, the opposite 
occurs in Continental and Southern Europe (2012, pp. 40-42). 
The existence of different patterns of dualization is a very interesting finding 
indeed. We have already pointed out (see section 1.1) that post-industrial labour 
markets have downplayed the position of young people. Furthermore, we have also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See also Häusermann and Schwander (2009), and Schwander and Häusermann (2013).   
  Dualization as generational layering !
! 38 
argued that while in some countries and regimes the labour market position of the 
young people is a transitory stage, in others it tends to become more persistent over 
time. As Häusermann and Schwander (2012) have argued, in Southern Europe it is 
mostly young labour market participants who are potential outsiders. However, the 
dualization literature does not provide a convincing explanation for this.  
The conceptual framework of dualization literature is particularly well suited 
to explain Continental dualization: the gender divide reflects the split between jobs in 
industry (where males are over-represented) versus jobs in services (where females 
are the majority of the labour force). Lower levels of dualities in the Nordic countries 
show that social policies can successfully tackle the process of dualization. As regards 
the Anglo-Saxon case, the existing divides have their roots in differences within the 
service sector. Contrary to what has happened in Continental Europe, the ‘core 
manufacturing economy’ was not saved in the 1980s (Margaret Thatcher’s era). But, 
the logic of complementarities plays an important role here as well: the radical 
retrenchment of the industrial sector led to an exponential growth of the service sector 
(particularly the financial sector) and therefore to a much more unequal society. 
Finally, the liberal welfare state was not able to tackle the process of dualization. As 
for Southern Europe, the link between complementarities and social policies is less 
evident. Southern Europe lacks the logic of complementarities extant in Continental 
Europe (Molina and Rhodes 2007) or that which characterizes the liberal market 
economy model. As its industrial sector was much less competitive (relying mainly on 
low wages rather than on specific skills) than its counterparts in Continental Europe, 
reforms during the 1980s and 1990s did not save the ‘core manufacturing economy’ 
because there was no such ‘core manufacturing economy’ (Molina and Rhodes 2007). 
Indeed, only a small part of the manufacturing sector was characterized by having 
well developed ILMs (Suleman et al. 2013, pp. 239-241). That is why the existing 
divides are of a different nature: rather than skill-based they tend to be age-based. 
Having said this, we do not support the view that the second part of the argument 
(concerning the role of policies) is useless. What is needed is to pinpoint the existing 
divides (which may differ from regime to regime) and to shed light on their 
intersections with the welfare state. 17  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The main focus of the current study is to clarify the structural drivers of dualization in Southern 
Europe. Therefore, we will not explore the interactions between this and the welfare state. However, by 
shedding light on this process, we also pretend to open up new avenues of research on this topic. Future 
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We must therefore innovate conceptually in order to integrate the existing 
diversity into the dualization literature. Although the welfare state plays an important 
role in all regimes (reinforcing or tackling the process of dualization), the causes of 
dualization differ from country to country. The process of dualization as generational 
layering attempts to address the Southern European case and to explain why the 
pattern of dualization in Southern Europe is different. 
 
 
2.4. Dualization as generational layering: connecting dualization with liberalization 
The above-mentioned tendency to see institutions as ‘guardians’ of efficiency (and 
therefore of stability) has concealed crucial features of some countries and neglected 
the conflictual logic of the capitalist system. In our view, this has contributed to a lack 
of understanding of the growing age-based labour market inequalities. To overcome 
these problems, it is crucial to highlight the distinctive characteristics of the industrial 
relations system in some countries and to place greater emphasis on liberalization. 
Finally, it is also because some countries lack what Palier and Thelen (2010) have 
called the ‘core manufacturing economy’ that a growing number of outsiders among 
young people exist. It is the combination of these three factors that leads to the 
process of dualization as generational layering.  
European countries diverge regarding the functioning of the industrial 
relations system: while more cooperative relations between social partners 
characterize Continental and Scandinavian countries, more conflictual relations 
historically characterize Southern Europe. Colin Crouch (1993, pp. 61–62) analyzed 
how the industrial relations system evolved in a large set of European countries 
between 1870 and 1990 and stressed the existence of three ideal types of interest 
intermediation: (i) contestative relations, (ii) pluralist collective bargaining, and (iii) 
neo-corporatism. As Crouch noted (1993, p. 56), the first type is inspired by 
‘orthodox Marxists and pure syndicalists [approaches]. To them any 
institutionalization of the class conflict constitutes a weakening of the drive for 
revolutionary transformation. It will therefore be seen as a manipulation of class-
consciousness, a corruption of working-class leaders, or something similar.’ As is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
research might explore how changes in Southern European labour markets are translated into the social 
policy realm and the consequences of this process.   
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well documented, this is the case of Southern Europe (and France), where articulation 
between labour and capital has historically been lacking (Regini and Regalia 1997; 
Goetschy 1998; Ebbinghaus 2006b, p. 73; Molina and Rhodes 2007; Lima and 
Naumann 2011).18 Another contributing factor was the influence of strong communist 
parties on the largest trade union confederations, on the one hand, and the fascist 
regimes (of Salazar and Franco) in the Iberian Peninsula (although for a shorter period 
of time this was also the case of Italy), on the other hand, which prevented the 
development of free autonomous relations between capital and labour from the 1920s 
to the 1970s.   
The conflictual logic of some industrial relations systems is problematic to the 
dualization framework given the emphasis that this literature places on cooperation.19 
It is at the very minimum debatable to suggest that trade unions, which historically 
followed a class struggle approach, guide their behaviour on the basis of strategic 
coordination with the employers of the ‘core manufacturing economy’. In spite of 
this, in our opinion, a different point must be highlighted: in countries with poor 
coordination between labour and capital, the limited union density led unions to 
represent their members first and foremost and to neglect the remaining workers (i.e., 
to protect workers with more political power rather than those in a weaker position), 
through a process of confrontation rather than cooperation with employers. Since 
younger generations are less unionized and therefore have less political power, this 
process has affected them in particular (Lima and Artiles 2013, pp. 351-352).  
Furthermore, social conflict can also result from market expansion, as 
liberalization scholars have emphasized. The liberalization literature, as an 
institutional theory of capitalism, emphasizes the communalities between countries 
rather than their distinctions and criticizes the functionalist’s assumptions on which 
the VoC relies (Streeck 2009). Drawing on Polanyi’s (1944) ‘double movement’ of 
market expansion and market containment thesis, Streeck argues that change in all 
capitalist economies is driven by a process of market expansion and by the social 
conflicts associated with it.20 This emphasis on the conflictual logic of the capitalist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Visser (1992, 1996, 2004) and Ebbinghaus (1998) also point out that different types of interest 
intermediation exist.   
19 ‘Dualization framework’ is used herein from the perspective of Palier and Thelen (2010).  
20 In our opinion, this emphasis on conflict is much more in line with the historical institutionalist 
tradition than the emphasis on institutions as guardians of efficiency. As Thelen (2010b, p. 43) noted, 
‘considerations of power lie at the centre of historical-institutionalism as an approach to the study of 
politics, and power-distributional struggles define this approach’s distinctive perspective on 
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system (Streeck 2009, pp. 5–6), is very much in line with the point we stressed above: 
politics plays a crucial role in countries with more conflictual relations since insiders 
are the ones who are more organized (and hold more political power), rather than 
those with more specific skills. The social countermovements have protected these 
workers more, but this is neither an efficient nor a stable solution.21 The two factors – 
poor coordination in the industrial relations system and the liberalization process – 
can be synthesized under what we call fertile breeding grounds for social conflict 
because both market expansion and a conflictual industrial relations system are 
conducive to social conflict. Social conflict has a negative effect on young people 
because, as mentioned above, they hold less political power.  
Besides its emphasis on social conflict, the literature on liberalization is 
crucial for an additional reason. Above, we argued that conflictual relations between 
social partners and market expansion are conducive to social conflict, but we did not 
explain why older people were able to obtain more stable jobs in the past. Before 
proceeding with this explanation, it will be necessary to venture further in the 
discussion about the compatibility of these two literatures (dualization and 
liberalization). 22 Indeed, it can be argued that dualization and liberalization are 
incompatible since they rely on different traditions: rational choice institutionalism 
and historical institutionalism, respectively. In our view, that is not the case. Against 
some misconceptions, liberalization does not claim the end of strategic coordination 
between capital and labour in ‘coordinated market economies’ and does not argue that 
all capitalist economies are converging towards the ‘liberal market economy’ model.  
As for the role of institutions, Streeck (2009, p. 158) clearly notes that ‘while 
liberalization sometimes does create atomistic markets, or aims to create them, it is 
not in principle hostile to institutions, provided their purpose is confined to making 
markets, or making them more efficient’. What Streeck does defend is that the 
German political economy underwent a process of liberalization that led to a shift 
from organized to disorganized capitalism (rather than from a coordinated to an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
institutional evolution and change’. Furthermore, other institutionalist scholars stressed the same point. 
See, for instance, Rodrigues (2008, p. 330).  
21 Note that contrary to economic insider-outsider scholars, the liberalization framework does not see 
conflict as a constraint that disturbs the functioning of the market, but as an intrinsic feature of 
capitalism. In their view it is market expansion that triggers social conflict and not the conflicting 
interests between insiders and outsiders. 
22 Dualization scholars often contrast their perspective with the liberalization framework (Palier and 
Thelen 2010, p. 120; Emmenegger et al. 2012a, p. 10; Thelen 2012, pp. 138–139).  
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uncoordinated system – from Streeck’s point of view, coordination may go hand-in-
hand with disorganization), the first being characterized by what he calls 
Durkheimian institutions and the latter by Williamsonian ones (Streeck 2009, Chapter 
11) (see Table 2.6).23 This fact is, in our opinion, very much in line with the 
dualization literature: as Streeck (2009, p. 151) notes, ‘liberalization, in other words, 
sets actors free from institutionalized obligations, allowing solidarism to be overruled 
by segmentalism (…), but does not preclude and is not incompatible with 
coordination in a “coordinated market economy”, provided such coordination comes 
about voluntarily and from below’.  
 
Table 2.6 – Two types of political-economic institutions 
Durkheimian Williamsonian 
Authoritative organization Voluntary coordination 
Creation of obligations Reduction of transaction costs 
Public order Private ordering 
Government Governance 
Obligational Voluntaristic 
Exogenously imposed Endogenously contracted 
Third party enforcement Self-enforcement 
Source: Streeck (2009, p. 155) 
 
As regards the discussion on the convergence towards the ‘liberal market 
economy model’, Streeck likewise does not refer to a process of convergence but 
indeed to one of convergence and divergence at the same time: ‘by distinguishing 
between coordination and organization, we can allow for nonconvergence with 
respect to coordination to coexist with convergence in organization, or 
disorganization, in the course of a global process of capitalism becoming “unleashed” 
(Glyn), freeing itself from constraining social obligations’ (Streeck 2009, p. 168). In 
short, while dualization sees change exclusively driven by efficiency, liberalization 
sees change mainly driven by the conflictual logic of the capitalist system. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 According to Streeck (2009, pp. 154–155): ‘Durkheimian institutions authoritatively constitute an 
obligatory public order that in principle exists apart from and beyond the choosing of those subject to 
it. To them they are “social facts”: a constraining external reality that they are not in principle free to 
adopt, reject, or change [while] (…) Williamson institutions, by contrast, are devices for nonmarket 
though market-responsive and indeed market-driven coordination of economic behaviour. They are 
purposely and voluntarily constructed by market participants to increase the efficiency of their 
exchanges.’ 
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Notwithstanding, liberalization scholars recognize that for various historically 
contingent reasons, some market-breaking institutions (such as those created in the 
‘coordinated market economies’) are compatible with the process of market 
expansion. 
By distinguishing organization and coordination, and arguing that 
liberalization is a process characterized by a shift from organized to disorganized 
capitalism (rather than a shift from a coordinated to an uncoordinated system), 
Streeck shows that coordination is compatible with market expansion, provided such 
coordination comes about voluntarily and from below. There are, however, countries 
(e.g., in Southern Europe) where such coordination is almost absent. As a 
consequence, the impact of the shift from an organized to a disorganized capitalism is 
stronger. In Southern Europe, a large part of stable jobs were created in the public 
sector (rather than in the ‘core manufacturing economy’), both due to the great 
expansion of the welfare state during the 1980s and the existence of a large number of 
state-owned enterprises (Chauvel 2010, p. 25). The privatizations of these enterprises 
and the cuts in public services have reduced the share of these jobs. This explains why 
older people were able to find more stable jobs in the past.  
Finally, by arguing that the dualization framework is particularly well suited 
to explaining the situation in Continental European countries, we do not mean that the 
emphasis on differences between the primary and the secondary sector is useless for 
understanding the situation in Southern Europe. In our view, that emphasis is 
important, but for a different reason. We argue that it is also because some countries 
lack what Palier and Thelen (2010) have called the ‘core manufacturing economy’ 
that a growing number of outsiders among young people exist. Indeed, while in 
Continental Europe the manufacturing sector still provides access to a large number 
of stable jobs, the same does not apply to the Mediterranean regime.24 The number of 
jobs in the core sectors of the public economy was already falling before the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 By saying this we are not arguing that in Continental Europe young people are immune to labour 
market problems. Compared with their parents, they indeed face more problems in finding stable jobs. 
However, we stress that in Southern Europe the situation is worse because the available jobs on the 
labour market are of lower quality. It is the quality of the available jobs that is the cause of the 
deterioration of the labour market position of young people. Furthermore, some policy-makers point to 
the German jobs miracle and argue that the main problem in Southern Europe is the transition from 
school to work. They defend the view that by spreading vocational education the younger generations 
would face fewer problems in finding a job. However, they do not take into consideration that 
vocational education is only one part of the German system; the other is the existence of a large 
manufacturing sector. 
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sovereign debt crisis, but the levels afterwards plummeted. Indeed, together with 
austerity policies in the public sector, the massive process of privatization of public 
enterprises that has taken place since the 1980s (coinciding with the accession to the 
European Economic Community) has also contributed to reducing the power of 
unions, as well as the share of workers covered by stable work arrangements. The 
new generations entering the labour market after/during this process have been 
severely affected. The deterioration of the position of young people on the labour 
market is therefore directly related to the spread of poor jobs. 
Taking these two factors together – fertile breeding grounds for social conflict, 
and the absence of a ‘core manufacturing economy’ –, we argue that the process of 
change in Southern Europe is therefore best described as change through layering: 
while the core labour force has remained protected, the fringes have been affected the 
most. Given the characteristics of the industrial relations system, a radical and abrupt 
change towards liberalization is difficult to implement in Southern Europe, as 
contestative relations block labour market reforms. However, as we have discussed 
throughout this chapter (see section 2.2), transformation can occur without disruption 
(Thelen 1999). Streeck and Thelen (2005) built a powerful theory to explain 
institutional change and stressed the importance of incremental change with 
transformative results. They highlighted the existence of at least five broad modes of 
gradual but nevertheless transformative change (displacement, layering, drift, 
conversion, and exhaustion). We believe that change through layering is the most 
accurate way to classify the process of labour market adjustment in Southern Europe. 
For Streeck and Thelen (2005, pp. 23–24), ‘change through layering can set in motion 
path-altering dynamics through a mechanism of what we might think of as differential 
growth. (…) Layering involves active sponsorship of amendments, additions, or 
revisions to an existing set of institutions.’ Later, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) 
identified which types of strategies flourish in which kinds of institutional 
environments. They (2010, p. 20) argued that ‘with layering institutional change 
grows out of the attachment of new institutions or rules onto or alongside existing 
ones. While powerful veto players can protect the old institutions, they cannot 
necessarily prevent the addition of new elements.’ Put simply, when strong veto 
possibilities exist and, at the same time, it is not possible to ‘ignore’ the existing 
institutions, layering is the most common mode of institutional change. This was 
precisely what happened in Southern Europe. Although no structural changes took 
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place regarding employees with permanent contracts and covered by collective 
agreements, massive changes were implemented outside this core. By resisting 
policies aiming to make the labour market more flexible, unions have been able to 
protect their core constituencies (in contrast to Continental Europe, protected workers 
are found not in the ‘core manufacturing economy’, but where the strength of trade 
unions is higher, i.e. in the core sectors of the public economy). As a consequence, 
gradually, from the 1990s onwards, a new labour market was created, characterized 
by the expansion of a secondary labour market, where fixed-term contracts, low paid-
jobs, and low union density are its main features.25  
In Chapter 4, we will apply Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative analysis to 
examine the determinants of outsiderness among young people. We expect that 
countries combining the above-mentioned factors have more outsiders among their 
young people than countries that do not combine these factors. Besides Southern 
Europe, other European countries will be included in the analysis, namely those that 
have been studied within the scope of the dualization literature. By doing so, we 
expect to find a path covering Southern Europe and combining the factors mentioned 
above. Notwithstanding, by including other countries in the analysis, we will also 
attempt to find other paths leading to high numbers of outsiders among young people 
and to clarify which dimensions are more important to explaining this outcome. 
Before proceeding to the fuzzy set analysis, an introduction to Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) is provided. Chapter 3 explains why QCA is used in the 
scope of this study and describes its main features.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Although beyond this thesis, an interesting question is whether dualization will last in Southern 
Europe. Research into the Continental case (Emmenegger et al. 2012b, pp. 315–318) supports the view 
that insider–outsider divides may last, given that outsiders are not competing directly with insiders. 
However, it is our conviction that the situation in Southern European is different. Age dualities have 
contributed (especially during the crisis) to a dramatic increase in youth unemployment. This situation 
has short- and medium-term consequences for the sustainability of the welfare state, to the extent that it 
has an impact on contributions to social security, given that an increase in unemployment both raises 
social protection expenditure and diminishes contributions. Delaying the entrance of young people into 
the labour market and the type of contract they are given when employed (precarious work) both have 
a negative effect on fertility rates, which worsens the population ageing problem. If we take into 
account that young people are comparatively more educated, the situation becomes even more 
dramatic, due to the waste of productive potential. The above-mentioned constraints, together with the 
fact that a huge proportion of young people have inadequate jobs for their level of education, are 
jeopardizing the future of these countries. Therefore, the process of change in Southern European 
labour markets seems to contain the seeds of its own destruction. Future research must address this 
issue.  
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3 Epistemological foundations of Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
Methodological procedures reflect theoretical interests and commitments, 
commitments that are epistemological in nature (Ragin and Zaret 1983, p. 748). In our 
view, it is not insignificant to explain why a certain methodological strategy is chosen 
in the scope of a specific investigation. Indeed, as Hall (2003) argued, the choice of 
the method must be aligned with the theoretical position of the investigator. The main 
objective of the present chapter is to explain the reasons for using Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA). Moreover, by explaining the epistemological 
foundations of QCA, we also enlighten why Chapter 5 compares two case studies to 
deepen the analysis carried out in Chapter 4.1 This chapter begins by laying out the 
differences between the qualitative and quantitative traditions. To clarify the origins 
of each tradition, a discussion is presented on John Stuart Mill’s canons of 
experimental inquiry. The third section presents the main features of QCA, focusing 
on two key themes. First, the similarities between QCA, Mill’s first three methods 
and the qualitative tradition are outlined. Second, the differences between them are 
clarified. The remaining part of the chapter explains why the method is used in the 
scope of our study.    
 
 
3.1. Qualitative and quantitative traditions: a different logic of inference  
Several authors point out that two different traditions exist in the social sciences: the 
quantitative and qualitative traditions (Ragin 1987; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). At 
first sight, this statement is not controversial since it is usual to recognize its 
existence. However, the reasons put forward by Goertz and Mahoney (2012) to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For details regarding this analysis, see Chapter 5.  
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explain qualitative–quantitative distinction, depart from standard explanations (see, 
for instance, King et al. 1994).  
 In their view, it is not the size of the N or the type of data used that explains 
the split between qualitative and quantitative methods. Goertz and Mahoney (2012, 
pp. 10-11) argue that it is not because qualitative scholars often carry out studies with 
a relatively small N while quantitative scholars conduct studies with a relatively large 
N, on the one hand, or qualitative scholars frequently use ‘qualitative’ data in their 
analysis while quantitative researchers use ‘quantitative’ data, on the other. According 
to them, the split results from the logic of inference that is predominant in each 
tradition (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, pp. 9-12). The core of their argument is the 
rejection of the assumption that a single logic of inference founded on statistical 
norms guides both the qualitative and the quantitative tradition. They put forward two 
interconnected differences between the traditions (see Table 3.1).  
First, there is the contrast between within-case analysis and cross-case 
analysis. It is argued that qualitative scholars look at cases as wholes and compare 
whole cases with each other. As a consequence, cases are viewed as configurations, as 
combinations of characteristics (Ragin 1987, p. 3). In contrast, quantitative scholars 
make inferences about populations. As Ragin (1987, p. 17) has argued, ‘the usual goal 
of variable-oriented investigations is to produce generalizations about relationships 
among variables, not to understand or to interpret specific historical outcomes in a 
small number of cases or in an empirically defined set of cases’. 2  Quantitative 
scholars do not perform within-case analysis because they analyze relationships 
between variables. By way of illustration, suppose that the objective of a certain 
research project is to explain the rise of income inequality in a set of European 
countries. While quantitative scholars will typically analyze how the variation of each 
independent variable (e.g., the level of collective bargaining coverage, the level of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 A renowned economist as Schumpeter earlier stressed the importance of these contextual and 
historical factors, which in his view play a crucial role to explain the workings of the economic system. 
Indeed, Schumpeter argued that, regardless of its limitations, one of the most important contributions 
of Marx was precisely the introduction of these factors at the centre of the analysis. As Schumpeter 
(1943, p. 37) argued ‘there is however one thing of fundamental importance for the methodology of 
economics which he [Karl Marx] actually achieved. Economists always have either themselves done 
work in economic history or else used the historical work of others. But the facts of economic history 
were assigned to a separate compartment. They entered theory, if at all, merely in the role of 
illustrations, or possibly of verifications of results. (…) Now Marx’s mixture is a chemical one; that is 
to say, he introduced them into the very argument that produces the results. He was the first economist 
of top rank to see and to teach systematically how economic theory may be turned into histoire 
raisonnée.’  
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union density, the level of deindustrialization, the weight of the financial sector, the 
level of centralization of collective bargaining, and the level of employers’ 
organization density) is correlated with the variation of the dependent variable (the 
variation of income inequality), qualitative scholars will follow a different research 
strategy. The latter do not isolate each independent variable from its context, they will 
typically analyze each case on its one and look at how different configurations of 
characteristics lead to the rise of income inequality (the outcome of the analysis). As 
for the results, quantitative researchers may conclude that the rise of income 
inequality is explained by two independent variables – the level of collective 
bargaining coverage and the level of union density – because on average the variation 
of these two variables is correlated with the variation of the dependent variable. 
However, qualitative scholars may point to a different conclusion, namely that, for 
example, only when collective bargaining coverage and union density are combined 
with rapid deindustrialization or with the rise of the financial sector the outcome 
occurs (because they may find that when collective bargaining and union density are 
combined with other factors the outcome does not occur). Therefore, while qualitative 
scholars identify two different configurations leading to the rise of income inequality 
(the first combining the absence of high collective bargaining coverage, the absence 
of high union density, and high deindustrialization; the second combining the absence 
of high collective bargaining, the absence of high union density, and the rise of the 
financial sector), quantitative scholars point to the importance of two independent 
variables to explain the variation in the dependent variable. It is for this reason that 
when quantitative scholars present their results, the cases ‘disappear’ from the 
analysis. Usually, a summary table is presented with information regarding the model 
and if a statistically significant relationship between each independent variable and 
the dependent variable exists. In contrast, when qualitative scholars present their 
results, cases remain present because they are the ‘main character’, the example used 
to illustrate how a certain configuration produces a certain outcome. All in all, the 
contrast between within-case and cross-case analysis plays a crucial role to explain 
the differences between the qualitative and the quantitative traditions.   
 Second, there is the contrast between inferential statistics, on the one hand, 
and logic and set theory, on the other. Quantitative research is based on inferential 
statistics (probability and statistical theory). The rationale is the following: the greater 
the number of entities the better, in order to establish control for contextual factors. 
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As Ragin and Zaret (1983, p. 738) have argued, ‘the logic of analysis used in 
comparative study of permanent causes minimizes the role of non-systemic causes 
associated with historical contexts and contingencies’. On the contrary, qualitative 
scholars tend to emphasize particularities of the single case because each case is seen 
as a whole. The objective is often to contrast different cases (each one with its 
different configuration of characteristics) and to clarify which specific characteristic 
explains a certain outcome (or its absence). Therefore, these methods are logical 
rather than statistical because they pretend to identify invariant relationships, not 
statistical relationships. As a consequence, the identification of necessary and 
sufficient conditions is the cornerstone of qualitative research practices (Goertz and 
Mahoney 2012, p. 11). In these studies, a condition is considered to be necessary if 
the outcome cannot occur in its absence, while a condition is sufficient if the outcome 
always occurs when the condition is present.    
 Before presenting QCA’s main features and its relation with the qualitative 
tradition, an introduction to John Stuart Mill’s canons of experimental inquiry is 
made. By carrying out this discussion, we pretend to clarify the historical foundations 
of each tradition.  
 
Table 3.1 Qualitative and quantitative traditions  
 Quantitative tradition Qualitative tradition 
Type of analysis Cross-case Within-case 
 
Logic of inference 
 
Probabilistic 
 
Logic and set theory 
 
 
3.2 John Stuart Mill’s canons of experimental inquiry  
In this section it is argued that three of Mill’s methods are of particular interest to 
case-oriented investigations, while one of Mill’s methods forms the core of the 
variable-oriented strategy (Ragin 1987, pp. 36-42; Rihoux and Ragin 2009, pp. 1-3; 
Caramani 2009).  
 The method of agreement, the method of difference, and the joint method of 
agreement and difference constitute the intellectual roots of case-oriented 
investigations. The method of agreement states that ‘if two or more instances of the 
phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the 
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circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the 
given phenomenon’ (Mill 1843, p. 280). By way of illustration, suppose that the 
objective of a certain research project is to identify the cause of the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe (the outcome). By using the method of agreement, one can, for 
example, argue that a deep crisis in the financial system is the cause of the outcome if 
in the set of European countries in which the outcome is present, they only have one 
characteristic in common, that characteristic being a deep crisis in the financial 
system.  
The method of difference states that ‘if an instance in which the phenomenon 
under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every 
circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the 
circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an 
indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon’ (Mill 1843, pp. 280-281). 
Suppose that, again, the objective is to identify the cause of the sovereign debt crisis 
in Europe. By using the method of difference, one could argue that a deep crisis in the 
financial system is the cause of the outcome if two sets of European countries (in 
which the outcome is present versus in which the outcome is absent) have every 
circumstance in common save one, that circumstance being a deep crisis in the 
financial system (which occurs only in the first group of countries).  
The joint method of agreement and difference argues that ‘if two or more 
instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, 
while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save 
the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of 
instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the 
phenomenon’ (Mill 1843, p. 284). Using the same example mentioned earlier, the use 
of the joint method requires two distinct analyses. First, one has to undertake the same 
analysis performed in the scope of the method of agreement (see above). Second, if 
the set of European countries in which the outcome is absent has any circumstance in 
common except the absence of a deep crisis in the financial system, one can argue 
that this is the cause of the outcome (the sovereign debt crisis in Europe).  
 Finally, the method of concomitant variation constitutes the intellectual roots 
of the variable-oriented strategy. This method states that ‘whatever phenomenon 
varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular 
manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it 
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through some fact of causation’ (Mill 1843, pp. 287-288). This method inspires 
contemporary standard statistical methods. Statistical methods aim to identify the 
(independent) variables that are correlated with a certain (dependent) variable. These 
scholars usually use large data sets to perform their analysis. Using the same example 
mentioned before, to test if the variation in the level of sovereign debt crisis is 
correlated with the variation in the level of the crisis in the financial system, one has 
to analyze if the two variables vary in the same manner. Notwithstanding, contrarily 
to the other three methods, no single cause has to be identified; several variables can 
be correlated with the level of the sovereign debt crisis.  
 Taken as a whole, Mill’s methods form the historical epistemological 
foundations of both qualitative and quantitative traditions. While the first three 
methods constitute a search for patterns of invariance and, therefore, inspire much of 
contemporary qualitative methods, the method of concomitant variation pretends to 
establish relationships between variables, inspiring the statistical method. QCA draws 
mainly on the first three methods, but it departs from them in a number of points. The 
following section outlines the main features of QCA.  
 
 
3.3 Qualitative Comparative Analysis as a synthetic strategy 
 
Figure 3.1 – Historical foundations of QCA 
 
J.S Mill ‘canons’ for establishing causal relations 
Method of 
agreement 
Method of 
difference 
Method of concomitant 
variation 
Joint method of 
agreement and difference 
Qualitative tradition 
(within-case analysis; logic and set theory) 
Quantitative tradition 
(cross-case analysis; inferential statistics) 
QCA 
(csQCA; mvQCA; fsQCA; tQCA) 
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QCA is a qualitative method because it aims to identify invariant relationships, not 
statistical relationships. Furthermore, together with the qualitative tradition, the 
identification of necessary and sufficient conditions is also the main objective of 
QCA. Therefore, it draws on three of Mill’s methods (see Figure 3.1). 
Notwithstanding, QCA departs from Mill’s methods and the qualitative tradition in a 
number of points. Below we discuss those differences and outline the unique features 
of QCA.  
 Contrarily to Mill’s methods, QCA allows the analysis of conjunctural (or 
configurational) causation and multiple conjunctural causation. As for conjunctural 
causation, Ragin (1987, p. 25) suggests that ‘whenever social scientists examine 
large-scale change (…) they find that it is usually combinations of conditions that 
produce change. (…) When a causal argument cites a combination of conditions, it is 
concerned with their intersection. It is the intersection of a set of conditions in time 
and in space that produces many of the large-scale qualitative changes, (…) not the 
separate or independent effects of these conditions. (…) In the absence of any of the 
essential ingredients, the phenomenon – or the change – does not emerge’ (Ragin 
1987, p. 25). Using again the same example mentioned above about the sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe, the conjunctural logic means that the single cause suggested 
above (a deep crisis in the financial system) may not be sufficient to produce the 
outcome. One can argue that only when combined with a huge state intervention in 
the financial system, does the financial crisis lead to the outcome. The method of 
agreement and the joint method are incapable of handling conjunctural causation, 
because they aim to identify single causes and not combinations of conditions.  
Regarding multiple conjunctural causation, it contains the notion of 
equifinality, which means that different combinations of conditions (paths) can lead to 
the same outcome (Ragin 1987, p. 25; Rihoux and Ragin 2009, p. 8). Mill’s first three 
methods are incapacitated by multiple causation (i.e. they do not allow multiple 
causation). For instance, when multiple combinations of conditions lead to a certain 
outcome, the application of the method of agreement would lead to the incorrect 
conclusion that neither of these factors causes the outcome (Ragin 1987, p. 38). Using 
the same example again, multiple conjunctural causation means that different paths 
may lead to the sovereign debt crisis. For example, while the financial crisis 
combined with the need for direct public intervention in large scale in the financial 
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system may lead to the outcome (i.e., the sovereign debt crisis in Europe) in a set of 
European countries, the financial crisis combined political instability may lead to the 
same outcome in a different set of European countries.  
 Besides departing from Mill’s first three methods, QCA also differs from the 
qualitative tradition in some respects. Although Ragin emphasizes the strengths of 
case-oriented investigations, the author also outlines the strengths of variable-oriented 
research. Ragin (1987, pp. 57-58) argues that standard statistical methods (i) allows 
the study of more than a limited number of cases; (ii) contributes to the existence of 
reliable quantitative cross-national data; (iii) socializes comparative social science 
because cross-national data banks are easily accessible to all investigators; (iv) and 
counteracts the tendency among qualitative scholars to favour particularistic 
explanations. As a consequence, QCA also aims to overcome some of the limitations 
of the qualitative tradition, but it attempts to do so in a way compatible with its logic 
of inference.  
 Ragin (1987, p. 68) argues that a trade-off exists between complexity and 
generality. The case-oriented strategy, because it is holistic, becomes more difficult to 
use as the number of cases increases. Regarding the variable-oriented approach, as the 
complexity of the causal argument to be tested increases, intractable methodological 
problems are introduced. QCA is a synthetic strategy because it tries to better 
combine complexity with generality. By synthetic, Ragin means to combine certain 
features of the two traditions in a selective way. From qualitative methodologies, 
QCA draws the same logic of inference, and particularly its allowance for complex, 
conjunctural causation (Ragin 1987, pp. 82-83). From the quantitative tradition, QCA 
draws the possibility to address a large number of cases and the possibility to 
formulate parsimonious explanations. Furthermore, considering that one of the 
weaknesses of case-oriented studies is the fact they are very private products (i.e., 
because qualitative scholars often collect their own data, they do not share their 
databases with other researchers), QCA also draws from the quantitative tradition the 
possibility to allow consideration of alternative explanations, namely by using data 
that is also available to other researchers (Ragin 1987, p. 84).  
 Before proceeding to examine why this method is used in this study, the four 
different techniques available in the scope of QCA are summarized. Furthermore, 
Table 3.2 presents the terminology used in QCA (in contrast to the one used in 
standard statistical techniques).  
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 Four different techniques are available in the scope of QCA: crisp-set QCA 
(csQCA), multi-value QCA (mvQCA), fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), and temporal QCA 
(TQCA). csQCA was the first QCA technique developed in the 1980s. This technique 
was based on Boolean algebra, using only binary data ([0] or [1]) (Rihoux and Ragin 
2009, pp. 33-67). To overcome the limitations of dichotomous variables, mvQCA 
extends csQCA by allowing multi-value variables, namely through the use of multi-
categorical nominal, ordinal scale, or by the use of multiple thresholds for interval 
data (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, pp. 69-86). The third technique is the most 
sophisticated. It has been developed in Ragin’s 2008 book Redesigning Social 
Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (Ragin 2008). Contrarily to csQCA and mvQCA, 
fsQCA permits membership scores in the interval between [0] and [1]. As Ragin has 
argued, ‘the basic idea behind fuzzy sets is to permit the scaling of membership scores 
and thus allow partial membership’ (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, p. 89).3 Furthermore, 
within the scope of this new technique, two key innovations were introduced: 
consistency and coverage. These two measures were introduced to aid the 
interpretation of the results of QCA applications (Ragin 2006; Ragin 2008; Marx, 
Rihoux and Ragin 2013). Even though fsQCA has been developed later, its 
introduction has boosted the use of QCA (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, pp. 86-121). The 
last technique (TQCA), developed by Caren and Panofsky (2005), attempts to better 
account for time and sequence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For example, to measure ‘the level of wealth’ in a set of countries, the available variable values 
depend on the technique that is being used. For csQCA, only two values are available: a country may 
only be considered as being rich (presence of the condition) or not rich (the absence of the condition). 
This is so because this technique is based on dichotomous variables. For mvQCA, more than two 
values are available. For instance, the following can be used: very rich (presence of the condition), rich, 
poor, and very poor (absence of the condition). This is so because this technique allows multi-value 
variables. Finally, for fsQCA, variable values vary in the interval between 0.00 and 1.00. Therefore, 
partial membership is allowed: while a certain case may have a membership score of say 0.17, a 
different case may have a membership score of 0.79 (and so on).     
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Table 3.2 – Terminology of QCA 
Standard statistical techniques Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Values on variables Set membership scores 
 
Correlations 
 
Set relations 
 
Linear 
 
Boolean/fuzzy algebra 
 
Independent variables 
 
Condition 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Outcome 
 
Equation 
 
Solution formula/solution term 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2010, p. 8).  
 
Chapter 4 applies fsQCA to examine the determinants of outsiderness among young 
people. There are four main reasons for the choice of this method. First and foremost, 
to test the theoretical argument put forward in Chapter 2 we need a data analysis 
technique able to analyze the existence of a complex causal explanation for high 
levels of outsiderness among young people. As argued before, fsQCA places great 
emphasis on complex causal explanations. Contrary to standard statistical methods, 
which focus mainly on the statistical significance level of each independent variable, 
fsQCA focuses on how causal conditions combine to generate outcomes. Second, in 
Chapter 2 it has been argued that dualization in some countries is very age-based. To 
test if our theoretical argument explains the outcome in Southern Europe, we need a 
data analysis technique that permits within-case analysis, i.e. the use of empirical 
information to make inferences about the individual case (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 
p. 10). Third, we opt for fsQCA because this method addresses the ‘few cases, many 
variables’ problem. Besides the above-mentioned problems with statistical analyses, 
regression analysis is not particularly useful here because the relatively small number 
of cases would produce unreliable results. Finally, fsQCA is used (instead of csQCA 
and mvQCA) because the data used in Chapter 4 allows the use of this technique, 
which, as explained earlier, is more sophisticated.  
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4 Young people and dualization in Europe: A fuzzy set 
analysis    
 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that the explanation of growing age-based labour market 
inequalities requires a different analytic focus which borrows important insights from 
the recent literature on dualization, but departs from it in three ways. First, it must 
highlight differences between the industrial relations systems. Rather than cross-class 
coalitions between trade unions and employer associations of the ‘core manufacturing 
economy’, it is the highly conflictual relations between labour and capital that 
characterize some countries. Second, we suggest placing more emphasis on the 
process of liberalization. Indeed, liberalization scholars have made a powerful critique 
of the rationalist-functionalist assumptions on which the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) approach relies and they argue that change in all capitalist economies is driven 
by a process of market expansion and social conflicts. The two factors – poor 
coordination in the industrial relations system and the liberalization process – can be 
synthesized under what we call fertile breeding grounds for social conflict because 
both market expansion and a conflictual industrial relations system are conducive to 
social conflict. Social conflict has a negative effect on young people because they 
hold less political power. Finally, although these two factors play a crucial role in 
explaining age-based inequalities, they are not the only drivers of the process. In our 
view, the growing number of outsiders among young people is also due to a smaller 
proportion of certain kinds of primary sector jobs in some countries.  
This chapter applies Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to 
examine the determinants of outsiderness among young people in Europe (Ragin 
2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012), 1 a method that has been gaining in popularity 
and application. 2 Based on our theoretical argument, we hypothesize that fertile !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This analysis is based on 14 cases (Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal).  
2  For a list of publications using fsQCA in economics, see: 
http://www.compasss.org/bibliography/busEco.htm. 
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breeding grounds for social conflict (due to either the poor coordination in the 
industrial relations system or liberalization) and a small proportion of primary sector 
jobs are necessary conditions for high levels of outsiderness among young people. 
Moreover, although we criticize the emphasis placed by the economic insider-outsider 
framework on the role of employment protection, it seems plausible to hypothesize 
that employment protection may play a non-redundant role (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, p. 79). Indeed, it is plausible that employment protection in 
combination with an uncoordinated industrial relations system and a small proportion 
of primary sector jobs constitute one path toward high levels of outsiderness among 
young people. However, this condition alone is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
The results of the fsQCA analysis presented in this chapter show that a small 
proportion primary sector jobs and the combination of a poor coordination in the 
industrial relations system and liberalization are necessary conditions for the outcome 
high levels of outsiderness among young people. Furthermore, we find no evidence 
that high employment protection is a necessary condition for the outcome. As 
concerns the analysis of sufficient conditions, two possible paths for the outcome are 
identified: the first combines a small proportion primary sector jobs, high employment 
protection, and poor coordination in the industrial relations system; the second 
combines a small proportion of primary sector jobs, the absence of high employment 
protection, and liberalization. 
This chapter has been divided into four parts. The first will present the raw 
data and the calibration of the outcome and conditions. The second part will then 
proceed to discuss the results of the empirical analysis, namely through the analysis of 
necessary conditions and sufficient conditions. The third part presents the robustness 
tests. The final section will summarize and conclude the chapter.  
 
 
4.1 Data and calibration 
Following Marx (2006), who argued that a moderate ratio of conditions to cases is 
required to ensure the validity of results, this analysis has four conditions: a small 
proportion of primary sector jobs (PS), high levels of employment protection (EP), 
poor coordination in the industrial relations system (PCO), and high levels of 
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liberalization (L).3 This section first presents the outcome high levels of outsiderness 
among young people (YO) and thereafter presents each condition. The calibration of 
fuzzy set scores is discussed in detail, following the instructions of Ragin and Sonnet 
(2005, p. 193), who argued that the calibration must be presented as transparently as 
possible.  
 
 
4.1.1. Outcome: high levels of outsiderness among young people (YO) 
The outcome under study is the high levels of outsiderness among young people 
(YO), which is calculated as the percentage point difference between the proportion 
of outsiders among young people (< 40 years old) and the proportion of outsiders 
among older age groups (≥ 40 years old). The question, however, is how to define 
outsiders. This section will explain how outsiders have been defined in the scope of 
the dualization literature, and discuss the definition followed here. This section 
concludes by explaining the calibration of fuzzy set scores.  
 Two different strategies have been used within the scope of the dualization 
literature. The first, used by Rueda (2005, p. 63; 2006, p. 395; 2007, pp. 14-15), 
Emmenegger (2009, p. 137), Lindvall and Rueda (2012, pp. 296-297), and Davidsson 
and Emmenegger (2013, p. 360) defines outsiders as those who are unemployed or 
holding part-time jobs, fixed-term contracts, or temporary jobs. 4 The second, used by 
Häusermann and Schwander (2012; Schwander and Häusermann 2013, pp. 252-254), 
is more sophisticated: rather than relying on a ‘snapshot’ categorization, outsiders are 
defined as those belonging to occupational groups that are ‘typically’ affected by 
atypical work and unemployment. Drawing on the class scheme proposed by Oesch 
(2006) and Kitschelt and Rehm (2005), Schwander and Häusermann  (2013, pp. 252-
253) identify five broad classes (capital accumulators, socio-cultural professionals, 
blue-collar workers, low-service functionaries, and mixed-service functionaries), then 
divide each class (except for capital accumulators, which they define as insiders) by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 A condition is a ‘factor which is used to explain the outcome’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 
323). An outcome is a ‘phenomenon to be studied in an analysis’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 
330).  
4 However, some differences exist within this group: while some authors define as outsiders those who 
work part-time, the fixed-term employed, and the part-time employed (e.g. Emmenegger 2009), others 
(e.g. Rueda 2006) only include these categories if these workers want a permanent job or a full-time 
job, otherwise they exclude them from the group of outsiders. !
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sex and two age groups (< 40 years old and ≥ 40 years old), ending up with 17 
occupational groups. Häusermann and Schwander define outsiders as those belonging 
to occupational groups that incur a particularly high probability (i.e., statistically 
significant) of atypical employment and/or unemployment. Furthermore, they analyze 
separately each regime (Esping-Andersen 1990), and consequently occupational 
groups characterized by atypical employment/unemployment differ in each regime 
(Table 4.1). By assigning to each occupational group a different probability of being 
in atypical employment and/or unemployment, this definition addresses the issue that 
people do not form identities on the basis of momentary labour market status and that 
outsiders are not a homogeneous group, as suggested by a conceptualization based on 
current labour market status (Schwander and Häusermann 2013, pp. 251-252). 
Though Schwander and Häusermann’s definition tackles some of the problems 
inherent to a ‘snapshot’ classification of outsiders, it still relies on the same logic as 
Rueda and Emmenegger: outsiders are those who are unemployed or holding atypical 
jobs. Therefore, regardless of their differences, both definitions contribute to the same 
strand of literature.   
 
 
Table 4.1 – Occupational groups with a statistical significant probability of being in 
atypical employment and/or unemployment 
Regimes Young people Older generations 
Southern 
LSF women 
LSF men 
SCP women 
BC women 
MSF women 
LSF women 
 
Anglo-Saxon 
LSF women 
LSF men 
SCP women 
BC young women 
MSF young women 
LSF woman 
Nordic 
LSF women 
LSF men 
SCP women 
BC women 
MSF women 
LSF women 
SCP women 
BC women 
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Continental 
LSF women 
SCP women 
BC women 
MSF women 
LSF Women 
SCP Women 
MSF Women 
Note: LSF, low service functionaries; SCP, socio-cultural professionals; BC, blue-collar workers; MSF, 
mixed service functionaries. As for the operationalization of each occupational group see Schwander 
and Häusermann (2013, p. 266). The authors recode ISCO88 in order to calculate each occupational 
group.  
Source: Schwander and Häusermann (2013, p. 255).  
 
 
 In this study we follow Häusermann and Schwander’s definition of outsiders. 
As mentioned earlier, the outcome is calculated as the percentage point difference 
between the proportion of outsiders among young people (< 40 years old) and the 
proportion of outsiders among older age groups (≥ 40 years old). 5 To compute the 
proportion of outsiders among young people, the following procedures were 
performed. First, for each country, the number of young individuals who belong to 
occupational groups that incur a particularly high probability of being in atypical 
employment and/or unemployment was computed. Second, it was established that 
insiders are considered as those who belong to occupational groups that do not face a 
high probability of being in atypical employment. Finally, the proportion of outsiders 
among young people was calculated. The same procedure was followed to calculate 
the proportion of outsiders between the older generations. In short, Schwander and 
Häusermann’s procedure is replicated, except for using different databases and 
calculating the difference between outsiderness among young people and outsiderness 
in older age groups.  
With regard to databases, with the exception of Austria and Italy, the 
European Social Survey 2010 Round 5 is used (ESS 2010). This is first and foremost 
because this database uses the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO), therefore allowing the replication of the procedure followed by Schwander 
and Häusermann (see discussion above). Second, the data was collected in 2010 (i.e., 
after the global economic downturn), reflecting the changes that have occurred in the 
labour market since then.  Finally, it provides large samples for each country (see 
appendix, Table A4.1). Since Austria did not participate in the ESS 2010 Round 5, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 These two age groups (more and less than 40 years old) are used because, as Häusermann and 
Schwander (2013, p. 253) have remarked before, ‘most European countries have still a considerable 
number of young adults in education at the age of 30 years (…). Considering that acquiring a firm 
position in the labour market requires another couple of years, a substantial share of people in their 30s 
must still be counted as labour market entrants’. 
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ESS Round 4 – 2008 database is used for the Austrian case (ESS, 2008). As Italy has 
not participated in ESS since 2004, the International Social Survey Programme 2009 
‘Social Inequality IV’ database is used (ISSP 2012). The ISSP 2009 database also 
uses the ISCO classification and provides data for 2009.  
Before proceeding to present the first condition, it will be necessary to explain 
the calibration of the fuzzy set score for the outcome. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
qualitative research and quantitative research are each based on a separate tradition: 
case-oriented versus variable-oriented, respectively. While in the first tradition 
measures are usually calibrated (i.e., the focus is on the degree to which cases satisfy 
membership criteria), in the second, usually no attempt is made to look at cases or to 
interpret if a certain difference is relevant or meaningful – all variation is considered 
relevant. For instance, to classify the level of development across countries, the 
dominant quantitative approach normally uses indicators (e.g., the national income 
per capita) and considers a country as being highly developed (or vice versa) 
depending on whether its score is above (or below) the sample’s central tendency 
(usually the mean). On the contrary, qualitative researchers usually use external 
information (e.g., what is necessary to consider a country developed) to distinguish 
most- and least-developed countries. However, from the perspective of conventional 
quantitative research, qualitative researchers skew their measurements to fit their 
preconceptions, and therefore quantitative researchers see qualitative approaches as 
less precise. Ragin argues, however, that ‘with fuzzy sets, it is possible to have the 
best of both worlds, namely the precision that is prized by quantitative researchers and 
the use of substantive knowledge to calibrate measures that is central to qualitative 
research’ (2008, p. 82). Following the procedures put forward by Ragin (2008), to 
calibrate raw data it is necessary to decide where the point of maximum indifference 
regarding membership versus non-membership is located (0.5), to define the point of 
full membership (1.0) and the point of non-membership (0.0). Furthermore, this 
decision must be based on the theoretical knowledge as well as on the empirical 
evidence (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 32). Since the external criteria used to 
calibrate sets must be transparent and stated explicitly (Ragin 2008, p. 82; Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012, p. 32), this chapter explains in great detail the calibration of the 
outcome and conditions. 
Three different methods of calibration are available in the scope of fsQCA: the 
direct method, the indirect method, and theory based, or qualitative, calibration 
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strategies (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 32-41). 6  The direct method of 
calibration is used to calibrate the fuzzy set score for the outcome. 7 The raw data and 
the fuzzy set scores are displayed in Table 4.2. The fact that, in comparison with older 
age groups, young people are more affected by atypical work and unemployment is 
not surprising: several authors have pointed out that post-industrial labour markets 
have downplayed the position of young people (Esping-Andersen 1999, p. 306; 
Bonoli 2006, p. 3; Tremmel 2010; Oliveira et al. 2011, p. 163; Price et al. 2011, p. 4; 
Emmenegger et al. 2012a, pp. 6-7; Häusermann and Schwander 2012, p. 29). 
Therefore, it is not the difference between age groups but rather the degree of that 
difference that is important. Corroborating this, raw data in Table 4.2 shows that in all 
countries the proportion of outsiderness among young people is higher than that 
among older age groups. Thus, we consider that at least 45 on the indicator is required 
for full membership, at least 17 to be more in than out of the set, and 8 (or less) for 
full non-membership.8  Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Sweden are considered more in than out of the set. We consider the 
Danish and Swedish cases as more in than out of the set because a huge gap exists 
between these two countries and the countries considered more out than in the set. 
Furthermore, the overall number of outsiders (second column), that is, regardless of 
the difference between age groups, shows that these two countries are closer to the 
Southern and Anglo-Saxon countries than to the Continental countries or Finland. 
Finally, Figure 4.1 provides a graphic representation of fuzzy set scores.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Note also that calibration in the scope of fsQCA has a different meaning from the one usually used in 
economics (Ragin 2008, p. 72).   
7 As Thiem and Dusa (2013, p. 55) have explained ‘in fsQCA, continuous base variables need not be 
categorized by the researcher, but they can also be transformed into fuzzy-set membership scores with 
the help of continuous functions. Ragin (2008), for example, calls this procedure the direct method, 
which makes use of a piecewise logistic function’. For technical details on this see: Thiem and Dusa 
(2013, pp. 55-62).  !
8 Besides relying on theoretical knowledge, we used obvious value breaks among the cases to set three 
qualitative anchors, and we have made sure that no cases are classified on the crossover point. This 
same procedure is followed in all four conditions. 
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Table 4.2 – Calibration of the outcome ‘high levels of outsiderness among young 
people’  
Country % Outsiders 
(<40 years old) % Outsiders (≥40 years old) Difference between young and old outsiders  Fuzzy set score  
Austria 54.0 42.8 11.2 0.18 
Belgium 49.7 39.0 10.7 0.15 
Denmark 60.5 38.6 21.9 0.59 
Finland 55.5 41.1 14.4 0.36 
France 52.5 39.7 12.8 0.27 
Germany 44.9 36.4 8.5 0.03 
Greece 58.4 12.7 45.7 1.00 
Ireland 56.6 18.2 38.4 0.88 
Italy 50.5 9.7 40.8 0.92 
Netherlands 50.1 42.0 8.1 0.01 
Portugal 65.5 27.6 37.9 0.87 
Spain 56.6 18.9 37.7 0.87 
Sweden 60.0 42.4 17.6 0.51 
United Kingdom 60.0 18.7 41.3 0.93 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on ESS (2010); ESS (2008); and ISSP (2012).  
 
Figure 4.1 – Graphic representation of fuzzy set scores (high levels of outsiderness 
among young people) 
 
 
 
4.1.2. Condition I: a small proportion of primary sector jobs (PS) 
The dual labour market (DLM) theory speaks of the existence of a primary and a 
secondary labour market. While the first depends on the employee’s specific skills 
(acquired through on-the-job training and experience), the second lacks that logic: it is 
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supply and demand forces that play the pivotal role. Later, DLM scholars 
distinguished between an upper and a lower tier within the primary sector. By doing 
this, they recognized that not all jobs in the primary sector are characterized by the 
use of specific skills and employment stability. Piore (1972, p. 3) argued that upper 
tier jobs are different ‘from those in the lower tier by the higher pay and status, and 
the greater promotion opportunities which they afford. They are also distinguished by 
the mobility and turnover patterns, which tend to more closely resemble those of the 
secondary sector except, in contrast to the patterns of that sector, mobility and 
turnover tend to be associated with advancement’. To explain this, they argued that 
while in the upper tier workers make use of general skills, the lower tier is mainly 
characterized by the use of specific skills. In their view, ‘it is for this reason that lower 
tier jobs place a premium upon stability and routine’ (Piore 1972, p. 14). Since the 
aim of this study is to explain the rise of atypical employment and/or unemployment 
among young people, our interest is on employment stability rather than on higher pay 
or status. Therefore, this condition is calculated as the percentage point difference 
between the proportion of workers in the lower tier of the primary sector among 
young people (< 40 years old) and the same proportion among older age groups (≥ 
40 years old).  
 To measure the weight of primary sector jobs, conceptualizations based on the 
dichotomy between outsiders and insiders are useless. Indeed, the operationalization 
of outsiders and insiders used by dualization scholars was taken directly from the 
economic insider-outsider theory (due to Rueda’s bias towards this strand of literature 
on the detriment of DLM theory). To measure the weight of primary sector jobs it is 
therefore necessary to use an indicator that gives a pivotal role to specific skills rather 
than to the type of contracts. Absolute skill specificity (Iversen and Soskice 2001; 
Cusack et al. 2006) is an indicator that assigns a different degree of skill specificity to 
different occupations. 9  The logic is as follows: absolute skill specificity of an 
occupation is the higher (i) where it has the higher number of sub-occupations and (ii) 
where it has the lower share in the labour force in empirical terms. This indicator is 
calculated using the ISCO (the same classification scheme for occupations used to 
calculate the outcome), a classification scheme that identifies nine occupational 
groups and a different number of sub-occupations attached to each occupational group !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  See the Excel spreadsheet showing the calculation of the specificity measure, available at: 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/SkillSpecificity.htm 
! Young people and dualization in Europe !
! 67 
(see Table 4.3). As this classification is used in several surveys (namely in the ESS 
and ISSP), it is possible to replicate the procedure first put forward by Iversen and 
Soskice (2001). Having explained why absolute skill specificity captures better the 
logic of the primary sector than does a measure based on the type of contracts, let us 
now explain how this indicator is calculated.  
 Using the ESS 2010 (see abovementioned exceptions), one can calculate the 
degree of absolute skill specificity attached to each occupational group, and to 
compute the proportion of workers holding jobs that require high levels of skill 
specificity. Using data for all cases (i.e., all countries) under analysis (see Table 4.3), 
the level of absolute skill specificity attached to each occupational group is calculated. 
The last column in Table 4.3 is the following ratio:  
 !"# − !""#$%&'!(),%!!"!!"!#$%!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&!!"#$%  
 
Table 4.3 shows that two different groups exist within the results: three 
occupational groups with a much lower level of skill specificity (‘clerks’, ‘service 
workers and shop and market sales workers’, and ‘elementary occupations’); and 
three occupational groups 10 where the level of skill specificity is higher  (‘craft and 
related trades workers’, ‘plant and machine operators and assemblers’, and 
‘technicians and associate professionals’). 11 Thereafter, workers in the occupational 
groups with high levels of skill specificity (identified in the first step) are considered 
as belonging to the primary sector. Finally, the proportion of workers in the primary 
sector for each age group is calculated and its difference is computed. Table 4.4 
summarizes that information.   
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 One might also have included workers from the first occupational group in the lower tier of the 
primary sector. Indeed, its level of absolute skill specificity is similar to the third occupational group. 
We decided not to do so because this literature clearly states that the first two occupational groups 
belong to the upper tier of the primary sector (Piore 1972, p. 3). 
11  For a definition of each occupational group see ILO’s webpage: 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/major.htm 
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Table 4.3 – Absolute skill specificity: all countries 
ISCO88 
1 digit 
Description of 
occupational group 
Number of 
sub-
occupations 
Sub-
occupations, % 
of total 
% in the 
labour force 
Absolute skill 
specificity 
1 Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 
33 8.5 6.4 1.33 
2 Professionals 55 14.2 14.4 0.99 
3 Technicians and associate 
professionals 
73 18.8 15.1 1.25 
4 Clerks 23 5.9 11.5 0.51 
5 Service workers and shop 
and market sales workers 
23 5.9 23.6 0.25 
6 Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers 
16 4.1 1.5 2.73 
7 Craft and related trades 
workers 
70 18.0 10.8 1.67 
8 Plant and machine 
operators and assemblers 
70 18.0 5.8 3.10 
9 Elementary occupations 25 6.4 10.9 0.59 
 Sum 388 100 100  
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on ESS (2010); ESS (2008); and ISSP (2012).  
  
 
The direct method of calibration is used to transform the resulting indicator 
into a fuzzy set. The raw data and the fuzzy set score are displayed in Table 4.4. For 
this condition, at least -3 is required for full membership; values above 3 reflect full 
non-membership; and 0 is a crossover point. These qualitative anchors were chosen 
because what is relevant is the difference between generations rather than if the 
degree of that difference is very high. Interestingly, Table 4.4 shows that in France 
and Germany – the two case studies analyzed by Palier and Thelen (2010) – the 
primary sector is larger among young people than between older age groups. 
Furthermore, Finland is also considered to be more in than out of the set. However, in 
the remaining countries the opposite is the case. Finally, Figure 4.2 provides a graphic 
representation of fuzzy set scores.     
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Table 4.4 – Calibration of the condition ‘a small proportion of primary sector jobs’  
 % Primary 
sector jobs  
(<40 years old) 
% Primary sector 
jobs (≥40 years old) Difference between age 
groups 
Fuzzy set score 
Austria 29.9 29.8 0.1 0.48 
Belgium 31.0 31.7 -0.7 0.62 
Denmark 29.2 38.5 -9.3 1.00 
Finland 33.5 34.4 -0.9 0.65 
France 41.7 36.2 5.5 0.00 
Germany 44.1 41.6 2.5 0.08 
Greece 26.6 29.7 -3.1 1.00 
Ireland 25.2 25.5 -0.3 0.55 
Italy 35.7 39.0 -3.3 1.00 
Netherlands 32.3 29.7 -2.6 0.93 
Portugal 34.9 40.9 -6.0 1.00 
Spain 29.9 32.0 -2.1 0.85 
Sweden 35.7 40.2 -4.5 1.00 
United Kingdom 24.2 28.1 -3.9 1.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on ESS (2010); ESS (2008); and ISSP (2012).   
 
Figure 4.2 – Graphic representation of fuzzy set scores (a small proportion of primary 
sector jobs) 
 
 
 
4.1.3. Condition II – high levels of employment protection (EP)  
The economic insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower 1988a; Blanchard 2006) 
is one of the leading strands of literature regarding labour market segmentation. 
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Scholars within this perspective argue that structural unemployment results from the 
existence of certain labour market institutions. Some workers, they argue, are trapped 
in involuntary unemployment because labour market institutions impede competition 
between the unemployed and those already in the labour market. When speaking of 
labour market institutions, economic insider-outsider scholars specifically mean 
institutions that protect insiders from the competition of outsiders, namely through 
rent-related labour turnover costs such as severance pay, seniority rules, requirements 
to give advance notice of dismissal, and other forms of legal protection. Furthermore, 
these scholars point to ‘restrictions on strikes and picking and relaxing job security 
and seniority legislation’ (Lindbeck and Snower 2001, p. 184) as the best solution to 
overcome the existing labour market divides. As discussed in detail below, two sub-
indicators are used to measure employment protection: the ‘employment protection 
index’, and ‘collective bargaining coverage’. The first is taken from the ‘OECD 
Indicators of Employment Protection’ (OECD 2013a), while the second is taken from 
the ‘Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2011 (ICTWSS)’ (Visser 2013). This section 
concludes by explaining the calibration of raw data.   
 Even though the OECD indicators of employment protection have been 
criticized by several authors (Crouch et al. 1999; Addison and Teixeira 2003; Venn 
2009, pp. 12-15; Barbier 2011, pp.  5-6), they have nevertheless been widely used to 
measure the level of strictness of employment protection (e.g., Emmenegger 2009; 
Venn 2009, p. 12; Emmenegger 2011). They are compiled from 21 items (see Table 
4.6) covering two broad aspects of employment protection regulations: ‘protection for 
regular contracts’ (including additional provision for collective dismissals) and 
‘protection for temporary contracts’ (all indicators are expressed in a scale of 0-6). 
These items are very much in line with the discussion made in the scope of the 
economic insider-outsider literature. However, with regard to the weights given to 
each item, following the suggestions made by Emmenegger (2011, online appendix), 
three changes to the original weights of the employment protection index were 
performed. 12 First, instead of using equal weights for the two level 2 indicators for 
temporary contracts (‘fixed-term contracts’ and ‘temporary work agency 
employment’), the minimum of the two is used. This is done because the original !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 As for the original weights of the ‘employment protection index’, see: Venn (2009, p. 43). 
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coding does not take into account that the two are substitutable (i.e., for employers it 
does not matter whether a worker has a fixed-term contract or is contracted from 
temporary work agencies). Second, instead of using equal weights for the three 
indicators for the regulation of regular contracts, the weight of the indicator ‘difficulty 
of dismissal’ is increased (from 1/3 to 1/2), while those of the other two indicators 
(‘procedural inconveniences’, and ‘notice period and severance pay for non-fault 
dismissals’) are decreased (both from 1/3 to 1/4). This is done because the OECD 
does not provide any reason to give equal weights to the three indicators. 
Emmenegger (2011, online appendix) provides evidence that ‘difficulty of dismissal’ 
is the only indicator (among these three) significantly related to the percentage of 
currently unemployed people who left their job due to a layoff. Third, instead of using 
equal weights for the different aspects of employment protection regulations, the 
regulation of regular contracts (including additional provision for collective 
dismissals) is weighted at 3/4 and the regulation of temporary work at 1/4. This is 
done because temporary workers have always been a minority and therefore it does 
not make sense to give an equal weight to each. The weights used are based on the 
contributions of each type to total employment growth (Emmenegger 2011, online 
appendix).  
 Even though the ‘employment protection index’ is the crucial sub-indicator in 
this condition, an additional sub-indicator is taken into account. As is well 
documented, legislation is not the only source of regulation. In many European 
countries, collective agreements or individual contracts may include provisions more 
generous than those within legislation (Venn 2009, p. 16; Emmenegger 2011). 
Therefore, besides the ‘employment protection index’, ‘collective bargaining 
coverage’ is also used. Data for this sub-indicator is taken from the ICTWSS 
database, which calculates the level of coverage as the number of employees covered 
by collective (wage) bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary 
earners in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as percentage, adjusted 
for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to 
bargain.  
 The direct method of calibration is used to calibrate the fuzzy set scores for 
this condition. The raw data, the additive indicator, and the fuzzy set score are 
presented in Table 4.5. Our calibration of high levels of employment protection 
combines two indicators: ‘employment protection index (2008-10)’ and ‘collective 
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bargaining coverage (2010)’. Furthermore, we have standardized the two indicators to 
range between 0 and 4. Since the ‘employment protection index’ is the crucial sub-
indicator in this condition, the two indicators are added using different weights: 4/5 
and 1/5 respectively. Data for the employment protection index refers to the average 
between 2008 and 2010, while data for collective bargaining coverage refers to 2010 
only (due to data availability). As for the qualitative anchors, at least 3 is required for 
full membership; 1.5 is a crossover point, and values equal to 0 reflect full non-
membership. Thus, Southern European countries, Continental European countries, 
Sweden, and Finland are more in than out of the set, while Anglo-Saxon countries and 
Denmark are more out of than in the set. Finally, Figure 4.3 provides a graphic 
representation of fuzzy set scores. 
 
Table 4.5 – Calibration of the condition ‘high levels of employment protection’ (EP) 
 
Employment protection 
index (2008-10) 
Collective bargaining 
coverage (2010) 
Additive 
indicator 
Fuzzy set 
score 
Austria 2.5 99.00 2.3 0.77 
Belgium 2.4 96.00 2.1 0.70 
Denmark 1.8 85.00 1.1 0.37 
Finland 2.3 89.50 1.9 0.63 
France 3.2 92.00 3.3 1.00 
Germany 2.5 61.00 1.9 0.63 
Greece 2.9 65.00 2.5 0.83 
Ireland 1.8 42.00 0.7 0.23 
Italy 3.0 85.00 2.9 0.97 
Netherlands 2.4 84.30 2.0 0.67 
Portugal 3.1 90.00 3.1 1.00 
Spain 2.8 73.20 2.5 0.83 
Sweden 2.2 91.00 1.8 0.60 
United Kingdom 1.3 30.80 -0.1 0.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on OECD Indicators of Employment Protection (OECD 
2013a); and ICTWSS (Visser 2013).  
Note: As for collective bargaining coverage (third column), in Denmark data refer to 2007, in Finland 
to 2009, and in France, Greece and Portugal to 2008. Regarding union density, in Greece data refer to 
2008.   
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Figure 4.3 – Graphic representation of fuzzy set scores (high levels of employment 
protection) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 – OECD Indicators of Employment Protection 
Level 1 Level 2 Item Level 3 
Employment 
protection for 
regular contracts 
Procedural 
inconvenience 
1 Notification procedures 
2 Delay involved before notice can start 
Notice and 
severance pay 
for no-fault 
individual 
dismissal 
3 
Length of the notice period at 9 months tenure 
Length of the notice period at 4 years tenure 
Length of the notice period at 20 years tenure 
4 
Severance pay at 9 months tenure 
Severance pay at 4 years tenure 
Severance pay at 20 years tenure 
Difficulty of 
dismissal 
5 Definition of justified or unfair dismissal 
6 Length of trial period  
7 Compensation following unfair dismissal 
8 
Possibility of reinstatement following unfair 
dismissal 
9 Maximum time to make claim of unfair dismissal 
Employment 
protection for 
temporary 
contracts 
Fixed-term 
contracts 
10 Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts 
11 
Maximum number of successive fixed-term 
contracts  
12 
Maximum cumulated duration of successive 
fixed-term contracts 
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Temporary work 
agency 
employment 
13 
Types of work for which temporary work agency 
(TWA) employment is legal 
14 
Restrictions on the number of renewals of TWA 
assignments 
15 
Maximum cumulated duration of TWA 
assignments 
16 TWA: authorisation or reporting obligations 
17 
Equal treatment of regular and agency workers at 
the user firm 
Collective 
dismissals 
protection 
– 
18 Definition of collective dismissal 
19 
Additional notification requirements in case of 
collective dismissals 
20 
Additional delays involved in case of collective 
dismissals 
21 
Other special costs to employers in case of 
collective dismissals  
 
 
4.1.4 Condition III – poor coordination in the industrial relations system (PCO) 
The following dimensions are used to measure the coordination in the industrial 
relations system: wage coordination and the level of organization of labour and 
capital. It is explained below how each dimension is computed, and how we have 
turned raw data into set-membership scores. 
 All the indicators in this condition were taken from the ICTWSS database 
(Visser 2013). Regarding the first dimension (wage coordination), we have used the 
indicator ‘coordination of wage-setting’, which is based on Kenworthy (2001) and 
ranges between 1 and 5. Countries with corporatist arrangements (centralized 
bargaining by peak associations) are ranked in the first two levels (4-5); those without 
corporatist arrangements but with a certain level of coordination (e.g., coordination 
only with some unions, and irregular industry-level bargaining with irregular and 
uncertain pattern setting) are ranked in the third level; finally, those with little pattern 
of bargaining or fragmented wage bargaining are ranked in the last two levels (1-2). 
To complement the information gathered in the first indicator, information on the 
level of organization of labour and capital are also provided (Ebbinghaus 2006b, p. 
74), namely ‘employers’ organization density’ (as a proportion of employees in 
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employment) and ‘union density’ (net union membership as a proportion of wage and 
salary earners in employment).   
 The fuzzy set is calibrated using the direct method of calibration. The raw 
data, the additive indicator and the fuzzy set score are presented in Table 4.7. Our 
calibration of the set poor coordination in the industrial relations system combines 
therefore three indicators: ‘coordination of wage-setting’, ‘employers’ organization 
density’, and ‘union density’. To calculate the additive indicator, we first standardized 
the three indicators to range between 0 and 4. Instead of using equal weights for the 
three different sub-indicators, we assigned greater weight to the first sub-indicator: 
wage coordination is weighted at 3/4, while employers’ organization density and 
union density are weighted at 1/8 each. As for the qualitative anchors, full 
membership in this set is reached when the level of coordination in the industrial 
relations system does not exceed 1.5, full non-membership is assigned when the level 
of coordination is above 3, and the crossover point is 2.1. The average for the period 
1980-2011 is calculated because the objective is to capture the structural pattern of 
coordination in these countries, rather than the coordination in a specific period. 
Given that this database provides data for the entire period, we have decided to 
compute the average of each sub-indicator. In line with Crouch (1993), poor 
coordination in the industrial relations system is observed in France, in Southern 
Europe, and in Anglo-Saxon countries. Finally, Figure 4.4 provides a graphic 
representation of fuzzy set scores. 
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Table 4.7 – Calibration of the condition ‘poor coordination in the industrial relations 
system’ 
 Wage 
coordination 
(1980-2011) 
Employers’ 
organization density 
(1980-2011) 
Union 
density 
(1980-2011) 
Additive 
indicator 
Fuzzy set 
score 
Austria 4.1 100.0 41.3 2.9 0.06 
Belgium 4.6 82.0 52.7 3.2 0.00 
Denmark 3.8 65.0 72.5 2.6 0.22 
Finland 4.3 72.7 73.1 3.0 0.00 
France 2.0 75.0 10.0 0.9 1.00 
Germany 3.9 60.0 28.0 2.3 0.39 
Greece 2.2 43.7 31.6 1.0 1.00 
Ireland 3.3 60.0 45.2 2.0 0.58 
Italy 3.0 58.0 38.2 1.7 0.83 
Netherlands 3.7 85.0 24.5 2.4 0.33 
Portugal 2.6 65.0 30.0 1.4 1.00 
Spain 3.2 75.0 14.2 1.8 0.75 
Sweden 3.9 83.0 79.5 2.8 0.11 
United Kingdom 1.0 35.0 36.8 0.0 1.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on ICTWSS (Visser 2013). 
Note: Regarding employers’ organization density, in Belgium and Sweden data refer to 2009, in 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom data 
refer to 2008, in Finland to 2006, and in Ireland to 2002.  
 
Figure 4.4 – Graphic representation of fuzzy set scores (poor coordination in the 
industrial relations system) 
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4.1.5. Condition IV – high levels of liberalization (L) 
As an institutional theory of capitalism, the liberalization literature emphasizes the 
communalities rather than the varieties between capitalist economies, and criticizes 
the functionalist’s assumptions upon which the VoC approach is based. Drawing on 
Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ of market expansion and market containment thesis 
(1944), it argues that change in all capitalist economies is driven by a process of 
market expansion, and highlights the social conflicts related to it. Furthermore, 
drawing on the historical institutionalist theory on institutional change (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005) it argues that in all capitalist economies the direction of change points 
towards liberalization (Streeck 2009, Chapter 17). Also relevant is the contribution of 
Glyn (2006), which points to two main characteristics of liberalization: the reduction 
of intervention in industry through the privatization of state-owned enterprises (2006, 
pp. 37-42), and the rise of the financial sector (2006, p. 51).13 To calculate this 
condition, two sub-indicators are used: the ‘index of product market regulation’, and 
the ‘weight of the financial sector’. The first is taken from the ‘OECD Product Market 
Regulation Database’ (OECD 2013b), while the second is taken from the ‘Eurostat 
National Accounts Database’ (Eurostat 2008).  
First, the OECD ‘index of product market regulation’ is used to measure the 
process of market expansion and privatization. This index is constructed from 18 low-
level indicators (see appendix, Table A4.2) and covers three general regulatory issues 
on fields such as: state control of business enterprises, legal and administrative 
barriers to entry (regulatory and administrative opacity; administrative burdens on 
start-ups, and barriers to competition), and barriers to international trade and 
investment (Wolfl et al. 2009). 14 This index ranges between 0 and 6, reflecting 
increasing restrictiveness of regulatory provisions for competition. Since the index 
only covers the period between 1998 and 2008, the difference between these two 
years is calculated. Second, with regard to the rise of the financial sector, we calculate 
the weight of financial activities and insurance activities on the Gross Value Added, 
in 2008. 15 This indicator is taken from the ‘Eurostat National Accounts Database’ 
(Eurostat 2008).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Glyn’s book is mentioned several times in Streeck’s book. Indeed, these two books are often seen as 
the main contributions to this literature (Palier and Thelen 2010, p. 120; Thelen 2012, pp. 138-139). 
14 For the weights given to each indicator, see Wolfl et al. (2009).  
15 At basic values, millions of euro, chain-linked volumes, reference year 2005. 
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The direct method of calibration is used to calibrate the fuzzy set score for this 
condition. The raw data, the additive indicator, and the fuzzy set score are presented 
in Table 4.8. Our calibration of high levels of liberalization combines two indicators: 
‘index product market regulation (1998-2008)’ and ‘weight of the financial sector 
(2008)’. Furthermore, we have standardized the two indicators to range between 0 and 
4, and have calculated the average score for every country. With regard to the 
qualitative anchors, at least 3 is required for full membership; 1.5 is a crossover point, 
and values equal to 0.9 reflect full non-membership. As can be seen in Table 4.8, the 
majority of countries have high levels of liberalization, since only Belgium and 
Greece are more out than in the set. 16 Finally, Figure 4.5 provides a graphic 
representation of fuzzy set scores. 
 
Table 4.8 – Calibration of the condition ‘high levels of liberalization’ 
Countries Index product market 
regulation (1998-2008) 
Weight of the financial 
sector (2008)  
Additive 
indicator 
Fuzzy set score 
Austria -38.7 5.9 2.0 0.67 
Belgium -10.0 6.0 0.9 0.00 
Denmark -34.8 7.3 2.0 0.67 
Finland -44.5 2.6 1.7 0.57 
France -43.3 4.2 1.9 0.63 
Germany -36.5 5.2 1.8 0.60 
Greece -21.0 4.3 1.0 0.08 
Ireland -45.9 15.8 3.8 1.00 
Italy -47.8 5.5 2.3 0.77 
Netherlands -43.1 8.2 2.5 0.83 
Portugal -37.8 7.7 2.2 0.73 
Spain -61.1 5.6 2.8 0.93 
Sweden -33.5 4.7 1.6 0.53 
United Kingdom -22.2 8.5 1.7 0.57 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation (OECD 
2013b); and Eurostat National accounts (Eurostat 2008).   
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Note that Table 4.9 summarizes the fuzzy set scores for the outcome and all conditions, Table 4.10 
summarizes the qualitative anchor points for the calibration of fuzzy sets, and Table 4.11 all indicators 
used in this analysis.   
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Figure 4.5 – Graphic representation of fuzzy set scores (high levels of liberalization) 
 
  
Table 4.9 – Summary table of all fuzzy set scores 
Countries YO PS EP PCO L 
Austria 0.18 0.48 0.77 0.06 0.67 
Belgium 0.15 0.62 0.70 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 0.59 1.00 0.37 0.22 0.67 
Finland 0.36 0.65 0.63 0.00 0.57 
France 0.27 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 
Germany 0.03 0.08 0.63 0.39 0.60 
Greece 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.08 
Ireland 0.88 0.55 0.23 0.58 1.00 
Italy 0.92 1.00 0.97 0.83 0.77 
Netherlands 0.01 0.93 0.67 0.33 0.83 
Portugal 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.73 
Spain 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.75 0.93 
Sweden 0.51 1.00 0.60 0.11 0.53 
United Kingdom 0.93 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.57 
 
 
Table 4.10 – Qualitative anchor points for the calibration of fuzzy sets 
Outcome/condition Fully out Crossover point Fully in 
High levels of outsiderness among young people (YO) 8.0 17.0 45.0 
A small proportion of primary sector jobs (PS) 3.0 0.0 -3.0 
High levels of employment protection (EP) 0.0 1.5 3.0 
Poor coordination in the industrial relations system (PCO) 3.0 2.1 1.5 
High levels of liberalization (L) 0.9 1.5 3.0 
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Table 4.11 – Summary table of all indicators 
Outcome/conditions Name Indicators 
Outcome 
High levels of 
outsiderness among 
young people 
(1) Percentage point difference between the 
proportion of outsiders among young people and 
the proportion of outsiders among older age 
groups 
Conditions 
A small proportion of 
primary sector jobs 
(2) Percentage point difference between the 
proportion of workers in the lower tier of the 
primary sector among young people and the same 
proportion among older age groups. 
High levels of 
employment 
protection 
(3) Employment protection index 
(4) Collective bargaining coverage 
Poor coordination in 
the industrial 
relations system 
(5) Wage coordination 
(6) Employers organization density 
(7) Union density 
High levels of 
liberalization 
(8) Index of product market regulation 
(9) Weight of the financial activities and 
insurance activities on the Gross Value Added 
 
 
4.2. Analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions 
Following Schneider and Wagemann (2010), necessary and sufficient conditions are 
analyzed in separate analytical steps, starting with the analysis of the former. 
Generally speaking, a condition (or a combination of conditions) is considered to be 
necessary (even if not sufficient) if the outcome cannot occur in its absence, while a 
condition is sufficient if the outcome always occurs when the condition is present. In 
the scope of fsQCA, a condition might be interpreted as necessary if, across all cases, 
set membership in it is larger than or equal to each case’s membership in the outcome. 
Also in the scope of fsQCA, a condition can be interpreted as sufficient if, across all 
cases, set membership in it is smaller than or equal to each case’s membership in the 
outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 56-76).  
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4.2.1. Necessary conditions for the outcome ‘high levels of outsiderness among young 
people’ 
Table 4.12 displays the results of the analysis of the necessary conditions for the 
outcome high levels of outsiderness among young people, namely the consistency and 
coverage measures for necessary conditions. The consistency measure expresses the 
percentage of cases’ set-membership scores in two sets that is in line with the 
statement that one of the two sets is a subset of the other. It thus indicates to what 
degree the empirical data are in line with a postulated subset relation. The coverage 
measure assesses the relation in size between the condition set and the outcome set. 
Coverage necessity is better understood in terms of the relevance and trivialness of a 
necessary condition. High values indicate relevance, whereas low values indicate 
trivialness (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 139-147).  
Since a consistency threshold of at least 0.90 is required for necessary 
conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 143), Table 4.12 shows that a small 
proportion of primary sector jobs is a necessary condition for the outcome, which 
supports the second part of the main hypothesis. On the other hand, an analysis of 
necessary conditions can also be performed by combining conditions via logical ‘OR’. 
However, this strategy ‘only makes sense if there are strong and plausible theoretical 
or substantive arguments to support the claim that the conditions combined by logical 
OR operate as functional equivalents’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 74). This is 
the case for both the lack of coordination in the industrial relations system and 
liberalization. As the first part of the main hypothesis states, fertile breeding grounds 
for social conflict play a crucial role in explaining age-based divides. As can be seen 
in Table 4.12, this is the case. The consistency value in the combination of conditions 
PCO+L is very high (0.968); therefore, this combination is a necessary condition for 
the outcome. Finally, the analysis of necessary conditions is graphically presented 
through XY plots. These plots show whether a specific condition is necessary. They 
offer graphical insights on whether a necessary condition might be trivial empirically. 
For a condition to be necessary, all cases should be located around or below the 
bisecting line (Ragin 2000, p. 215; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 76). Figure 4.6 
shows that for the small proportion of primary sector jobs, only three cases are clearly 
located above the diagonal, and only two cases are located above the diagonal for 
PCO+L. However, other cases are clearly below the diagonal in both graphs. This 
! Young people and dualization in Europe !
! 82 
means that while poor coordination in the industrial relations system, or liberalization 
are necessary for the outcome, their presence is not sufficient (e.g., see the French 
case). The same applies to the other necessary condition: it is necessary for the 
outcome but it is not sufficient on its own (e.g., see the Dutch case).  
In short, the analysis of necessary conditions supports the main hypothesis. 
First, a small proportion of primary sector jobs is a relevant (coverage 0.684) and 
consistently (0.918) necessary condition for the outcome. Second, the combination of 
conditions PCO+L is a relevant (0.690) and consistently (0.968) necessary condition 
for the outcome.  
 
Table 4.12 – Analysis of necessary conditions for the outcome ‘high levels of 
outsiderness among young people’ 
Condition Consistency Coverage 
PS 0.918 0.684 
L 0.773 0.682 
PCO 0.748 0.779 
EP 0.734 0.602 
PCO+L 0.968 0.690 
 
 
Figure 4.6 – Necessary conditions for the outcome ‘high levels of outsiderness among 
young people’   
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4.2.2. Sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘high levels of outsiderness among young 
people’ 
With regard to the analysis of sufficient conditions, this section begins by displaying 
the truth table and explaining the process of Boolean minimization. Thereafter, the 
solution term and parameters of fit are discussed. Finally, a qualitative discussion of 
the different solution terms is made.  
 Table 4.13 displays the truth table.17 For the analysis of sufficient conditions 
of the outcome high levels of outsiderness among young people, we used a 
consistency threshold for sufficient rows of 0.82. There are three principal reasons for 
this: following Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 127), values below 0.75 are 
considered problematic as they have consequences for the subsequent analysis; no 
true logically contradictory cases exist (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 182-
186), and the threshold is also justified by a large gap below the consistency value of 
0.82. Finally, the software minimizes the truth table using Boolean algebra and 
identifies the combinations of conditions that are sufficient to produce the outcome.!18  
 
Table 4.13 – Truth table for the analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘high 
levels of outsiderness among young people’ 
PS EP PCO L Cases Consistency 
1 1 1 0 Greece 0.897 
1 1 1 1 Italy, Portugal and Spain 0.890 
1 0 1 1 Ireland and United Kingdom 0.832 
1 0 0 1 Denmark 0.823 
1 1 0 0 Belgium 0.663 
1 1 0 1 Finland, Netherlands and Sweden 0.630 
0 1 0 1 Austria and Germany 0.495 
0 1 1 1 France 0.490 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17!Besides presenting the truth table rows, the table also reveals the existence of eight configurations 
with no empirical observations (logical remainders). To overcome the problem of limited diversity (i.e., 
the presence of logical remainders), we draw on the strategy suggested by Ragin (2008): the ‘Standard 
Analysis procedure’. It consists of producing the complex solution (without assumptions about logical 
remainders), the most parsimonious solution (all simplifying assumptions), and the intermediate 
solution (only easy counterfactuals). In this study, only those counterfactuals that correspond to the 
theoretical expectations (easy counterfactuals) are incorporated. Therefore, the results presented in this 
section refer to the intermediate solution.!
18 In this analysis we use the R Package ‘QCA’, version 1.1-2 (Dusa and Thiem 2012).!
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The solution term and the parameters of fit are presented in Table 4.14. Raw 
coverage indicates how much of the membership in the outcome is covered by the 
membership in a single path. The unique coverage indicates how much a single path 
uniquely covers. Consistency indicates how well a given solution set explains the 
outcome in question. The solution coverage expresses how much is covered by the 
entire solution term (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 139). In Boolean logic, 
logical AND (*) refers to the intersection of sets and logical OR (+) to the union of 
sets. Furthermore, capitals indicate the presence of a condition, and lower cases its 
absence.   
The solution shows satisfactory consistency (0.909) and coverage (0.789). The 
analysis of the sufficient conditions shows two possible paths for the outcome (Figure 
4.7). The first path combines a small proportion of primary sector jobs, high 
employment protection, and poor coordination in the industrial relations system, while 
the second path combines a small proportion of primary sector jobs, the absence of 
high employment protection, and liberalization. This solution explains high levels of 
outsiderness among young people in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, United 
Kingdom, and Denmark. Therefore, the solution term can explain all cases except the 
Swedish one. Note however that Sweden has the smallest fuzzy set score (0.51) when 
compared with the countries that belong to the set of countries with high levels of 
outsiderness among young people. Finally, Figure 4.8 presents the results graphically. 
This figure shows whether the combinations of conditions PS*EP*PCO and PS*ep*L 
are sufficient. For a condition to be sufficient, all cases should be located around or 
above the bisecting line (Ragin 2000, p. 236; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 69). 
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Table 4.14 – Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘high levels of 
outsiderness among young people’ 
Solution term PS*EP*PCO + PS*ep*L → YO 
Raw coverage 0.520 0.392 
Unique coverage 0.396 0.268 
Consistency 0.887 0.863 
Covered cases* Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece Ireland, United Kingdom, and Denmark 
 
Solution consistency 0.909 
Solution coverage 0.789 
Uncovered cases** Sweden 
Note: Consistency threshold 0.82. The complex and intermediate solutions are identical. The 
parsimonious solution is ep + PS*PCO → YO (coverage: 0.908, consistency: 0.861).  
* Cases with membership in path > 0.5 
** Cases with membership in solution < 0.5 and outcome > 0.5 
 
Figure 4.7 – Paths for the outcome ‘high levels of outsiderness among young people’ 
 
 
Figure 4.8 – Sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘high levels of outsiderness among 
young people’ 
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The previously identified necessary conditions (PS, and PCO+L) can also be 
found in the analysis of sufficient conditions. All countries with high levels of 
outsiderness among young people exhibit the two identified necessary conditions. 
However, a small proportion of primary sector jobs, liberalization, and poor 
coordination in the industrial relations system are not sufficient conditions alone: 
Finland, the Netherlands, and Belgium exhibit a small proportion of primary sector 
jobs but no high levels of outsiderness are observed; Austria, Finland, the 
Netherlands, France and Germany exhibit liberalization but no high levels of 
outsiderness among young people; France has poor coordination in the industrial 
relations system, and high liberalization, but no high levels of outsiderness among 
young people. France is indeed a very interesting case; it combines several 
characteristics of the Southern European case but it displays a large proportion of 
primary sector jobs. 
Taking into account the combination of conditions in the first path, the 
analysis of sufficient conditions supports the second hypothesis – that employment 
protection is an INUS condition, i.e. an insufficient but non-redundant part of an 
unnecessary but sufficient (combination of) condition(s) (Schneider and Wagemann 
2012, p. 79).  However, these results contain an unexpected and interesting result: 
when combined with a small proportion of primary sector jobs and liberalization, the 
absence of employment protection is also an INUS condition. This illustrates the 
naivety of focusing the analysis on single variables rather than on complex causal 
explanations, and of seeing the reduction of employment protection as the best 
solution to tackle labour market segmentation. Finally, it is relevant that 39.6 per cent 
of the total solution’s coverage of 78.9 per cent (based on the so-called unique 
coverage of the paths), is due solely to the first path (PS*EP*PCO), while the second 
path (PS*ep*L) uniquely covers 26.8 per cent.  
 As pointed out by Emmenegger et al. (2013, p. 189), the results of the fsQCA 
‘need to be complemented by a qualitative discussion of the different solution terms’. 
Below, three cases are discussed: Portugal, UK, and Denmark. The first two cases are 
chosen because they illustrate quite well the dynamics that are in place in each 
configuration, while the Danish case is used to explain why, despite its singularities, it 
makes sense to include Denmark within the second configuration. 
 Blocked flexibilization. The revolutionary events of 1974-1975 had a great 
impact in the Portuguese industrial relations system (Naumann and Stoleroff 2000, p. 
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545; Lima and Naumann 2011, p. 147). First, the democratic revolution constituted a 
reaction against the longest lasting authoritarian corporatist regime in Europe. 
Therefore, corporatist arrangements were by trade unionists seen as a tool created by 
the authoritarian regime to overcome the class struggle and control unions. As a 
consequence, the trade union movement grew up in the 1970s against this logic. 
Second, the communist party-linked General Confederation of Portuguese Workers 
(CGTP) gained a prominent role in the Portuguese industrial relations system after 
1974. Indeed, while the General Union of Workers (UGT) was only founded in 1978 
(with the support of the two main parties: the Socialist Party and the Social 
Democratic Party), CGTP was a prominent actor during the revolutionary years. 
During this period, major political, economic and social changes took place and 
CGTP actively supported them, namely the nationalization of the largest national 
industrial and financial groups, as well as the approval of the new constitution and 
several legislative measures regarding the labour market (Stoleroff 1990, p. 135; 
Barreto 1992, p. 445). Since the early 1970s up until today, CGTP is by far the largest 
trade union confederation, representing about two-thirds of the unionized labour force 
(Lima and Artiles 2011, p. 390; Visser 2013). Even though since the early 1990s 
several changes to the Portuguese economy were implemented, namely because the 
Portuguese government privatized several nationalized banks, insurance banks and 
large public enterprises (Naumann and Stoleroff 2000, p. 547), changes to labour 
market legislation did not follow the same pattern. As explained by Barreto (1992, pp. 
468-469), because unions were unable to ‘prevent the rise in unemployment or the fall 
in real wages between 1976 and 1985, the unions directed their energies to preventing 
the watering down of the labour legislation passed after the revolution (…). The 
unions have been only partially successful in their aim, but they used political action, 
including a successful general strike in 1988, to secure what may well be their major 
achievement in the 1980s: the maintenance of union rights and the protection of the 
main legal provisions on job security’. Consequently, up until the current economic 
crisis Portugal remained as one of the OECD countries with the highest level of 
permanent employment protection (Cerdeira 2014, p. 454). Notwithstanding, changes 
to labour market legislation have been implemented regarding temporary 
employment, fostering therefore the systematic use of fixed-term contracts and 
temporary agency work. This gave rise to a growing segmentation in the Portuguese 
labour market (Barreto 1992, p. 477; Dornelas et al. 2010; Centeno and Novo 2012, p. 
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321; Silva and Pereira 2012, p. 136; Carneiro et al. 2014, pp. 453-453; Cerdeira 2014, 
p. 455), a process that has affected disproportionally young people. Indeed, while a 
large part of the older people was able to safeguard their position because they had 
permanent contracts when changes were implemented and they were more unionized 
(e.g., in the public sector or in former public enterprises), a huge part of young people 
entered the labour market through the rise of temporary employment and through the 
expansion of the individual employment contract (Reis 2010, p. 7). Finally, contrarily 
to other European countries (namely in Continental Europe), in which the 
manufacturing sector still provides access to a large number of stable jobs, in Portugal 
– as in other Southern European countries – the manufacturing sector has undergone a 
great reduction of its size since the early 1980s. Indeed, its industrial sector was much 
less competitive (relying mainly on low wages rather than on specific skills) than its 
counterparts in Continental Europe. Therefore, reforms during the 1980s and 1990s 
did not save the ‘core manufacturing economy’ because there was no such ‘core 
manufacturing economy’. 19 Only a small part of the manufacturing sector was 
characterized by having well developed internal labour markets (Suleman et al. 2013, 
pp. 239-241). Furthermore, the penetration of Chinese exports and the eastward 
enlargement of the European Union had a detrimental effect on the Portuguese 
economy (Rodrigues and Reis 2012, pp. 197-198). To sum up, age-based dualization 
in the Portuguese labour market is directly related with the highly conflictual 
industrial relations system, together with a dual pattern of job security regulations and 
an accelerated deindustrialization process.  
 Disembedded flexibilization. The election of the Conservative government 
under Margaret Thatcher in the 1979 general election is widely seen as marking a 
turning point in the British political economy (Crouch 2005, pp. 143-150). Since the 
early 1980s a massive privatization programme and several measures to flexibilize the 
labour market were implemented. Furthermore, a great reduction in the weight of the 
manufacturing sector took place. Throughout the 1980s, the Conservatives’ 
privatization programme reduced the public sector to about one third of its former 
size: British Telecom was privatized in 1984, British Gas in 1986, British Airways in 
1987, British Steel in 1988, the water industry in 1989, electricity distribution in 
1990, and electricity generation in 1991 (Ferner and Colling 1991, p. 391). As for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 In line with Palier and Thelen (2010), the ‘core manufacturing economy’ is understood here as a 
highly competitive industrial core.  
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deindustrialization, between 1980 and 1984, 1.6 million manufacturing jobs were 
wiped out. This figure is particularly striking, especially if one compares with the 
period between 1984 and 2004, when 1.8 million manufacturing jobs were lost 
(Rubery et al. 2009, p. 70). Finally, as for the legislative programme, several 
measures were taken to deregulate labour markets (e.g., individual rights to protection 
from unfair dismissal have been restricted) (Longstreth 1988, pp. 416-419; Edwards 
et al. 1992, pp. 13-15). Each of these changes led to a growing segmentation in the 
British labour market. First, after privatizations, the former government companies 
started to outsource parts of their operation and expanded their activities in new areas, 
creating new subsidiaries. As a consequence, a dual pattern of industrial relations 
emerged in the privatized utilities. As explained by Ferner and Colling (1991, p. 405), 
‘in the core business, the traditional industrial relations ethos of public enterprises on 
the whole persists, (…) but in the new areas of business, a new and changing ‘culture’ 
of industrial relations was seen as both more likely and more desirable by 
management’. Unions played a crucial role in this process because they used their 
strength to resist against flexibilization. For instance, the level of union density in 
utilities (gas, water and electricity) was, in 1995, 66.1%. Even though this figure 
dropped to 41.7% in 2008, it is well above the national average, which is set at 27.2% 
(Visser 2013). Second, even though deindustrialization led to a great reduction in the 
number of manufacturing jobs, it has not led to its disappearance. Consequently, the 
basic institutional features of collective bargaining were safeguarded in some 
companies. This is so because a large number of employers preferred to maintain 
bargaining relationships with unions, adopting what Longstreth (1988) called a 
‘pragmatic adaptation’ strategy. In face of severe commercial pressures, employers 
preferred to maintain some degree of cooperation or at least of compliance with the 
workforce. As argued by the same author (1988, p. 427) this led to ‘a new division 
(…) in the workforce between core and peripheral sectors’, because the expansion of 
jobs in services did not require the existence of such cooperation and the degree of 
union membership was lower (Visser 2013). Third, labour market deregulation 
contributed to a rapid expansion of jobs in services. Indeed, deindustrialization took 
place simultaneously with a great expansion of the service sector (Edwards et al. 
1992, p. 60; Rubery et al. 2009, p. 71). Notwithstanding, this was not a haphazard 
event, without labour market deregulation it would have been much more difficult to 
see such an increase in the service sector, namely because a large number of low paid 
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and atypical jobs were created in this period (Goos and Manning 2003; Rubery et al. 
2009, p. 58). Furthermore, although labour market deregulation played a central role, 
other legislative measures were also important.  The abolition of the Fair Wages 
Resolution (FWR) and the cuts on social welfare benefits also fuelled the rapid 
expansion of lower tier jobs. Through the abolition of the FWR government 
contractors were no longer required to adhere to minimum rates of pay or working 
conditions, and with lower welfare generosity people became more prone to accept 
worse paid jobs (Goldthorpe 1984, p. 338; Longstreth 1988, p. 416). The rise of 
atypical and low-paid jobs contributed to a growing segmentation in the labour market 
because huge institutional differences exist between peripheral jobs and those in the 
public (or in the core labour force of the former public companies) and manufacturing 
sectors (the major union strongholds). Finally, this affected disproportionally young 
people because the radical transformation undertaken by the Conservative 
government was implemented from 1979 onwards, affecting more those entering the 
labour market after this turning point. As argued by Longstreth (1988, p. 422) ‘in 
particular, the young, the low paid and manual workers have experienced a relative 
decline in their position, compared to gradual improvements made in the course of the 
1970s’. All in all, age-based dualization in the UK is directly linked with the neo-
liberal agenda carried out by the Conservative government in the early 1980s, an 
agenda that was characterized by an ambitious privatization programme, the 
deregulation of the labour market and a rapid deindustrialization process.       
Embedded flexibilization.20 Comparing with the British case, Denmark is 
different in a number of aspects. However, a combination of liberalization, low job 
security and deindustrialization characterizes both cases. In our view, this explains 
why young people in Denmark are also experiencing growing problems in the labour 
market. Below we begin by explaining the similarities between the British and the 
Danish cases, and thereafter we highlight the existing differences. We conclude by 
arguing that the existence of a well-organized labour movement together with a 
generous welfare state have prevented greater segmentation (similar to the British and 
Portuguese cases), but have not avoided this process completely. As for similarities, 
there are three main features on which these countries converge.  First, the turn to 
liberalization also took place in Denmark in the early 1980s. Indeed, under the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20  We take this expression from Kathleen Thelen’s recent book on the different varieties of 
liberalization (2014, pp. 14-15).  
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leadership of Poul Schluter, who served as Prime Minister of Denmark from 1982 to 
1993, several aspects of economic and labour market policy were liberalized (Thelen 
2014, p. 145). Furthermore, as in the UK, there was an attempt to diminish union 
influence and membership (Scheuer 1992, p. 188). These changes were quite 
impressive in historical terms, especially considering this was the first Conservative 
Prime Minister since 1901. Second, historically the level of employment protection is 
much lower than in other Scandinavian and Continental countries. Regardless of the 
type of arguments used to explain this fact, the existing literature on the Danish labour 
market agrees in this regard (Scheuer 1992, p. 170; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; 
Emmenegger 2010; Madsen 2013, p. 3; Thelen 2014, p. 142). Third, from the 1980s 
onwards the Danish political economy underwent a rapid deindustrialization process. 
While in the early 1960s services accounted for only 46% of the total labour force, in 
the late 1980s they reached 67%, and in 2013 they accounted for 79% (Scheuer 1992, 
pp. 170-171; Madsen 2013, p. 16). There are however a number of issues where the 
Danish case is different. First, union density was higher in Denmark than in the UK. 
Furthermore, white-collar and unskilled workers were better organized and their 
influence within the peak trade union confederation was very high (Ebbinghaus 2000, 
p. 169). As a consequence, liberalization faced the fierce unions’ opposition, being the 
1980s characterized by intense conflicts (Thelen 2014, pp. 59-62). Due to the 
decentralization of wage bargaining, unions have not been able to prevent the 
breakdown of solidaristic wage bargaining but they resisted liberalization and 
corporatist bargaining has been safeguarded. As explained by Thelen, this was 
achieved through the ‘functional conversion of traditional arrangements to new goals 
and purposes. This shift was based on a political exchange in which decentralization 
in wage formation was traded against progress on a range of non-wage issues’ (2014, 
p. 59). These non-wage issues include the investment in training, which has become a 
crucial issue for unions. This is related with the second major difference between 
Denmark and the UK: the combination of low levels of employment protection with 
the social safety net of the traditional Scandinavian welfare state. Indeed, the Danish 
system provides measures to facilitate the re-integration of workers in the labour 
market and generous unemployment benefits, a system which is commonly called the 
Danish model of flexicurity (Madsen 2013, p. 31). Third, while the expansion of 
services in the UK was mainly achieved through the growth of the private sector, in 
Denmark a large share of jobs were created in the public sector. For example, while in 
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Denmark the share of public sector jobs increased from 17.2% in 1970, to 30.1% in 
1989, in the UK it has only increased from 18.1% in 1970, to 19.6% in 1989 (Ferner 
1994, p. 57; Salavisa 2006, p. 188).  Currently, the share of public employment jobs 
remains very high in Denmark, accounting for about 33% of total employment 
(Madsen 2013, p. 16). Since public sector jobs are characterized by greater union 
membership and by more stable jobs, this also contributed to prevent greater 
segmentation in the labour market. Taken together, the above-mentioned similarities 
between Denmark and the UK unravel the process that led to a growing age-based 
dualization in the Danish labour market. As recent studies have shown, young persons 
have a much higher probability of being in a temporary job or working part-time than 
the older age groups (Madsen 2013, pp. 21-26). The existing differences between 
countries explain why in Denmark this process is less marked than in the UK. 
 
4.3. Robustness tests 
Following Schneider and Wagemann (2012, pp. 284-294), a series of tests to assess 
the robustness of the analysis are carried out. First, we have changed the score of the 
case just above the crossover point to 0.49, and the case just below the crossover point 
to 0.51.!21 Table 4.15 shows that the solution term is robust to revisions of the 
calibration: in eight cases the solution term is identical. As for the case (fifth row) in 
which the second path is different (PS*PCO*L), the unique coverage for this path 
decreases to 0.118. Regarding the case where the first path is different (ninth row), 
this is because the revision of this fuzzy set score requires a huge change in the 
calibration. Generally speaking, Table 4.15 shows that the solution term is robust.  
Second, we change the consistency levels for truth table rows. With a 
consistency threshold of 0.885 (instead of 0.82), the solution turns into PS*EP*PCO 
(coverage: 0.520, consistency: 0.887). Note, however, that in comparison with the 
solution displayed in Table 4.14, the number of uncovered cases increases to four and 
the solution coverage decreases sharply. We prefer the solution displayed in Table 
4.14 because more cases are covered by the solution term, and because the existing 
differences between Southern Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries (together with 
Denmark) are clarified.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 We take this from Davidsson and Emmenegger (2013).  !
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Finally, to assess the robustness of the analysis, we tested a different solution 
including five conditions instead of four. This new condition (DR) is based on the 
aggregate index of dualization (Rueda 2014, pp. 390-391). The objective is to test if 
the introduction of the new condition changes the main results of the analysis. The 
aggregate index of dualization is the ratio of employment protection for standard 
employment over active labour market policies (ALMP) generosity. To measure 
employment protection for standard employment we use data from ‘OECD Indicators 
of Employment Protection’ (OECD 2013a). ALMP generosity is measured as the ratio 
of ALMP to GDP over the ratio of the unemployed to the labour force.22 The first 
indicator is taken from Armingeon et al. (2012), while the second is taken from 
OECD.Stat (unemployment is the harmonized rate, measured as a percentage of the 
civilian labour force). Data for the aggregate index of dualization refers to 2010. As 
for the calibration of this condition, we consider that at least 2.5 on the indicator is 
required for full membership, at least 0.95 to be more in than out of the set, and 0 for 
full non-membership. The fuzzy set scores and raw data for this condition are 
displayed in Table 4.16. With five conditions the solution term (complex solution) 
consists of two conjunctions: PS*DR*EP*PCO + PS*dr*ep*L (coverage: 0.908, 
consistency: 0.782). The first covers Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece, while the 
second covers Ireland, United Kingdom, and Denmark. Comparing with the solution 
term displayed in Table 4.14, the major difference is the presence of DR in the first 
conjunction and its absence in the second. Thus, DR follows a similar pattern to the 
condition high employment protection. Furthermore, the analysis of necessary 
conditions shows that DR is not a necessary condition for the outcome. Overall, the 
introduction of DR does not change the main results of the analysis.23  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 For a definition of active labour market policies see Marques et al. (2015, p. 222). 
23 Additionally, also to check for the robustness of the analysis, we tested a different solution with 
modifications in the indicators used for calculating three conditions. First, we changed the first 
condition by using a simple indicator of deindustrialization (the rate of change in the number of 
employees working in industry excluding construction, between 2000 and 2014). Second, we changed 
the second condition by using only one indicator to measure high levels of employment protection (the 
employment protection index). Third, we made more complex the content of the liberalization 
condition. We used six indicators instead of two (collective bargaining coverage; employers’ 
organization density; union density; the unemployment generosity index; the state control index; and 
market capitalization of listed companies). These modifications did not change the main results of the 
analysis, i.e. the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions point to the same conclusions. These 
results are available from the author upon request.   
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Table 4.15 – Robustness of solution term 
 Recalibration Solution term Comment 
1 YO: Finland from 0.36 to 0.51 PS*EP*PCO + PS*ep*L Identical to solution term. 
2 YO: Sweden from 0.51 to 0.49 PS*EP*PCO + PS*ep*L Identical to solution term. 
3 PS: Ireland from 0.45 to 0.51 PS*EP*PCO + PS*ep*L Identical to solution term.  
4 PS: Austria from 0.52 to 0.49 PS*EP*PCO + PS*ep*L Identical to solution term. 
5 EP: Denmark from 0.37 to 0.51 PS*EP*PCO + PS*PCO*L Unique coverage of both terms 
drops to 0.125 and 0.118, 
respectively. The solution coverage 
drops to 0.638. Denmark becomes 
an uncovered case. 
6 EP: Sweden from 0.60 to 0.49 PS*EP*PCO + PS*ep*L Identical to solution term. Sweden 
becomes a covered case.  
7 PCO: Germany from 0.39 to 0.51 PS*EP*PCO + PS*ep*L Identical to solution term. 
8 PCO: Ireland from 0.58 to 0.49 PS*EP*PCO + PS*ep*L Identical to solution term. 
9 L: Greece from 0.08 to 0.51 PS*PCO*L + PS*ep*L This new calibration implies a huge 
change in the fuzzy set score for 
Greece.  
10 L: Sweden from 0.53 to 0.49 PS*EP*PCO + PS*ep*L Identical to solution term. 
 
Table 4.16 – Calibration of the condition ‘high levels of dualization’ (DR) 
Countries Aggregate index of dualization Fuzzy set score 
Austria 0.60 0.32 
Belgium 0.61 0.32 
Denmark 0.41 0.22 
Finland 1.05 0.53 
France 1.12 0.55 
Germany 1.10 0.55 
Greece 3.01 1.00 
Ireland 0.38 0.20 
Italy 1.98 0.83 
Netherlands 0.63 0.33 
Portugal 3.55 1.00 
Spain 1.58 0.70 
Sweden 1.01 0.52 
United Kingdom 0.36 0.19 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on OECD Indicators of Employment Protection (OECD 
2013a); Comparative Political Data Set I 1960-2011 (Armingeon et al. 2012); and OECD.Stat. 
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4.4. Conclusion  
This chapter applied fsQCA to examine the determinants of outsiderness among 
young people. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the dualization literature argues that the 
attempt to save the ‘core manufacturing economy’ has been the structural driver of 
change and emphasizes the role of different welfare regimes to explain different 
degrees of dualization. Although these scholars speak of the existence of different 
patterns of dualization, they do not explain why it is mostly young labour market 
participants who are the outsiders in some countries.  
This chapter identifies the conditions contributing to high levels of 
outsiderness among young people. The analysis of necessary conditions reveals the 
existence of two necessary conditions for the outcome of high levels of outsiderness 
among young people: a small proportion of primary sector jobs (PS) and the 
combination of (i) poor coordination in the industrial relations system and (ii) 
liberalization (PCO+L). This supports our main hypothesis. The analysis of sufficient 
conditions indicates two possible paths for the outcome: the first combines a small 
proportion of jobs in the primary sector, high employment protection, and poor 
coordination in the industrial relations system, while the second combines a small 
proportion of jobs in the primary sector, the absence of high employment protection, 
and liberalization. The first path covers Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, and the 
second path covers the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. The combination of 
conditions in the first path supports the second hypothesis – that employment 
protection is an INUS condition. However, the second path shows that when 
combined with a small proportion of primary sector jobs and liberalization, the 
absence of high employment protection is also an INUS condition.   
 Furthermore, three additional conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. 
First, it illustrates the pitfalls of seeing institutions solely as guardians of efficiency 
and the only source of institutional change. On the contrary, we show how other 
institutional factors are crucial to explain the high levels of outsiderness among young 
people. Second, our analysis also illustrates the benefits of using fsQCA: in line with 
the hypotheses of this study, we show that no single condition is sufficient to explain 
the outcome. Third, this chapter shows that high levels of outsiderness among young 
people exist in Southern European countries, as hypothesized in Chapter 2. However, 
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people exist in Southern European countries, as hypothesized in Chapter 2. However, 
this chapter also shows that in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden, 
young people are also facing increasing problems in the labour market.  
Although this chapter has identified the conditions contributing to high levels 
of outsiderness among young people, it has not provided empirical evidence on the 
process of dualization as generational layering. Indeed, the main strength of fsQCA is 
the possibility to test theoretical arguments that combine several conditions to explain 
a certain outcome. Notwithstanding, fsQCA is less appropriate to shed light on how 
change takes place over time. It is precisely for this reason that Chapter 5 will contrast 
two case studies: the telecommunications sector and the vehicle manufacturing 
industry in Portugal. By studying these sectors, we pretend to illustrate why 
dualization as generational layering captures well the process of change in Southern 
European labour markets.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A4.1 – Databases and samples size for each country  
Country Sample size Database 
Austria 2250 ESS2008 
Belgium 1704 ESS2009 
Denmark 1576 ESS2009 
Finland 1878 ESS2009 
France 1728 ESS2009 
Germany 3031 ESS2009 
Greece 2715 ESS2009 
Ireland 2576 ESS2009 
Italy 1084 ISSP2009 
Netherlands 1829 ESS2009 
Portugal 2150 ESS2009 
Spain 1885 ESS2009 
Sweden 1497 ESS2009 
United Kingdom 2422 ESS2009 
Total 29831  
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Table A4.2 – OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation 
Dimensions Item Definition 
State control 
Scope of public enterprises 
Measures the pervasiveness of state 
ownership across business sectors as the 
proportion of sectors in which the state 
controls at least one firm (based on 24 
business sectors). 
Government involvement in 
network sectors 
Measures the extent of public ownership in 
the energy, communications and transport 
sectors (based on detailed data for seven 
network industries) 
Direct control over business 
enterprises 
Measures the existence of government 
special voting rights in privately-owned 
firms, constraints on the sale of state-
owned equity stakes, and the extent to 
which legislative bodies control the 
strategic choices of public enterprises 
(based on 24 business sectors). 
Price controls 
Reflects the extent of price controls in 
competitive sectors, such as air travel, retail 
trade, road freight, professional services, 
and mobile communications. 
Use of command and control 
regulation 
Indicates the extent to which government 
uses coercive (as opposed to incentive-
based) regulation in general and in specific 
services sectors (road freight, retail trade, 
air transport, railways, professional 
services). 
Legal and 
administrative 
barriers to entry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Licences and permits systems 
Reflects the use of ‘one-stop shops’ and 
‘silence is consent’ rules for getting 
information on and issuing licenses and 
permits. 
Communication and simplification 
of rules and procedures 
Reflects aspects of government’s 
communication strategy and efforts to 
reduce and simplify the administrative 
burden of interacting with government. 
Administrative burdens for 
corporations 
 
Measures the extent of administrative 
burdens on the creation of corporations. 
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Administrative burdens for sole 
proprietors 
Measures the extent of administrative 
burdens on the creation of sole proprietor 
firms. 
Sector-specific administrative 
burdens 
Reflects administrative burdens in the road 
transport and retail distribution sectors. 
Legal barriers  
Measures the pervasiveness of barriers to 
entry across business sectors as the 
proportion of sectors in which there are 
explicit legal limitations on the number of 
competitors (based on 24 business sectors). 
Antitrust exemptions 
Measures the scope of exemptions from 
competition law for public enterprises. 
Barriers to entry in network sectors 
Measures various kinds of entry barriers in 
network sectors, as well as the degree of 
vertical integration in energy, rail transport 
and telecommunication sector (based on 
detailed data for seven network sectors). 
Barriers to entry in services 
Measures barriers to entry in retail trade 
and professional services. 
Barriers to trade 
and investment 
Barriers to foreign direct 
investment 
Measures general and sector-specific 
restrictions on foreign acquisition of equity 
in public and private firms, obligatory 
screening procedures and operational 
controls for affiliates of foreign firms (e.g. 
nationality requirement for key personnel). 
This indicator covers manufacturing, 
construction, electricity and 9 services 
sectors. 
Tariffs 
Reflects the average of most-favored-
nation tariffs, computed from detailed 
product data on tariffs. 
Discriminatory procedures 
Reflects the extent of discrimination 
against foreign firms at the procedural 
level. 
Regulatory barriers 
Reflects other non-tariff barriers to trade, 
such as lack of mutual recognition 
agreements or international harmonization 
of standards. 
Source: Wolfl et al. (2009, pp. 10-11).  
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5 Explaining age-based dualization: a study of 
telecommunications and vehicle manufacturing industries   
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter contrasts two case studies – the telecommunications sector and the 
vehicle manufacturing sector – to illustrate why dualization as generational layering 
captures the process of change in Southern European labour markets. As presented in 
Chapter 4, the results of the fsQCA analysis show that a small proportion of primary 
sector jobs is a necessary condition for high levels of outsiderness among young 
people. Based on this finding, our objective is to shed light on the causal mechanism 
that links these two processes, i.e. how the reduction of the primary sector and the 
concomitant expansion of the secondary sector brought about a generational divide in 
Southern European labour markets, one in which young people face a much higher 
risk of unemployment and atypical employment than the older generations.  
 The central thesis of this chapter is that the gradual erosion of the traditional 
internal labour market (ILM) model in the telecoms sector led to the expansion of 
non-standard employment and consequently to increase the risk of unemployment. It 
is argued that older generations were able to maintain a better position in the labour 
market because, when liberalization and privatization started, both union membership 
and bargaining coverage were very high and trade unions resisted against this process. 
This prevented therefore a large number of redundancies in the public company. On 
the other hand, it is argued that, in the vehicle manufacturing industry, the traditional 
ILM model has been maintained. Although some changes were implemented, the 
‘traditional’ pillars of the ILM model have been safeguarded. Therefore, no 
substantial generational differences exist. It is however stressed that the vehicle 
manufacturing sector represents a low share of jobs in the Portuguese labour market 
and that it has not increased throughout the past decades. Taken as a whole, it is 
argued that liberalization led to a radical transformation in telecoms but not in vehicle 
manufacturing. Considering that a reduction in the share of primary sector jobs has 
taken place in Portugal (see Chapter 4), this comparison exemplifies the 
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transformations in the labour market. Finally, it highlights the importance of both 
liberalization and social conflict to explain the increasing levels of labour market 
segmentation.    
 This chapter has been organized in the following way. The first section makes 
a brief presentation of the data and reasons underlying the comparison between these 
two cases. Thereafter, each one is analysed separately, scrutinizing in detail two 
different periods: before (2004-08) and after the global economic downturn (2008-
13). The third section outlines the main differences between sectors and discusses the 
main findings.  
 
 
5.1 Data and case selection 
This investigation analyses two sectors of the Portuguese Economy: vehicle 
manufacturing and telecoms. These two sectors differ in several aspects, namely 
regarding its size, interest representation and how its weight in the Portuguese 
economy has evolved throughout the recent past. Considering the main objective of 
the present chapter – to explain how a decreasing number of jobs in the primary sector 
and the concomitant expansion of the secondary sector have led to high levels of 
outsiderness among young people – the selection of these two cases follows the 
subsequent rationale.  
First, the automotive sector is a relatively small sector of the Portuguese 
economy and its size has not increased during the past decade. However, it represents 
a much larger proportion of jobs in a set of other European countries, namely France 
and Germany (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Eurofound 2010, p. 25; Holst 2014).1 As 
shown in Chapter 4, these two were precisely the countries with the larger proportion 
of jobs in the primary sector. On the other hand, while in Germany and France the 
majority of jobs in the automotive sector are in the subsector of vehicle manufacturing 
(34.10 ‘Manufacture of motor vehicles’, NACE rev. 1.1), the opposite is the case in 
Portugal (Eurofound 2010; Banco de Portugal 2013a, p. 6). In Portugal, the majority 
of jobs are in the components subsector (34.20 ‘Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) 
for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers’; and 34.30 ‘Manufacture !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Doellgast and Greer (2007, p. 65) pointed out that German automotive firms have seen an increase in 
the number of employees between 1994 and 2004 (from 657,000 to 773,000).    
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of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines’, NACE rev. 1.1). 
Indeed, data from the ILO shows that regarding the total employment in the 
automotive sector in Europe, Portugal accounts for only 1.4%, while Germany and 
France account for 40.7% and 13.1%, respectively. Furthermore, it also shows that the 
components industry accounts for 86% of the total employment in this sector, while in 
Germany and France the share of jobs in the components subsector is 44% and 38%, 
respectively.2  Thus, the Portuguese case is characterised by having a low share of 
jobs in the automotive industry, and an even lower share in the subsector of vehicle 
manufacturing. This subsector is therefore chosen because it represents a low share of 
jobs in the Portuguese economy, but it represents a large share of jobs in countries 
identified in Chapter 4 as having the absence of high levels of outsiderness among 
young people. 3  
Second, the telecoms industry (64.20 ‘Telecommunications’ NACE Rev 1.1) 
is a growing sector in the Portuguese economy, with many young people and where 
atypical employment represents a large share of jobs (Kovács 2005, pp. 30-41). 
Furthermore, prior to liberalization in the 1990s, this sector was dominated by the 
public company, Portugal Telecom (PT). Therefore, besides being a growing sector 
and with many young people, it can also provide evidence on the impact of 
liberalization. Finally, in France and Germany, the share of jobs in 
telecommunications is lower than the proportion of jobs in the automotive industry 
(Holst 2014).   
To conduct our study, five automotive plants and five telecom companies 
were analysed. Concerning data collection, two different sources were used: 
interviews and document analysis. In this research, the interviews were in-depth 
interviews based on a semi-structured questionnaire and lasted between 60 and 90 
minutes. In total, 17 interviews were conducted (see appendix, list of interviewees). 
The analysis builds on interviews with managers, trade unionists, works councillors, 
civil society activists and, if such a department exists, the head of training. Four more 
people were invited to do an interview, however, in the end the invitation did not 
result in an interview. Most interviews were held with one interviewee but in a few 
cases more than one interviewee was present. One round of interviews was held, in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  On this see: http://eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/industrial-
relations-in-the-automotive-sector 
3 Doellgast and Greer (2007) and Holst (2014) used a similar research strategy.  
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the fall of 2014. With the permission of the interviewee, each interview was recorded. 
All interviews were completely typed out in a transcript. These transcripts were used 
for the analysis of each interview and the comparison between interviews, and thus 
contributed to the thoroughness of the analysis.  
The codification of interviews reflected the key categories of the analysis, 
which are the classical ILM principles: recruitment into a permanent job, steady 
career progression from low skilled to high skilled positions; protection against 
redundancies, and on-the-job training (Kerr 1954; Doeringer and Piore 1971; 
Grimshaw et al. 2001). As discussed in Chapter 2, the primary sector is characterized 
by having well-developed ILMs in which (formal and informal) institutional rules 
substitute market mechanisms. It is argued that firms in the primary sector depend 
more on their employees’ specific skills (acquired through on-the-job training and 
experience) and therefore develop strategies to protect their labour force from the risk 
of poaching. While investment in on-the-job training and job security are quite 
obvious characteristics of the traditional ILM model (the first because employees 
need to acquire specific skills, the second to recoup the firm’s costs of training), the 
other two characteristics are less intuitive. As for career progression from low skilled 
to high skilled positions, the logic is as follows: in a typical ILM a vertical line of 
career progression is established where work within one job provides the required 
experience and level of skill for the job at the next level. As Kerr (1954, p. 104) 
noted: ‘the industrial worker [moves] vertically in the seniority area’. Regarding the 
predominance of permanent contracts, as Grimshaw et al.  (2001, p. 32) explained ‘in 
the ideal type model of the internal labour market, a stable employment relationship 
between employer and employee is a necessary partner to conditions of skill 
specificity, on-the-job training and custom in the workplace’.  
A range of questions was asked in each interview. However, other questions, 
which were more specific to the particular organization, were included. The 
introductory questions addressed the current economic situation of each 
company/plant. Thereafter, questions about each firm’s training policies were made. 
Next, several questions addressed the use of different types of non-standard 
employment (fixed-term work, part-time work, temporary agency workers, and 
outsourcing). Moreover, specific questions about the period between 2009 and 2013 
were posed. Questions were made about workforce reductions, as well as other 
changes that have taken place to deal with the economic crisis. Finally, each 
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interviewee was asked to provide data on the company’s workforce, namely regarding 
the number of employees, average seniority, average age, and level of education of 
the workforce. As for trade unionists, work councils, and civil society movements, the 
interview guide also covered questions on their level of organization in each company 
(union density and works council organization), as well as about activities carried out 
to tackle the rise of atypical employment.  
 To get additional information, secondary material provided useful 
information, namely Social and Environmental Responsibility Reports (2004-13), 
press releases, newspaper articles, union documents, and collective bargaining 
agreements. These documents played a crucial role in this research, particularly 
regarding the telecoms sector, in which it was difficult to obtain information directly 
from managers (although interviews were conducted with unionists, works 
councillors and activists, only one manager from these five companies accepted to be 
interviewed). Several studies investigating the rise of atypical employment in Portugal 
point to this fact, i.e. it is increasingly difficult to get interviews with managers from 
companies that have a large share of non-standard employment (Rosa 2000; Kovács 
2005). Furthermore, by deriving data from various sources triangulation occurs. This 
allows for crosschecking data on the same dimension from various sources.  
 
 
5.2 Vehicle manufacturing sector: the resilience of the ILM model  
In Portugal there are five plants (Eurofound 2010, p. 43), all of them owned by large 
multinational companies, known as Original Equipment Manufacturers. One is 
dedicated to the production of passenger cars (Volkswagen Autoeuropa (VW-
Autoeuropa)), three to the production of commercial vehicles (Mitsubishi Fuso, PSA 
Peugeot Citroen Mangualde, and Toyota Ovar) and one to the production of buses 
(CaetanoBus). It is a very small sector in the Portuguese economy, with about 6,000 
employees (Table 5.1). As discussed above (see section 5.1), comparing with other 
European countries, the share of jobs in the automotive sector is very low and the vast 
majority of jobs are in the components industry rather than in the vehicle 
manufacturing subsector (Banco de Portugal 2013a). From 2004 to 2013, the major 
developments were the closure of a plant belonging to the multinational company 
OPEL, in 2006 (with about 1,200 employees), the recruitment of 600 employees in 
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VW-Autoeuropa, and a substantial reduction in the workforce of three plants.4 Table 
5.1 shows that VW-Autoeuropa is the largest plant, accounting for more than half of 
the total employment in this sector, and three out of the five plants have a relatively 
small number of employees. Notwithstanding, Toyota Ovar and CaetanoBus are part 
of the same group and are located nearby. As for union density, it is above the 
Portuguese average, which is about 20% (Visser 2013). Collective bargaining is 
widespread due to extension ordinances. Finally, three out of the five plants possess a 
works council (VW-Autoeuropa, PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde and CaetanoBus). 
This section has been organized in the following way. The first part deals with the 
situation in the vehicle manufacturing industry before the economic downturn, while 
the second describes how companies reacted to changes in the economic conditions 
after 2009. This section concludes by highlighting how the economic crisis affected 
young people. 
 
Table 5.1 – Employment, per plant  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
VW-Autoeuropa 2,955 2,790 2,857 2,990 3,028 2,992 3,207 3,603 3,626 3,606 
Mitsubishi Fuso 450 450 450 460 358 333 322 324 315 311 
PSA PC Mangualde  1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 900 1,200 1,200 857 1130 
Toyota Ovar  325 321 325 343 360 340 311 229 198 190 
CaetanoBus 450 450 450 450 450 455 474 491 463 503 
Source: As for Mitsubishi Fuso, PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde, Toyota Ovar and CaetanoBus, 
interviewees provided the data. As for VW-Autoeuropa, figures were taken from the company’s 
website and Relatórios de Sustentabilidade.   
 
Table 5.2: Vehicle production, per plant  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
VW-Autoeuropa 95,660 79,449 81,832 93,609 94,100 86,008 101,284 133,100 112,550 91,200 
Mitsubishi Fuso 8,215 8,556 9,267 10,478 10,886 2,850 : 5,498 4,117 3,758 
PSA PC Mangualde 53,432 53,426 57,208 64,064 61,360 34,520 47,369 50,290 43,940 56,717 
Toyota Ovar  2,793 3,657 3,529 4,625 5,750 1,814 2,644 1,815 1,331 1,030 
CaetanoBus 236 272 302 298 197 153 : 208 50 81 
Source: ACAP – Portuguese Automobile Association.   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 On the closure of this plant see: http://eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/conflict-
over-terms-of-closure-of-opel-plant. 
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5.2.1 Pre-crisis: a frozen landscape (2004-08) 
Between 2004 and 2008, both the number of employees and the level of vehicle 
production remained stable (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2). Indeed, the majority of plants 
saw an increase in the level of production. Below, we discuss how the situation 
evolved in the sector regarding four dimensions, the traditional characteristics of an 
ILM (see Table 5.3). As will emerge from the discussion, these plants constitute well-
developed ILMs. 
Investment in training, namely on-the-job training, is impressive. Large plants 
have their own vocational training school (dual-teaching system), as well as a training 
centre inside the factory where workers regularly develop their skills (CaetanoBus’s 
training centre is co-managed with an university).5 These schools provide courses in 
several areas and were established for a long time (the oldest has been in place since 
the 1980s). Furthermore, large plants share their vocational training schools with 
smaller plants (even when plants are owned by different groups), i.e. smaller plants 
are allowed to recruit new employees from these schools. On the other hand, all plants 
have their traineeship programmes. Finally, on-the-job training is not restricted to the 
training provided in the vocational school or in the training centre (Interview nos. 3, 
5, 7, 8, 11). According to the Director of HR (Human Resources) of Mitsubishi Fuso, 
investment in training is a gradual process:  
 
At least one month [of initial training] is needed for an operator. After being integrated, we have 
in the ground what we usually call ‘rotation’ (…). If, for instance, we want that an operator 
knows four or five workstations, we have to invest to develop their skills… on the ground. (…) 
This is done at the ‘plant’s floor’… as we usually call it. This is a gradual process (…). It is 
always taking place… the on-the-job training. (Director of HR, Mitsubishi Fuso)  
 
In the automotive sector, sectoral collective bargaining agreements, which exist 
since the 1980s, ensure career progression based on seniority. These agreements 
provide three levels of progression for operators and also apply to the vehicle 
manufacturing subsector. Notwithstanding, in several plants, company-level 
bargaining supplements sectoral agreements, namely by providing additional levels of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The percentage of the Portuguese population whose highest level of education is vocational upper 
secondary is 14.2% (OECD 2012, p. 39). It is one of the lowest percentages among OECD countries. 
The investment made by these companies is therefore significant, given the situation in the country in 
this regard.   
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progression. VW-Autoeuropa and PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde are a good 
illustration of this point. Regarding the way progression is processed for operators, in 
the latter, there are 14 levels of progression and, in the former, 15 levels (for 
additional details on this see: Correia 2000, pp. 751-756). The average level of 
education also illustrates this point: in all plants the vast majority of the workforce 
does not have a university degree. For example, in CaetanoBus, only 12.5% of the 
employees have a university degree. Therefore, skills are mainly ‘technical’ rather 
than ‘generic’, and are acquired on-the-job. This is why the access to certain job 
levels is conditional to previous experience (Interview nos. 5, 11).   
The majority of employees in these plants have a permanent contract. Fixed-
term contracts are mainly used to screen workers and this is why the share of direct 
employees with fixed-contracts reaches about 20% in some plants. With respect to 
temporary agency workers, they are both used to face production peaks or to screen 
workers. Thus, atypical employment in this sector can also be a port of entry, i.e. a 
transitory stage. As for employees involved in activities that were outsourced, the 
situation is different because they remain ‘outside’. However, the number of 
employees working in outsourcing is relatively low in this sector. The exception is 
VW-Autoeuropa, where it accounts for about 35% of the entire labour force. At this 
plant outsourcing has increased for parts of production which is subcontracted to 
MNCs like Acciona that specialize in such functions as logistics, tooling, 
maintenance, cafeteria and cleaning services. Furthermore, at VW-Autoeuropa, 400 
out of 1,900 indirect employees belong to Autovision Services, a company owned by 
the Volkswagen Group, and which specializes in supplying services to Volkswagen 
(namely those directly related with production). Finally, part-time is not commonly 
used (Interview nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10 12). As one trade unionist put it, fixed-term 
contracts are often used to screen workers:  
 
We dispute the use of fixed-term contracts as a trial period, but we are aware that these 
employees are gradually integrated in the core labour force. (Unionist, VW-Autoeuropa).    
 
In the same vein, as a works councillor explained, even temporary agency 
workers are often integrated in the core labour force:  
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At this moment, there are 80 [temporary agency workers] working in the factory (…). They all 
belong to a temporary employment agency owned by Volkswagen [Autovision People]. [When 
they are recruited], they make tests, fulfil several conditions and remain, up to one year, in that 
company… in trial. Notwithstanding, they progress in the same way as permanent workers. 
(Works councillor, VW-Autoeuropa)   
 
Finally, protection against redundancies is very high. The great majority of 
employees are direct employees, and this number remained stable throughout this 
period. Average seniority in this sector corroborates this fact: in all plants seniority is 
very high.6 Notwithstanding, temporary workers and those working in outsourcing 
have a lower protection. Although agency temps can be used to screen workers, they 
are sometimes used to face production peaks. As for outsourcing, because 
subcontracting companies may change, these workers have less stable jobs 
(outsourcing was used in VW-Autoeuropa, while temporary agency work was used at 
Mitsubishi Fuso and PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde). These two groups represent 
however a low proportion of the workforce in all plants (see Table 5.3, last column). 
Finally, even though this period was relatively stable, some companies had to use 
‘hour banks’ to cope with falling demand. Indeed, since 2003, production has been 
halted for several days at VW-Autoeuropa, using a tool negotiated with the works 
council. By using this solution, this plaint avoided redundancies during this period. As 
will be explained in the next sub-section, this solution was used in all plants to cope 
with the global economic downturn (Interview nos. 1, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12).  
To sum up, this sector is constituted by well-developed ILMs. Specific skills 
play a crucial role and therefore these companies make a large investment in on-the-
job training. This is the case before new employees join the company, because they 
usually attend the company’s vocational school during several years,7 and after 
joining the company, because they continue to acquire specific skills through on-the-
job training. Consequently, career progression is based on seniority (from low skilled 
to high skilled positions) and a large number of progression levels exist. Due to this 
investment, atypical employment represents a low share of jobs and it is mainly used !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For instance, the average seniority is 17 years, 14 years, 19 years, and 18.5 years in Mitsubishi Fuso, 
PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde, Toyota Ovar and Caetano Bus, respectively.  
7 As explained earlier, large plants have their own vocational training school (dual-teaching system), 
which usually receives financial support from the European Funds. Some courses last for 2-3 years 
because students need to acquire a large number of competences directly related with their profession 
and, because these schools are recognized by the Ministry of Education, a variety of other skills are 
also included (e.g., language skills).   
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to screen workers. Therefore, non-standard employment is, in many cases, a port of 
entry into the ILM rather than merely a way to face production peaks. Job security is 
therefore very high, as illustrated by the high average seniority. 
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5.2.2 Crisis: massive drop in production but a relatively stable workforce (2009-13) 
In Europe, the vehicle manufacturing industry was hardly hit by the global economic 
downturn (Eurofound 2010, pp. 18-24). As can be seen in Table 5.4, Portugal was no 
exception. Although all plants decreased their production level, those producing 
commercial vehicles and buses were more affected. However, despite a significant 
fall in production, employment levels did not fall in the same proportion (Table 5.1). 
In the largest plant, employment levels increased during this period. This sub-section 
will contrast how the situation has evolved regarding the same four dimensions used 
before and will highlight the main differences between plants, namely regarding how 
each has coped with the economic recession (see Table 5.4).   
 Due to lower levels of production, investment in on-the-job training increased 
throughout these years because employees were involved in training during lower 
demand periods. In some plants, the Portuguese government, in the scope of a special 
initiative launched in 2009 – the  ‘Plan to Support the Automotive Sector’ (‘Plano de 
Apoio ao Sector Automóvel’) – subsidized training and reskilling (Mitsubishi Fuso 
and Toyota Ovar). Furthermore, except in VW-Autoeuropa, in all plants this training 
also took place during temporary lay-offs (see discussion on this below). Although all 
plants organized courses, huge differences exist between them. Indeed, the number of 
days spent in each plant with training varies remarkably (see Table 5.4, first column) 
(Interview nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12). Regarding career progression, no changes 
were made to the existing dispositions in collective agreements, i.e. they continue to 
ensure career progression based on seniority. As for the type of employment 
contracts, there has been a great reduction in the number of employees with fixed-
term and temporary work, while the use of outsourcing has remained stable (at VW-
Autoeuropa fixed-term contracts were converted into open-ended contracts). Finally, 
regarding part-time, the situation remained unchanged, despite the increase in the 
number of employees in this situation at PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde (Interview 
nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13).    
 Besides the investment in training, other measures were taken to protect the 
core labour force against the risk of redundancies. All plants adapted their working 
hours, using tools negotiated with trade unions and works councils (‘hour banks’). 
Furthermore, in two plants staff had to be redeployed from one plant to another: in 
VW-Autoeuropa, 240 employees were sent abroad to work in the main factory 
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(Volkswagen Wolfsburg) during several years; while in Toyota Ovar, 40 employees 
were redeployed to a different plant, but located in Portugal. In four plants, a 
temporary lay-off was implemented (at CaetanoBus several temporary lay-offs took 
place).8 In three plants, these measures were not sufficient to tackle with the fall in 
production and a number of employees were dismissed. Temporary agency workers 
were made redundant in the first place, thereafter fixed-term employees, and finally, 
early retirement agreements were reached with a set of workers (no collective 
dismissals took place). In PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde, where the largest 
reduction took place, there was anticipation of holidays in 2009.9 In Mitsubishi Fuso 
there was a reduction of working hours (10%) with a decrease in pay (10%) 
(Interview nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12).    
Taken together, the global economic crisis hit the vehicle manufacturing 
industry hard and all plants had to find solutions to adjust their labour force to the 
declining levels of production. However, employment levels have been cushioned 
against the effects of the economic recession by a combination of measures such as 
temporary lay-offs, full-time training, redeployment of workers, and short-time 
working (‘hour banks’). In our view, the way this sector coped with the economic 
crisis in almost all plants illustrates quite well the functioning of a sector constituted 
by well-developed ILMs. As Doeringer and Piore (1971, p. 15) argued: ‘the utility of 
the ILM as an analytical construct does not hinge upon the existence of administrative 
rules. It depends rather upon the rigidity of the rules which define the boundaries of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Temporary lay-offs were widely used. The lay-off regime (Regime de Lay-off) is a procedure 
provided by the Portuguese legislation and can be used when companies are hit by temporary decreases 
in demand. It must begin with consultation with the works council and allows the company to reduce 
the labour force temporarily. This ensures that workers laid off entirely (those who are on 100% short-
time work) receive an allowance of 66% of their normal gross pay. From this amount, the Portuguese 
Social Security System supports 70%. Short-time working can last up to 6 months. All plants 
(excluding VW-Autoeuropa) used this regime.   
9 In terms of job losses, PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde was the most affected. In our view, two main 
reasons explain this. First, several plants from the same Group were closed during this period, being 
therefore difficult to use the same strategy followed in VW-Autoeuropa (i.e., to send employees to 
work abroad), and the pressure to contain and reduce costs was much greater (Público, 12 July 2012). 
Second, since 2010, this plant’s production became dependent on the level of production in another 
Spanish plant. It is so because, in contrast with the other plants analysed in our study, the two models 
produced in Mangualde are not exclusively produced there. They are also fabricated in a Spanish plant 
located nearby. The number of vehicles produced in Mangualde depends on the number of vehicles that 
the Spanish plant is unable to fabricate due to higher levels of demand. Since the Spanish plant is much 
larger (with about 6,000 employees), there are more firms supplying components nearby (reducing 
therefore transport costs). Furthermore, the degree of automation is much higher in the Spanish plant 
and thus the Group prioritizes this plant. As a consequence, due to changes in the level of production in 
the Spanish plant, the night shift in Mangualde was closed and reopened several times and this explains 
the fluctuations in the number of workers in this plant. Finally, when the night shift has reopened, new 
employees work part-time and have temporary contracts (Interview nos. 5, 6). 
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internal markets and govern pricing and allocation within them. If these rules are not 
rigid, and respond freely to variations in economic conditions, their independent 
economic role will be minimal’. Our study shows that, although differences exist 
between plants (see footnote seven regarding PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde), the 
pattern has been the attempt to maintain the core labour force, as well as the 
institutions supporting the ILM, namely the large investment in on-the-job training 
and career progression based on seniority. As the Head of Group HR (plants Toyota 
Ovar and CaetanoBus) told us, even when maintaining employees meant a high cost, 
companies made a great effort to maintain their core labour force:  
 
We went through deeply troubled times, we made a great effort to keep these employees… only 
with this group’s philosophy… and I can tell you that we had… we lost money and in many 
realities this company would have been closed. (Head of Group HR, Toyota Ovar and 
CaetanoBus)  
 
In the same vein, the works councillor at VW-Autoeuropa also explained how 
the situation evolved during this period, stressing the effort made to keep the same 
number of employees:   
 
Considering that we had about 3,600 employees to produce 130,000 cars, and we continue, at 
this moment, with 3,600 employees… There has been a considerable effort, a permanent 
negotiation between the works council and the company’s board, but so far we have succeeded! 
(Works councillor, VW-Autoeuropa) 
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Box 1  
How the global economic downturn affected young people?  
 
The vehicle manufacturing industry has been badly hit by the economic recession. However, a similar 
proportion of job losses did not match the loss in production. Furthermore, workforce reduction in this 
sector was mainly achieved through the reduction of temporary agency workers, the decrease in the 
number of employees with fixed-term contracts, and by reaching early retirement agreements with 
older workers. The latter measure affected older people, while the first two young people. Therefore, a 
balance was reached between different age groups. Furthermore, considering that fixed-term contracts 
are also used in this sector to screen workers and that a large investment in these workers’ skills is 
made (both before and after joining the company), a large number of redundancies is avoided. The 
example of VW-Autoeuropa, which despite a great reduction on its production level decided to convert 
a large number of fixed-term contracts into open-ended contracts during this period, is illustrative of 
this fact. All in all, because atypical employment is mainly a transitory stage in this sector, young 
people were not disproportionally affected by the global economic downturn.  
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5.3 Telecommunications sector: the gradual erosion of the ILM model 
The markets for telecommunications in almost all EU (European Union) countries 
were liberalized in the 1990s (Ferner and Colling 1991; Batt and Darbishire 1997; 
Doellgast and Greer 2007; Eurofound 2009, pp. 40-41; Holst 2014). Furthermore, the 
EU has strongly promoted the privatization of formerly state-owned telecoms 
companies (Doellgast et al. 2009, p. 352). Portugal was no exception and the public 
company began to be privatized in 1995. The privatization was only finalized in 2011, 
when the Portuguese government gave up on the 500 golden shares pack that it owned 
on the company and that enabled special veto powers to the government on vital 
issues. Notwithstanding, up until 2006 this company continued to hold a dominant 
position in the liberalized Portuguese market. In 2007 the former state company spun 
off its media assets, which included a cable TV operator, and this lead to the creation 
of an independent brand (NOS). Currently, as shown in Table 5.5, these two 
companies (PT and NOS) have the overwhelming majority of the market share in 
telecoms in Portugal (Banco de Portugal 2013b, pp. 16-17).10 Furthermore, one 
company has a large market share in mobile telephone but a low market share in the 
other services (Vodafone), and two companies (ONI and Cabovisão), which currently 
belong to the same group (Altice), have a relatively small market share.11 In terms of 
employment, this is a fast growing sector in the Portuguese economy. Currently, 
including employees in outsourcing, these five companies account for around 45,000 
employees. In the 1990s (prior to liberalization) the sector had about 22,000 
employees. Union membership is below the Portuguese average in all companies 
except for PT, where it is well above. Indeed, while union density is about 40% in PT, 
it is below 30% in Cabovisão, and below 5% in the remaining three companies.12 
Furthermore, only PT has a works council and collective bargaining is confined to the 
former public company.   
 This section has been divided into two parts. It begins by discussing how the 
situation evolved from 2004 to 2008, namely how this sector’s liberalization 
contributed to the gradual erosion of the classical ILM model. It will then go on to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Note that this company’s original name was ZON. Notwithstanding, in 2013 took place a merger 
between ZON and another telecommunications company (Optimus). This led to the creation of a new 
brand called ‘NOS’. For reasons of clarity, throughout this chapter this company is always called NOS.  
11 Recently, in 2015, Altice also bought PT.   
12 Interestingly, in Europe only in Portugal and Finland union membership in the telecoms sector is 
higher than in other sectors (Eurofound 2009, p. 30).   
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analyse how the global economic downturn affected the telecommunications industry, 
namely its workforce. This section concludes by highlighting how the overall 
transformation in this sector affected young people.  
 
Table 5.5 – Market shares, by type of service (2007-13) 
Service Companies 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TV subscribers 
PT 1.0 13.7 23 30.4 35.5 39.2 41.5 
NOS 78.4 71.8 63.8 57.3 53.3 50.3 47.8 
Vodafone : : 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.4 3.5 
ONI : : : : : : : 
Cabovisão 14.9 12.4 10.2 9.5 8.7 7.8 7.1 
Others 5.7 2.1 2.7 2.1 1.3 1.3 0.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Fixed telephony 
PT : 68.5 63.6 60.2 58.4 57.2 56.4 
NOS : 4.3 10.6 14.8 17.4 19.7 31.2 
Vodafone : 2.9 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.7 6.4 
ONI : 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 
Cabovisão : 6.4 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.4 5.6 
Others : 16.7 15.3 14 13.3 12.3 0.0 
Total : 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Fixed broadband 
PT : 42.1 44.5 46.9 49.3 51.3 50.5 
NOS : 30.7 31.9 32.5 33.0 33.0 36.2 
Vodafone : 3.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 3.9 6.5 
ONI : 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 : 
Cabovisão : 9 7.8 7.9 7.2 : : 
Others : 14.7 11.3 8.2 6 11.5 6.8 
Total : 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Mobile telephone 
PT : : : 43.9 43.1 43.1 45.0 
NOS : : : 0.7 0.8 0.9 14.8 
Vodafone : : : 39.3 40.5 40.7 38.3 
ONI : : : : : : : 
Cabovisão : : : : : : : 
Others : : : 16.1 15.6 15.3 1.9 
Total : : : 100 100 100 100 
Source: ANACOM (2013) and ANACOM (2008). 
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5.3.1 A flourishing but increasingly segmented sector (2004-08) 
From 2004 to 2008, revenues increased substantially (Table 5.6). However, regarding 
the number of direct employees, it decreased massively throughout this period (Table 
5.7). To explain this, it is necessary to consider the rise of outsourcing. Indeed, as it is 
explained below, the sector’s liberalization and the former public company’s 
privatization led to a great expansion of activities in outsourcing, contributing 
therefore to the gradual erosion of the ILM model. The discussion will proceed by 
analysing the same four characteristics used in section 5.2, namely: on-the-job 
training; career progression; use of atypical employment; and protection against 
redundancies (see Table 5.8).    
 Regarding training, none of these companies had their own vocational school 
or their own training centre. Notwithstanding, two companies have one or more 
traineeship programs (PT and ONI). PT created the most ambitious, in 2007. It 
consists of two different programs: the first for young graduates and the second for 
students from vocational training schools. For instance, in 2008, 586 young people 
were selected in the scope of these programs. Furthermore, regarding the total 
expenditure on training, the majority of the companies spent a low amount of 
resources on these policies, and those expending more – PT and Vodafone – gradually 
reduced their investment throughout these years.13 Furthermore, in contrast with the 
vehicle manufacturing sector, the majority of the core labour force has a university 
degree (in all companies). For instance, 74% of the NOS’s labour force has a 
university degree. Therefore, these workers’ skills are generic and were acquired 
before joining the company (Interview nos. 16, 17). All in all, investment in on-the-
job training is not especially high.  
 As for career progression, great changes took place during these years. While 
in NOS, Vodafone, ONI and Cabovisão the situation remained stable, because 
collective agreements or progression based on seniority have never existed 
(progression is exclusively based on merit), the situation in PT has radically changed 
because job ladders were ‘delayered’ for direct employees, and indirect employees are 
not covered by collective bargaining. Since the 1980s, career progression in this 
company was based on seniority. For example, in the collective agreement concluded 
in 2001, there were 34 professional groups, each one with several progression levels !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 For instance, Portugal Telecom decreased its investment from €4.8 million in 2004, to €3.1 million 
in 2008.  Vodafone decreased its investment from €2.2 million in 2004, to €1.5 million in 2008.  
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(some groups had 15 levels of progression). In 2006, a new collective agreement 
(company-level) was reached between trade unions and the company’s board. 14 This 
agreement no longer provides career progression based on seniority and the number 
of professional groups has been reduced. In the new agreement there are only four 
levels of employee, each one with five levels of progression. Furthermore, regarding 
the new progression requirements, seniority accounts for only 10% of each 
employee’s grade. Considering its large market share, its number of employees, and 
the proportion of direct employees which were covered by collective bargaining in 
2006 (71.5%), the changes regarding career progression at PT had a great impact in 
the sector (Interview nos. 14, 17). As one trade unionist put it, this was the major 
change since privatization:  
 
The most serious setback was on careers. We had one career to each professional group… we 
had around 30 professional groups, all of them with progression based on seniority. This ended 
in 2006. (…) In 2006, the other unions concluded an agreement in which automatic progression 
based on seniority is no longer provided. The new model of careers is based on each employee’s 
performance. (Unionist, telecoms sector) 
 
Furthermore, because progression now depends from availability of funding, 
young people are particularly affected by this change. As explained by a works 
councillor: 
 
It is the difference between a worker like me, which has been with the company for 28 years, 
that receives €1,500; and another worker, which is much more skilled… because today this 
profession requires more qualifications… but he earns €750, and might no longer progress. He 
may even have a very good assessment, but there may be no available funding.  (Works 
councillor, PT)  
 
These years were also characterized by a great expansion of outsourcing, 
increasing therefore the weight of non-standard employment. Indeed, while 
outsourcing was absent throughout most of the 1990s, it increased dramatically since 
then. Crucial activities such as call centres, door-to-door selling, stores, installation 
and network maintenance services, were outsourced. As a consequence, a great !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 It should be noted that this agreement was concluded without the participation of SINTTAV-CGTP, 
the most representative trade union.  
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number of jobs, which historically were in the core labour force, were transferred to 
independent subcontractors. Although differences exist between companies, in all of 
them the number of indirect employees exceeded the number of direct employees. For 
instance, during this period, PT had about 16,000 indirect employees, and NOS 7,000. 
To a large extent, this explains why the number of direct employees did not increase 
during these years. This led to an increase in the number of atypical jobs because 
fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs are often used in activities that were 
outsourced. This is evident in the case of call centres (Doellgast et al. 2009, p. 353; 
Holst 2014, p. 11).  For example, PT had about 8,000 employees working in call 
centres during this period, i.e. half of its workforce. Finally, these workers are not 
covered by collective agreements and union membership is very low (below 5%) 
(Interview nos. 14, 15, 16 17). In some companies, outsourcing is so widespread that 
even employees carrying out their activities at these companies’ headquarters are 
subcontracted. A manager from Cabovisão and ONI explains this fact: 
 
In some areas we have what we usually call, for instance, ‘the operational centre’. Even though 
we coordinate this service… in the past this was totally externalized… in order to better 
supervise this service, these activities are now carried out in our headquarters but these 
employees belong to a subcontractor (Director of HR, ONI and Cabovisão).   
   
One activist from a civil society movement told us about her experience at a 
subcontractor:     
 
The company for which we have more information is Portugal Telecom, (…) I worked there as 
a call centre operator [through a temporary employment agency]. Fixed-term contracts were the 
norm. We had a six-months contract, renewed up to three times, and then… what they used to 
do was… through temporary employment agencies… when the maximum number of legal 
renewals was reached, they exchange workers between agencies and they recruit again… 
generally with worse conditions and a lower salary. (Activist, civil society movement)    
 
Finally, as far as job security is concerned, the situation remained stable for 
direct employees, but the expansion of outsourcing led to an increase of atypical 
employment. Considering that the majority of employees were transferred to the 
external market, job protection declined massively throughout this period. Finally, 
regarding PT, this period was also characterized by a great reduction in the number of 
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direct employees (see Table 5.6). This is related with the process of privatization. 
When privatization began, in 1995, this company had about 22,000 employees. Since 
then, the company’s board has tried to reduce the number of direct employees, 
because this process faced the fierce opposition of trade unions, no collective 
dismissal was undertaken (in 1995, union density was above 90%). To implement its 
strategy, the company’s board negotiated with trade unions a reduction of the 
workforce through a pre-retirement programme. Since then, this plan has been used. 
For instance, in the scope of this program, 614, 1004 and 344 employees left the 
company in 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively (Interview no. 14). As one trade 
unionist put it, this process began in 1995:   
 
In 1995 we had 22,000 direct employees and today we have around 10,000. Only yesterday the 
President announced that the company has too much managers. (…) At that time [of 
privatization], [the former president] wanted to dismiss 3,000 employees. Because we carried 
out a massive war against this, only 200 were made redundant, and they left the company 
because they decided to do so. (Unionist, telecoms sector) 
 
As explained by a works councillor, the other companies did not reduce their 
core labour force because they did not inherit such a heavy structure:  
 
In the other companies, as they did not inherit such a cumbersome structure, the proportion is 
different. They have few internal people, and many external. NOS, for example, has 1,000 
employees… but if they… if we have 12,000 [direct employees] for 16,000 [external 
employees]… they have 1,000 for 7,000. NOS, broadly speaking, does not have what we 
usually call ‘operational direction’, it does not have operational workers. All these activities are 
outsourced. (Works councillor, PT) 
 
Overall, this sector went through a great transformation during these years. 
Although this process began earlier – when liberalization and privatization started in 
the 1990s – three main changes took place between 2004 and 2008. First, due to 
favourable economic conditions, the sector grew very fast. However, because 
companies opted to externalize staff through outsourcing this has given rise to the 
increase of indirect employment. As explained before, this took place simultaneously 
with the reduction of direct employment. Consequently, this contributed to the 
expansion of non-standard employment and to the reduction of employees covered by 
collective agreements. Second, in 2007, the former public company spun off its media 
  Explaining age-based dualization  !
! 124 
assets, which included a cable TV operator. This led to the creation of an independent 
brand with a large market share. Consequently, PT faced increased competition, rising 
therefore the pressure to dismantle the traditional ILM model in the former state 
company. Third, in PT, a new collective agreement was reached in 2006. This 
agreement changed substantially the situation for direct employees because career 
progression is no longer based on seniority and both the number of professional 
categories and progression levels were remarkably reduced. Taking these three 
changes together, atypical employment became dominant and the situation for direct 
employees in the former public company was considerably changed.     
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5.3.2 The telecommunications sector during the economic crisis (2009-13) 
The telecoms industry was not hit by the economic crisis as other sectors. 
Notwithstanding, since 2011, total revenues stagnated (see Table 5.6). Indeed, while 
other sectors were affected since 2009 (due to the global economic downturn), the 
telecoms were more affected by the retraction in the domestic market due to 
Portugal’s three-year bailout programme (2011-14). As for employment, since 2011 
all companies reduced their workforce, except NOS which merged with another 
telecommunications company (Optimus) (Table 5.7). The discussion below will 
analyse how the situation evolved regarding the four dimensions examined in the 
previous section (Table 5.9).    
 No structural changes took place regarding investment in training, career 
progression, and the use of non-standard employment (fixed-term contracts, 
temporary work, and part-time). Investment in training remained low in the majority 
of companies. Furthermore, those expending more (PT and Vodafone) decreased their 
investment.15 Atypical employment continued to represent a large share of jobs in this 
sector, and some companies continued to expand the number of indirect employees. 
For example, in 2013 Vodafone inaugurated a new call centre with 200 employees 
(Jornal de Negócios, 6 December 2013), and PT inaugurated, in 2009, a new call 
centre with 630 employees (Press release, 31 August 2009). As for career 
progression, no structural changes took place during these years, but modifications to 
collective agreements implemented in 2006 (see section 5.3.1) led to the freezing of 
progressions since 2012 (Interview nos. 14, 15). According to one trade unionist, in 
2013 and 2014 no progressions took place:    
 
The main problem is that career progression depends on the availability of budget. Two years 
ago, around 450 employees progressed. They [the administration] gave an assurance that in the 
last year [2013] 400 more would progress… but no one did due to lack of budget… and this 
year the situation is the same. (Unionist, telecoms sector) 
 
Turning now to the level of job security during this period, in a number of 
companies there was a reduction in both the number of indirect and direct employees. 
NOS, ONI and Cabovisão reduced substantially the number of indirect employees due !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 For instance, Portugal Telecom decreased its investment from €3.1 million in 2008, to €1.5 million 
in 2013.  Vodafone decreased its investment from €1.5 million in 2004, to €660 thousand in 2013. 
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to a drop in their market shares (Table 5.5). For instance, from 2012 to 2013 NOS 
announced the axing of 1,000 indirect employees and, in 2012, Cabovisão dismissed 
all their indirect employees (to renegotiate contracts and save costs). Changes were 
also felt in the number of direct employees. ONI and Cabovisão reduced their number 
due to lower market shares and Vodafone due to a substantial reduction on its 
revenues (Público, 14 May 2012). 16 Finally, PT continued its plan to reduce the 
number of direct employees. However, recruitment in the scope of traineeship 
programs stabilized the number of direct employees (Interview nos. 14, 16, 17). As 
one trade unionist said, those companies facing a great reduction in their market 
shares reduced substantially both the number of direct and indirect employees:   
 
When Cabovisão was sold [to Altice, in 2012], one third of the employees were dismissed. 
More recently, another collective dismissal took place, and 10 employees left the company. (…) 
A number of measures have been taken… the first was the suspension of all outsourcing 
contracts. Shortly thereafter, they renegotiated contracts for lower prices. (Unionist, telecoms 
sector)   
 
Taken as a whole, no structural change took place in this sector throughout 
this period, the gradual erosion of the traditional ILM model continued its path. 
Notwithstanding, since 2011, adjustments in both the number of direct and indirect 
employees were implemented. This period illustrates quite well how companies in 
this sector react to changes in economic conditions: when they face a decrease in their 
market share (and/or a drop in their total revenues), they reduce quasi automatically 
their labour force. In this regard, indirect employees are the most affected. Given the 
weight of indirect employment, short-term variations in economic conditions lead to 
high numbers of redundancies. This is completely at odds with the logic of the 
classical ILM model, which, as has already been said, is characterized by its rigidity, 
i.e. by not responding freely to variations in economic conditions (Doeringer and 
Piore 1971, p. 15).  
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Vodafone’s revenues are concentrated in the mobile telephone, which, as shown in Table 5.6, 
dropped significantly since 2009 
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Box 2  
How the erosion of traditional ILM model affected young people?  
 
Until the 1990s a publicly owned company monopolized the telecommunications sector, where atypical 
employment was very low. The spread of non-standard employment took place throughout the 2000s 
due to the company’s privatization and the liberalization of this sector. This process affected 
disproportionally young people because while older generations maintained their position at the core 
labour force (due to high union density and high bargaining coverage at the former public company), a 
large share of young people entered the labour market through the expansion of outsourcing. As a 
consequence, because in this sector workers may remain precarious for a long period of time, atypical 
employment affects more young people. On the other hand, they also face a greater risk of being laid 
off because variations in the number of indirect employment affect disproportionally young people. 
Considering that short-term variations in economic conditions lead to high numbers of redundancies, 
precisely in the number of indirect employees, this affects young people disproportionally.      
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5.4 Discussion 
Based on the analysis carried out in the previous two sections, three main differences 
between the vehicle manufacturing and the telecoms sectors are highlighted in this 
section: its structure, the way each one reacts to variations in economic conditions, 
and how each one was affected by liberalization. By highlighting these dissimilarities, 
our objective is to shed light on the process that has led to a growing generational 
divide in the Portuguese labour market. Below it is argued that liberalization and 
social conflict have played a crucial role in bringing about a growing segmentation in 
the Portuguese labour market.  
Each sector’s structure is different. First, as shown in Figure 5.1, while in the 
vehicle manufacturing industry the majority of employees are direct workers, the 
opposite occurs in telecoms. Recent literature suggested that over the past decades a 
similar process of vertical disintegration took place in both telecoms and auto 
industries (Holst 2014). 17 This however does not appear to be the case. Our results 
clearly show that, although both outsourcing and temporary agency employment are 
used in the auto industries (namely at the VW’s plant), in telecoms the share of 
indirect jobs is much higher. This is so because throughout the 2000s 
telecommunications companies opted to massively externalize staff through 
outsourcing, while in the vehicle manufacturing sector a comparable process did not 
take place. Besides the above-mentioned discussion about the role of specific skills in 
the latter sector, in telecommunications, as Doellgast et al. (2009, pp. 352-353) 
pointed out ‘the nature of the work and technology allows tasks to be easily separated 
into discrete groupings that may be allocated to different jobs, employee groups, or 
organizational units (…) Call centre managers can allocate work to subsidiaries or 
subcontractors without incurring the transportation or inventory costs found in 
manufacturing’. Second, while atypical employment represents a relatively small 
proportion of jobs in the vehicle manufacturing sector, the opposite is the case in 
telecommunications. Besides counting for a low proportion of the labour force, in the 
former sector atypical employment is used to both screen workers and face production 
peaks. Therefore, atypical employment may constitute a port of entry, an opportunity 
to enter into an ILM. In telecommunications, an employee may remain in a precarious !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Vertical disintegration is defined as ‘the creation of new intermediate markets in a previously 
integrated production process’ (Doellgast and Greer 2007, p. 56).  
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situation throughout his entire working life, and a large proportion of employees work 
part-time, a finding which is in line with investigations on the Portuguese labour 
market, which claim that a growing number of workers are trapped in precarious jobs 
(Kovács 2005, pp. 42-51; Alves et al. 2011, p. 37). Third, while the expansion of 
indirect employment in telecoms has been made at the expense of reductions in the 
number of direct employees, in the vehicle manufacturing industry the number of 
direct employees remained stable.   
 Each sector responds differently to variations in economic conditions. In the 
scope of a massive reduction of production, the vehicle manufacturing industry 
increased its investment in training, used ‘hour banks’ and temporary lay-offs to cope 
with falling demand, and no collective dismissals were undertaken. Employees more 
affected were those with fixed-term contracts and temporary agency workers. Early-
retirement agreements were also reached with older workers. In the telecoms industry, 
adjustments were undertaken in the number of indirect employment and, in 
companies facing more problems, a large reduction of the core workforce was carried 
out through collective dismissals. No alternative measures were used to prevent the 
dismissal of a large number of indirect employees. To summarise, while the vehicle 
manufacturing industry is composed by well-developed ILMs and therefore job 
security is higher, in telecoms, the majority of the labour force has a much lower 
protection.  
 Liberalization affects differently each sector. The vehicle manufacturing 
sector is still characterized by well-developed ILMs. There are differences between 
plants, but the ‘traditional’ pillars of the classical ILM model have been safeguarded. 
It is interesting to note that a large investment in on-the-job training, high bargaining 
coverage, and cooperative relations between labour and capital at the plant level 
characterize this sector (Lima et al. 2012). As explained in Chapter 2, the Southern 
European countries lack much of the characteristics of the coordinated market 
economies (Hall and Soskice 2001; Molina and Rhodes 2007). Notwithstanding, our 
study shows that several institutions that characterize coordinated market economies 
exist at the company-level in these plants, illustrating how coordination can exist if 
their purpose is confined to making markets more efficient (Streeck 2009, p. 158). In 
telecoms, there was a gradual erosion of the traditional ILM model at the former 
public company. The company’s privatization and the sector’s liberalization led to a 
great transformation. New challenger firms never had the characteristics of the ILM 
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model and the former state company has been gradually transformed. At this 
company, the core labour force has shrunk since the 1990s, and, simultaneously, a 
growing number of indirect employees were recruited. Furthermore, since 2006, due 
to changes in the existing collective agreements, several characteristics were 
modified, namely progression based on seniority and the existence of a large number 
of professional groups and a large number of progression levels. Interestingly, only 
after 2006 this company began to integrate a large number of new employees (in the 
scope of a traineeship programme). To sum up, while liberalization did not lead to 
transformations in the ILM structure in the vehicle manufacturing sector, the opposite 
happened in the telecommunications sector. This shows that the ILM structure existed 
not only to meet the internal productive requirements of the organization (as 
hypothesized by Doeringer and Piore (1971)), but also due to other external 
conditions, such as strong trade unions (as hypothesized by Grimshaw et al. (2001, p. 
26)).   
 Age-based dualization. The contrast between sectors illustrates why 
dualization as generational layering captures well the process of change in Southern 
European labour markets. The vehicle manufacturing sector accounts for a low share 
of jobs in the Portuguese labour market, but it represents a much larger proportion of 
jobs in countries characterized by lower levels of outsiderness among young people 
(see Chapter 4). The proportion of workers in telecoms is much higher in the 
Portuguese labour market, and it has grown throughout the past years. As explained 
above (see Boxes 1 and 2), the public company’s privatization together with the 
sector’s liberalization led to a gradual deterioration of job quality. This process 
affected young people disproportionally because while the core labour force in the 
former state company – by large still the largest company in this sector – was 
protected due to unions’ power and resistance, the number of indirect employees 
expanded very fast and young people entered into the labour market through these 
jobs, which are characterized by being more precarious. Furthermore, in the 
telecommunications sector, workers may remain in a precarious situation for a long 
period because atypical employment is not used to screen workers. The way the 
situation evolved in the vehicle manufacturing sector during the crisis illustrates quite 
well why young people are less affected in countries where the traditional ILM 
structure is present in a large number of companies. In this industry, to cope with the 
global economic downturn, a balance has been reached between different age groups. 
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This was so because atypical employment is also used to screen workers. 
Consequently, when companies need to adjust their labour force, a high number of 
redundancies are avoided because a large investment in these workers’ skills had been 
made before.  
Further studies might explore how the situation evolved in a different set of 
companies that until the 1990s were public-owned (e.g. electricity operators and 
postal services operators), but it is our conviction that these companies’ privatization 
and sector’s liberalization led to a deterioration of job quality and this affected 
disproportionally young people in Portugal. In our view, liberalization and social 
conflict are the drivers of labour market segmentation in the Portuguese labour 
market. Against some misconceptions, it is not labour market legislation, which 
supposedly protects insiders against the interest of outsiders, but indeed the erosion of 
the traditional ILM model that has led to the existing inequalities in the labour market. 
Social conflict played a crucial role in this process, because social groups resisted 
liberalization policies and in some sectors were able to protect their constituencies 
against the risk of dismissal or lower working conditions. In the Polanyian sense, it is 
market expansion that brings about social countermovements and not the other way 
around. The transformations in the Portuguese labour market illustrate this fact.  
 
Figure 5.1 Labour market structure of each sector 
 
 
4"
3"
2"
1"
2"
1"
4"
Note: (1) permanent; (2) fixed-term; (3) agency temps; (4) outsourcing 
Vehicle manufacturing industry Telecoms industry 
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Appendix: List of Interviewees 
 
Note: This is an alphabetical list of interviewees. The interview numbers in the text 
are the author’s own reference, and are not a direct cross-reference, in order to protect 
the interviewees’ anonymity.  
 
Anabela Guerra, interviewed 26 November 2014 
Head of Training of PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde 
 
António Chora, interviewed 19 November 2014 
Works councillor – VW-Autoeuropa 
 
Fernanda Aparício, interviewed 17 December 2014 
Head of Human Resources of Mitsubishi Fuso Tramagal 
 
Francisco Gonçalves, interviewed 18 December 2014 
Works councillor – PT  
 
Idalécio Filipe, interviewed 26 November 2014 
Head of Human Resources of PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde 
 
Jorge Abreu, interviewed 26 November 2014 
Works councillor – PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde      
Trade unionist – Sindicato dos Trabalhadores das Indústrias Transformadoras, 
Energia e Atividades do Ambiente do Centro-Norte (CGTP) 
 
Jorge Magalhães, interviewed 27 November 2014 
Head of Human Resources of CaetanoBUS Vila Nova de Gaia 
 
José Silva, interviewed 17 January 2015 
Trade unionist – Sindicato dos Trabalhadores das Indústrias Transformadoras, 
Energia e Atividades do Ambiente do Sul (CGTP) 
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Justino Pereira, interviewed 25 November 2014 
Trade unionist - Sindicato dos Trabalhadores das Indústrias Transformadoras, Energia 
e Atividades do Ambiente do Centro-Norte (CGTP) 
 
Luís Caseiro, interviewed 27 November 2014 
Head of Training of Grupo Salvador Caetano  
 
Luís Duarte, interviewed 28 November 2014 
Trade unionist – Sindicato dos Trabalhadores das Indústrias Transformadoras, 
Energia e Atividades do Ambiente do Centro-Sul e Regiões Autónomas (CGTP) 
Worker at Mitsubishi Fuso Tramagal 
 
Manuel Gonçalves, interviewed 5 December 2014 
Trade unionist – Sindicato Nacional dos Trabalhadores das Telecomunicações e 
Audiovisual (CGTP) 
 
Marina Pereira, interviewed 26 November 2014 
Manager at the Training Department at PSA Peugeot Citroen Mangualde  
 
Nuno Mourão, interviewed 12 November 2014 
Head of Human Resources of ONI and Cabovisão 
 
Paula Arriscado, interviewed 27 November 2014 
Head of Group Human Resources – Grupo Salvador Caetano  
 
Sara Simões, interviewed 5 December 2014 
Civil Society Movement activist – Associação de Combate à Precariedade: Precários 
Inflexíveis  
 
Susana Alves, interviewed 27 November 2014 
Head of Human Resources of Toyota Caetano – Fábrica de Ovar    
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6 Conclusions, empirical and theoretical     
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the empirical findings of this thesis (both the Fuzzy Set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) analysis and the case studies) and relates 
our findings with the broader theoretical debate on dualization. The chapter is divided 
in three parts. It begins by the empirical findings. Regarding the fsQCA analysis, 
besides synthetizing the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions, it explains 
why our results go beyond other statistical analyses or single country case studies. As 
for the two case studies analysed in the last chapter (telecommunications and vehicle 
manufacturing industries), the main results are summarized and it is explained how 
they complement the fsQCA analysis. The second part deals with the theoretical 
implications of our study. It is argued that to shed light on the age-based dualization 
process it is crucial to bring social conflict back in and consequentially to overcome 
both the rationalist bias on which the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach relies 
and the mainstream assumptions in which the economic insider-outsider theory is 
rooted. Furthermore, it is also argued that liberalization and dualization literatures 
must be combined to successfully respond to the research puzzle presented in the 
introduction. Finally, the last part discusses the policy implications of our thesis.  
 
 
6.1 Empirical findings 
A variety of methods were used to assess age-based dualization in Europe. First, 
fsQCA was used in Chapter 4 to analyse 14 cases and therefore identify which 
countries were more affected by this process and to shed light on the causal 
mechanisms behind age-based dualization. On the other hand, different combinations 
of conditions (paths) leading to high levels of outsiderness among young people were 
also identified. Second, based on the fsQCA findings, two case studies were analysed 
in Chapter 5, namely the Portuguese telecommunications and vehicle manufacturing 
industries. By characterizing how each sector has evolved throughout the past decade, 
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Chapter 5 clarifies why young people were more affected by the transformations 
taking place in the Portuguese labour market. The following two sub-sections 
describe how each methodology has contributed to enhance our understanding 
regarding the age-based dualization process.  
 
 
6.1.1 Different paths to age-based dualization  
Chapter 4 identified the conditions contributing to high levels of outsiderness among 
young people. The analysis of necessary conditions revealed the existence of two 
necessary conditions for the outcome: a small proportion of primary sector jobs (PS) 
and the combination of (i) poor coordination in the industrial relations system and (ii) 
liberalization (PCO+L). The analysis of sufficient conditions indicated two possible 
paths for the outcome: the first path combines a small proportion of primary sector 
jobs, high employment protection, and poor coordination in the industrial relations 
system, while the second one combines a small proportion of primary sector jobs, the 
absence of high employment protection, and liberalization. The first path covers 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, and the second path covers the United Kingdom 
(UK), Ireland, and Denmark. Based on these results, we will outline why the fsQCA 
analysis provides a more consistent story than existing single country case studies or 
other statistical analyses. 
 In our view, the fsQCA analysis provides a more consistent story than existing 
single country case studies (e.g., Palier and Thelen 2010) or other statistical analyses 
(e.g., Rueda 2014). Regarding the latter, because these analyses do not allow the 
identification of multiple paths to the same outcome (i.e., they do not allow multiple 
conjunctural causation), statistical analyses are focused on single explanations, 
namely those that are more representative. Furthermore, they do not allow 
combinatorial explanations (i.e., they do not allow conjunctural causation). Therefore, 
they are focused on the impact of each independent variable on the dependent 
variable. Taking these two characteristics together, this might lead to erroneous 
conclusions. As our results have shown, no single condition is sufficient to produce 
the outcome and two different combinations of conditions lead to the outcome. As a 
consequence, it is quite simplistic to claim that lower job security will necessarily 
decrease segmentation (as many studies actually do). First, high levels of job security 
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alone do not lead to high levels of outsiderness among young people. Second, both 
the presence and absence of high levels of job security can lead to high levels of 
outsiderness among young people, depending on the different combinations of 
conditions. Our results show that in addition to the always-present small proportion of 
primary sector jobs, one of the configurations contains the absence of high 
employment protection combined with liberalization, while the other one includes 
high employment protection combined with poor coordination in the industrial 
relations system. Therefore, for the outcome to take place each pair of conditions 
needs to occur together and in the context of a small proportion of primary sector 
jobs. In our view, fsQCA provides a more consistent explanation, as it shows that 
different stories can be told about this process and that the emphasis on labour market 
legislation made by mainstream scholars may be misleading. On the other hand, 
comparing with single case studies, the main strength of fsQCA is its capacity to 
analyse a higher number of cases. Indeed, studies on dualization using qualitative 
methodologies have been able to provide more complex explanations than studies 
using statistical methods, but because they were focused on two or three cases, it has 
been difficult to capture other patterns of dualization. In our view, our study 
overcomes this problem because it extends the analysis to countries that have up until 
now deserved scant attention. All in all, by allowing the analysis of (multiple) 
conjunctural causation and the study of a relatively higher number of cases (at least, 
comparing with traditional qualitative studies), the fsQCA analysis provides, in our 
view, a more consistent story than existing single country case studies or other 
statistical analyses.  
 
 
6.1.2 Case studies: dualization as generational layering in action 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the case studies analysed in Chapter 5. 
They confirm the fsQCA’s main findings, clarify the role of labour market legislation 
and, finally, show how different sequences of events lead to different outcomes. 
The case studies (the Portuguese telecommunications and vehicle 
manufacturing industries) corroborate the analysis carried out with the fsQCA, 
namely the analysis of necessary conditions, which, as explained earlier, are the small 
proportion of primary sector jobs and the combination of (i) poor coordination in the 
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industrial relations system and (ii) liberalization. As for a small proportion of primary 
sector jobs, the analysis of the vehicle manufacturing industries (a sector in which a 
large investment in on-the-job training is made) reveals that although this sector 
underwent a massive crisis since 2009, an attempt has been made to avoid job losses. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, and regarding the Portuguese case, in some plants this has 
been quite impressive. For example, at VW-Autoeuropa, despite a massive drop in 
production, a large number of workers have seen their contracts converted into open-
ended contracts and no workforce reduction took place. This situation contrasts 
sharply with telecommunications (a sector characterized by a low and declining 
investment in training) where after 2011 several companies reduced substantially their 
workforce. As for poor coordination in the industrial relations system, in the 
telecommunications an uneven union membership led to greater segmentation. While 
in the former public company collective bargaining and job stability was maintained, 
atypical employment grew very fast in the new firms and subcontractors because 
collective bargaining is non-existent there and union density is very low. The situation 
in the vehicle manufacturing industry is completely different. Collective bargaining 
covers the whole sector and union density is not unevenly distributed. Finally, as for 
liberalization, the analysis carried out in Chapter 5 regarding telecoms also illustrates 
why liberalization brings about social conflict and greater segmentation. 1 Indeed, it is 
only after this sector’s liberalization and the former public company’s privatization 
that segmentation rose in this sector. As explained in Chapter 5, after privatization, 
unions resisted liberalization and workers were able to maintain their rights due to a 
very high union membership and generous collective agreements. Notwithstanding, 
segmentation rose because liberalization also led to the creation of new firms and the 
rise of outsourcing, which together contribute to the spread of atypical employment. 
In the vehicle manufacturing industry the situation is different because coordination 
between labour and capital was maintained and, therefore, no substantial changes took 
place regarding job stability.     
 On the other hand, the case studies clarify the role of labour market 
legislation in Portugal. Our findings suggest that labour market legislation should be 
analysed in relation with other factors. First, in telecommunications unions used job !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Contrarily to other sectors in the Portuguese economy (such as the water industry, electricity 
distribution or air transport), liberalization in telecommunications started 1990s. To a large extent, this 
is explained by a more active role played by the European Union regarding this sector’s liberalization.     
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security as a critical asset in their fight against liberalization and therefore it amplified 
their power and contributed to greater segmentation. Labour market protection 
remained very high for permanent workers because they were better organized and 
resisted more. The same did not happen for temporary employees, because union 
membership and collective bargaining were absent in the new firms and 
subcontractors. A dual pattern of job security regulations therefore emerged in this 
sector because market forces faced a fierce opposition in some firms and not in others. 
This dual pattern is an outcome of a dynamic process that opposes those trying to 
expand market forces, and those trying to constrain them. Second, in the vehicle 
manufacturing industries, the story is completely different because employers were 
not interested in flexibilization, at least in a radical way (although outsourcing has 
also risen, the share of atypical employment is much lower). Due to a large 
investment in workers’ specific skills and the need to guarantee a certain level of 
cooperation from workers, the great majority of employees in this sector still have 
permanent contracts and atypical employment is also used to screen workers. In the 
vehicle manufacturing industries, segmentation is much lower because market forces 
were less interested in flexibilization. The comparative analysis of these two sectors 
shows that, per se, high job security does not lead to higher segmentation. To 
conclude, labour market legislation must be analysed in a broader context, one in 
which market expansion and social countermovements play a crucial role.  
Finally, taking the two conclusions together, the analysis conducted in Chapter 
5 also shows why different sequences of events lead to different outcomes. It is the 
move towards labour market flexibilization in telecommunications that brought about 
social conflict and, thereafter, greater segmentation, while in the vehicle 
manufacturing industry it is precisely the opposite because employers followed a 
different strategy. By avoiding a move towards flexibilization, employers in the 
vehicle manufacturing sector prevented the rise of social conflict and, consequently, 
of segmentation. The contrast between sectors provides support for the hypothesis 
that age-based dualization is caused by a move towards liberalization which took 
place since the 1990s and has affected particularly those entering the labour market 
since then.   
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6.2 Theoretical implications: bringing social conflict back in  
Several theoretical conclusions can be drawn from our study. First and foremost, it 
seems to corroborate that the arguments inspired both by the economic insider-
outsider framework and the VoC approach neglect the role of social conflict and 
consequently do not offer a convincing explanation for growing age-based dualization 
in Europe. Second, our study supports the need to combine liberalization and 
dualization frameworks to overcome these limitations.  
 David Rueda’s argument that social democratic parties (together with trade 
unions) contributed to an increase in the gap between insiders and outsiders for 
electoral reasons because they promoted job security for insiders instead of active 
labour market policies to support outsiders, gives a prominent role to job security to 
explain labour market segmentation. As explained in Chapter 2 (section 2.3), his 
argument relies mainly in the economic insider-outsider framework, a strand of 
literature developed in (mainstream) economics, which stresses the need to reduce 
both job security and union power to overcome labour market segmentation and 
structural unemployment. This way of conceptualizing the workings of the labour 
market sees market mechanisms as a superior way of organizing societies. It is 
completely absent from these scholars’ frameworks the limits of market expansion, 
namely the vulnerability individuals face when they are completely dependent on 
market mechanisms to satisfy their social needs. Furthermore, they also neglect the 
fact that job security and the rise of union power after the Second World War has 
been indeed an attempt to reconcile markets with the basic requirements of social life. 
In our view, the main theoretical limitation of this framework is therefore its 
incapacity to understand labour market institutions (as labour market legislation or 
union organization), as a result of the individuals’ need for protection from market 
forces. Although job security has reinforced the power of the more organized and 
increased differences between individuals in the labour market, this occurred  because 
change towards liberalization has been taking place since the 1990s and consequently 
those lacking political power have seen their position deteriorated. Job security 
regulations are therefore only part of the story. Indeed, our study has shown that even 
in countries where job security has been reduced (e.g., the UK under the leadership of 
the Conservative governments), individuals also developed strategies to protect 
themselves from market forces. Therefore, it is the incapacity to understand social 
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conflict as an intrinsic feature of capitalism that impedes these scholars to understand 
growing age-based dualization in Europe.      
 Palier and Thelen’s argument is more prone to accommodate the role of 
institutions in their framework, but it tends to do so in a quite rationalist way. Their 
argument is based on a different explanation for segmentation, namely the attempt to 
save the ‘core manufacturing economy’ in Continental Europe. They argue that 
reforms during the 1980s and 1990s shrank the industrial sector and therefore allowed 
the expansion of new types of jobs in the outside, giving rise to the emergence of a 
secondary labour market. In their view, to maintain a set of institutional comparative 
advantages, coordination between labour and capital was kept within the ‘core 
manufacturing industry’, but not in the secondary sector, where the spread of atypical 
employment took place. Additionally, they claim that the welfare state has reinforced 
the problem in countries where the eligibility for benefits is historically based on past 
contributions. In our view, their argument also neglects the role of social conflict. For 
them, institutional change is driven by an attempt to maintain a set of institutional 
comparative advantages, very much in line with the way the VoC approach 
conceptualizes change (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall 2007). The pursuit of greater 
efficiency is the driver of institutional change for these scholars. They however 
neglect that some countries lack such institutional complementarities. As a 
consequence, when coordination is absent, conflict rather than cooperation tends to 
become more important to explain institutional change towards dualization. To 
conclude, there are countries where institutional change towards dualization has been 
driven by social conflict rather than by the attempt to increase efficiency. By 
neglecting this, rationalist scholars are unable to understand age-based dualization.  
 The main theoretical implication of this study is that the literatures on 
dualization and liberalization must be combined in order to explain the growing levels 
of outsiderness among young people in Europe and therefore respond to the research 
puzzle presented in the introduction. As explained in Chapter 2 (section 2.4), the 
liberalization literature, as an institutional theory of capitalism, argues that change in 
all capitalist economies is driven by a process of market expansion and by the social 
conflicts associated with it. This literature distinguishes between organization and 
coordination, and argues that liberalization is a process characterized by a shift from 
organized to disorganized capitalism (rather than a shift from a coordinated to an 
uncoordinated system). As explained earlier, in Streeck’s point of view, coordination 
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is compatible with market expansion, provided such coordination comes about 
voluntarily and from below. In line with this perspective, different patterns of 
dualization can exist, depending on whether the shift from organization to 
disorganization co-exists with the maintenance of coordination. When, as in 
Continental Europe, coordination is safeguarded in the manufacturing sector, 
dualization results from a divide between the industrial core and the expanding 
fringes (as hypothesized by Palier and Thelen (2010)). When, as in Southern Europe 
and Anglo-Saxon countries, such coordination is almost absent, the impact of the shift 
from organized to disorganized capitalism leads to a different pattern of dualization, 
one in which age plays a crucial role. As argued earlier (see Chapter 2), for example 
in Southern Europe a large part of stable jobs were created in the public sector (rather 
than in the ‘core manufacturing economy’), both due to the great expansion of the 
welfare state during the 1980s and the existence of a large number of state-owned 
companies (Ferner 1994, p. 57; Chauvel 2010, p. 25). The privatization of these firms 
and the cuts in public services have reduced the share of these jobs and consequently 
both union membership and collective bargaining coverage declined. The 
transformations in these countries contributed to greater social conflict because for 
many employees (from the core labour market), market expansion could potentially 
mean greater precariousness (the opposite occurs in Continental Europe, where 
employees from the primary labour market do not face the same risk). Furthermore, in 
these countries industrial relations are historically characterized by a higher level of 
conflict because labour and capital do not cooperate as in Continental and 
Scandinavian countries (Crouch, 1993). Taken these two factors together (the absence 
of coordination and a conflictual industrial relations system), age plays a crucial role 
because while older generations have been able to safeguard their labour market 
position due to their ability to have more political power, those entering the labour 
market after privatizations and liberalization are entitled with less political power. Job 
security amplified the power of unions and older workers but was not the driving 
force of labour market segmentation. In our view, social conflict plays a crucial role 
to explain age-based dualization. Theories neglecting this factor will necessarily 
provide an incomplete picture of this process.   
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6.3 Policy implications 
Based on the main results of our thesis, three interrelated issues are of paramount 
importance to successfully fight age-based dualization. On the one hand, public 
policies should focus primarily on fighting precariousness by expanding the primary 
sector. Below it is explained that this focus will contribute both to reduce 
unemployment and fight labour market segmentation. On the other, regarding job 
security, priority should be given to revise labour market legislation in order to find a 
balance between social groups and generations. Finally, it is also argued that the 
promotion of social dialogue and collective bargaining is crucial to fight 
segmentation. 
 Public policies should not focus exclusively on reducing youth 
unemployment. As recognized in the introduction of this thesis, youth unemployment 
is a dramatic problem in a number of European countries and should be addressed 
urgently. Notwithstanding, the rise of youth unemployment is a direct consequence of 
a deeper problem that was already in place before 2008: the rise of precariousness in 
the labour market. Indeed, youth unemployment rose very rapidly in some countries 
because young people were in a weaker labour market position due to the expansion 
of the secondary labour market. If the focus is exclusively on fighting unemployment, 
three problems will necessarily emerge. First, this will only defer the problem because 
countries where young people hold a more precarious situation will remain highly 
segmented and, therefore, young people will continue to face a higher risk of 
unemployment. Second, the problem of labour market segmentation will be neglected. 
As explained earlier in our study (see Chapter 2, section 2.3), labour market 
segmentation is not only a result of the divide between employed and unemployed 
workers (this is what mainstream scholars have called the divide between insiders and 
outsiders). There are other types of segmentation. Indeed, while a group of individuals 
have employment stability, are relatively well paid and have chances of advancement, 
there is another group that is characterized by low wages, few promotion possibilities, 
poor working conditions and a high labour turnover (this is what institutionalist 
scholars have called the divide between the primary and the secondary labour 
market). As a consequence, if the latter type of segmentation is to be tackled, it is 
crucial to expand the primary sector, rather than focusing the attention only on 
unemployment. Finally, because in the short-term labour market deregulation may 
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contribute to fight youth unemployment (through the creation of unsecure and low 
paid jobs), measures to relax job security or minimum standards may be adopted. 
Notwithstanding, this will also contribute to increase labour market segmentation. As 
explained earlier, this is problematic because age-based segmentation contributed to 
the rise of youth unemployment since 2008.  
 As for job security, in Southern Europe, it is necessary to relax labour market 
protection for those highly protected, namely those working in the public sector, and 
to restrict the use of fixed-term contracts. This modification, could contribute to 
achieve a better balance between generations. As for the Anglo-Saxon countries, to 
prevent the expansion of unstable and badly paid jobs, it is urgent to increase job 
protection. This modification could also contribute to improve the labour market 
situation of young people. Therefore, changes to labour market legislation should take 
into consideration the situation in each country.  
Finally, it is also necessary to promote social dialogue and collective 
bargaining. This could contribute to decrease labour market segmentation in two 
ways. If a larger part of employees were covered by collective agreements, 
differences between individuals (and generations) would be lower. On the other hand, 
in our view, social partners must voluntarily accept modifications to labour market 
legislation. This is crucial because without this agreement it will be difficult to apply 
these changes in the future, since employers would try to evade labour market 
legislation (e.g., by using outsourcing or similar solutions) and unions would resist 
labour market flexibilization in their strongholds (e.g., in the public sector). Although 
these suggestions will not do away with all problems, they could contribute to reduce 
labour market segmentation in the near future.  
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